Speaking of the Rafidain Bank, anyone notice that their site has been down and under construction for about a week?
الصف*ة الرئيسية
Cheers!
DayDream
Please visit our sponsors
Results 211 to 220 of 984
-
05-05-2007, 09:31 PM #211
- Join Date
- Aug 2006
- Location
- Wild Wonderful West Virginia
- Posts
- 992
- Feedback Score
- 0
- Thanks
- 236
- Thanked 1,040 Times in 98 Posts
1.61 USD Yazzman Rate
-
05-05-2007, 09:37 PM #212
-
05-05-2007, 09:38 PM #213
- Join Date
- Nov 2006
- Location
- KY
- Posts
- 121
- Feedback Score
- 0
- Thanks
- 47
- Thanked 435 Times in 21 Posts
A Number Of Players Discussed The HCL on Tuesday Before Parliament
اربيل/المدىIrbil / long
تستمر فعاليات اسبوع المدى الثقافي الخامس في اربيل، حيث سيتم متابعة مناقشة المحور الثقافي والادبي اليوم الاربعاء فضلاً عن بحث آليات العمل المصرفي في العراق والاستثمار والسياحة في كردستان وعرض فلم حياة ساكنة للمخرج قتيبة الجنابي.Activities will continue a week long cultural V in Arbil, where they will be discussed further cultural and literary hub today, Wednesday, as well as discuss mechanisms banking work in Iraq, investment and tourism in Kurdistan and presented no static life of the director Koutaiba Al-Janabi.
وتتضمن فعاليات اليوم عرض مسرحية الجحيم اخراج وتمثيل فاروق صبري عبد الله وامسية فنية تحييها فرقة الخشابة البصرية وقارئ المقام العراقي حامد السعدي وفرقته وشهد امس الثلاثاء عددا ًمن الفعاليات والطاولات المستديرة، فعلى طاولة المدى المستديرة نوقش قانون النفط والغاز المطروح على مجلس النواب، وشارك في طرح البحوث كل من الدكتور عبد الجبار الحلفي (المستشار العلمي لمركز دراسات الخليج العربي في جامعة البصرة) والدكتور نبيل جعفر عبد الرضا (أستاذ في كلية الإدارة والاقتصاد في جامعة البصرة) والمهندس الدكتور كفاح محمد مهدي الجواهري (خبير في الشؤون النفطية).The events today theatrical presentation hell and get representation Farouk Sabri Abdullah Evening technical revive Task Grain and optical reader primarily Iraqi Hamed Al-Saadi and his band saw yesterday, Tuesday, a number of players and tables, at the table long tables discussed oil and gas law before the House of Representatives, and participated in a research each Dr. Abdul Jabbar Halve (Scientific Adviser to the Center for Arab Gulf Studies at Basra University) and Dr. Nabil Jaafar Abdel consent (professor in the Faculty of Administration and Economy at the University of Basra) and Engineer Dr Muhammad Mahdi struggle Jeweler (expert in the affairs of oil).وتم تقديم البحوث التي ناقشت (قانون النفط والغاز العراقي الجديد)، و(قراءة نقدية في مسودة قانون النفط الجديد)، و(قانون النفط والغاز من المستفيد من الاستعجال في تشريعه).A research discussed (the oil and gas new Iraqi), (Critical Reading of the new draft bill oil), (oil and gas law who is the beneficiary of urgency in the legislation).
The values Abduljabbar Halve the law, saying : "The preamble to a successful law stipulates that oil and gas is the property of the people, and the House will take priority in the debate and ratify laws and continued : But we believe that there are negative aspects need to be drastically amended to ensure the people's ownership of the wealth and strategic outlook, so that foreign companies the upper hand in the disposition of these wealth and draining. "
من جانبه وصف الدكتور نبيل جعفر مسودة قانون النفط والغاز العراقي الجديد بأنها متناقضة تماما مع المادة (29) من الفصل السابع لقانون الاستثمار الاجنبي الذي صادق عليه مجلس النواب في 10/10/2006 ، والتي نصت على استثناء الاستثمار الأجنبي في مجال استخراج وإنتاج النفط والغاز". وتابع مشخصاً العيوب التي يحويها القانون: "أن مسودة القانون لم تكتب بلغة اقتصادية رصينة اذ لم يميز المشرع بين الواردات والايرادات، الاولى تعني الاستيرادات والثانية تعني العوائد (عوائد الصادرات النفطية في القانون) وبالتالي لا يمكن لاحداهما ان تكون بديلة عن الاخرى، وهذا يشير الى عدم وجود أي اقتصادي ضمن فريق العمل المكلف بتشريع هذا القانون".For his part, Dr. Nabil Jaafar draft bill oil and gas as a new Iraqi completely contradict the Article (29) of Chapter VII of the foreign investment law, which was approved by the House of Representatives on 10 / 10 / 2006, which stipulates exception of foreign investment in the extraction and production of oil and gas. " He continued Mckhasa defects contained Act : "The draft law did not write the language of economic wholesome as the legislature did not distinguish between imports and income, I mean imports and the second means the proceeds (revenues of oil exports in the law) and therefore one can be a substitute for the other, and this refers to the absence of any economic group within Labor charged that the legislation law."
من جانب آخر وضمن المحور الفني لفعاليات أسبوع المدى الثقافي، ناقش عدد من المسرحيين والتشكيليين ونقاد السينما الواقع الفني في العراق امس الثلاثاء تحت عنوان (مقومات استنهاض الحركة المسرحية والسينمائية في ظل "التابوات"والتحريم) وتم تقسيم الجلسة إلى ثلاثة محاور (التشكيلي و المسرح والسينما ) وطرحت فيها اوراق العمل متضمنة البحوث والمشاكل والمعالجات.On the other hand, within the hub of artistic activities, a week long cultural, discussed a number of theatrical and plastic film critics and artistic reality in Iraq yesterday, Tuesday, under the title (constituents awaken movement and movie theater in the shadow "Altaboat" interdiction) meeting was divided into three axes (Studio and theater and cinema), and raised the working papers included research The problems and treatments.
كما تم بحث موضوع الفكر والاعلام على طاولات المدى الثقافية، وكان من ضمنها، الضمانات الدستورية والمادية لصيانة حرية الصحافة والاعلام والمعايير والضوابط القانونية لأشغال القضاء العراقي في ضوء التجارب الديمقراطية، ومحور تركز حول تنظيم العمل الصحفي في كردستان العراق في ضوء التشريعات الدولية.It also discussed the matter of thought and media on the long tables cultural, and including, constitutional guarantees and material for the maintenance of freedom of press and information, standards and legal controls to divert Iraqi judiciary in the light of experience of democracy, the center focuses on the organization of journalistic work in Iraqi Kurdistan in the light of international legislation.
Translated version of http://www.almadapaper.com/
Yesterday was history,
Tomorrow is a mystery,
Today is a gift,
That is why its called the present!!!!!
-
05-05-2007, 09:44 PM #214
- Join Date
- Sep 2006
- Posts
- 1,631
- Feedback Score
- 0
- Thanks
- 415
- Thanked 2,241 Times in 226 Posts
-
05-05-2007, 09:48 PM #215
-
05-05-2007, 09:48 PM #216
- Join Date
- Sep 2006
- Location
- TOP OF THE WORLD!
- Posts
- 6,127
- Feedback Score
- 0
- Thanks
- 2,187
- Thanked 11,082 Times in 416 Posts
Warnings of big inflation because of the continuing rise in fuel prices
05 May 2007
Warnings emerged in Iraq of the economic consequences because of the continued rise in fuel prices made by the government of Nuri al-Maliki, similar to the steps taken by the previous Al-Jaafari government which doubled fuel prices more than 5 times by the end of 2005.
The economic expert in the affairs of planning and economic development, Bataa Al-Kubeisi, said that the Iraqi government continuation in raising fuel prices will lead to a rise in the current inflation rates in Iraqi economy because of the direct impact of the drastic increase in prices on the wages of transportation and therefore the result would be an increase in food prices thus raising the prices of materials in all areas.
At a time when Al-Maliki government brought the price per liter of gasoline to 400 dinars a month ago after raising its price from 250 to 350 dinars under their endeavors to bring it to 750 dinars by the end of this year, the Iraqi Ministry of Planning indicated that the inflation rate in Iraqi economy exceeded 70%.
In case the Iraqi government achieved its aim and brought the price per liter of gasoline to 750 dinars by the end of this year after it was only 20 dinars two years ago (before Al-Jaafari government increased its price from 20 to 250 all at once, promising to grant financial returns to the poor but have not been paid yet) the price of petrol in Iraq will come much closer to the one in the United States and EuropeJULY STILL AINT NO LIE!!!
franny, were almost there!!
-
05-05-2007, 09:50 PM #217
- Join Date
- Sep 2006
- Location
- TOP OF THE WORLD!
- Posts
- 6,127
- Feedback Score
- 0
- Thanks
- 2,187
- Thanked 11,082 Times in 416 Posts
Maliki, the Iraqi delegation is due to Iraq from Sharm El-Sheikh
(Voice of Iraq) - 05-05-2007
Adel luxurious
Baghdad - (Voices of Iraq)
He said media source in the Cabinet that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and his accompanying delegation returned to Baghdad, today, Saturday, noon, in the wake of their participation made with the International Covenant and the neighboring countries of Iraq, who concluded their work in the Egyptian city of Sharm el-Sheikh yesterday.
The source added News Agency (Voices of Iraq) Independent today, "accompanied Maliki in his participation in numerous conferences of ministers and members of parliament .. As well as the Iraqi mission briefing.
The conference final statement, which stipulates that participants agreed to "reaffirm the sovereignty and territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq and its national unity and Arab and Islamic identity and the inviolability of the Iraqi border internationally recognized commitment to the principle of non-interference in Iraq's internal affairs."
م عRBJULY STILL AINT NO LIE!!!
franny, were almost there!!
-
05-05-2007, 09:53 PM #218
- Join Date
- Nov 2006
- Location
- KY
- Posts
- 121
- Feedback Score
- 0
- Thanks
- 47
- Thanked 435 Times in 21 Posts
Read all the red and put it all together!!!!
[/html]Tuesday 01 May 2007
Flights to transfer currency from the Rafidain Bank to a number of banks
Luna / Baghdad / The Iraqi company for banking services several trips to the transfer of currency to the Rafidain bank branches all over in Baghdad during the third week of April.
The source added that the branches are (Rustumiyyah, Haifa, Liberals, the White Palace, paradise, Khansa, Jerusalem, Al-Mansour, Diyala bridge, in essence, Karradat Maryam, the eastern section, Azwaih, projectors, Hotel Babylon, oil compound, Waziriyah, New Dawn), has moved the company private currency Rashid Bank and its branches, some branches of private banks, adding that the company has several flights outside Baghdad governorate to the Wasit governorate, including three special Rafidain Bank branches in the (Suwayrah, Wasit, the project) and another trip to the Rasheed Bank branch in (Nu'maniyah).Yesterday was history,
Tomorrow is a mystery,
Today is a gift,
That is why its called the present!!!!!
-
05-05-2007, 10:00 PM #219
- Join Date
- Dec 2005
- Posts
- 5,906
- Feedback Score
- 0
- Thanks
- 3,000
- Thanked 5,808 Times in 483 Posts
-
06-05-2007, 03:15 AM #220
- Join Date
- Mar 2007
- Posts
- 514
- Feedback Score
- 0
- Thanks
- 0
- Thanked 76 Times in 5 Posts
Bing West provides his excellent report on the stabilization of Iraq
This SWJ update is an overview of my trip to Iraq, where I had last visited in February of 2007. The April visit - about my 13th time since 2003 - was my typical month-long trip, focused on the company-level. I accompanied twelve Iraqi and American units in Anbar (Habbineah, Haditha, Ramadi, Saqwaniyah, the Zidon, etc.) and Baghdad (Rusafa, Sadr City, Azamiyiah, Khalidiah, Gaziliah).
While I spoke with senior officers -- General Petraeus, LtGen Odierno and MajGen Gaskin run an open organization that goes out of its way to let a journalist accompany any unit -- they were happy to have me go out and take a look for myself. Appended is a list of those who so generously shared their views.
Below are some observations, with my conclusions under point #18. In a nutshell, for the US to achieve the goal of relative stability in Iraq, by the end of 2007 three battlefield conditions must be met. First, Iraq's predominantly Shiite army must demonstrate a strategy and a momentum against a resumption of Shiite ethnic cleansing in and around Baghdad.
Second, in Anbar the Iraqi army and the predominantly Sunni police must sustain the momentum for eradicating al Qaeda in Iraq. Third, in the rest of the Sunni Triangle, the Iraqi Army must prevent al Qaeda from developing sanctuaries.
Background. Iraq's 26 million traumatized inhabitants have few leaders, are rent by religious and ethnic antagonisms, and are slaughtered and terrified by the Grendel-like monster called al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The reasonable timeline for counterinsurgency and nation-building under such conditions is ten to twenty years.
The administration and the Pentagon attempted to complete "full-spectrum counterinsurgency" - i.e., clear, hold and rebuild the key cities - in 2005, transition to Iraqi forces in 2006, and begin leaving in 2007. If accomplished, that would have been the fastest turnaround in history.
In 2006, US troops did indeed fall back into Forward Operating Bases in order to reduce the visibility of Americans. Soldiers on patrol drove to and from the capital in armored humvees, a tactic one colonel said was equivalent "to observing the shoreline through the periscope of a submarine".
The murderous AQI bombing campaign against Shiites, though, provoked ethnic cleansing in and around Baghdad by the Jesh al Mahdi (JAM) militia. Baghdad was slowly falling apart as the violence increased and the American soldiers stood on the sidelines.
In response, President Bush, supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, surged five brigades into and around Baghdad, and a new commander, General David Petraeus, implemented a Surge Strategy based on classic counterinsurgency principles. The key was deploying American companies throughout the city in concert with Iraqi police and soldiers. It was back to "clear and hold" again.
The surge is off to a good start. It is, however, based on borrowed forces. The US troops were "borrowed" by a (final?) withdrawal upon the good will of the American electorate, and the Iraqi troops were borrowed from the Kurds and from Anbar, both of which will reclaim them. Thus, at the end of the surge, Baghdad has to maintain stability with fewer American and Iraqi forces.
In Anbar, the unknown is whether the government in Baghdad, especially the Ministry of Interior, will provide the resources to reinforce the unexpected success. In Baghdad, the unknown is whether Jesh al Mahdi (JAM) leaders will resume attacks. On both battle fronts, American rifle companies are the steel rods in concrete that is just beginning to harden.
For the Americans to move out, competent non-sectarian Iraqi security leaders must replace them. The police in Baghdad use most of their manpower at checkpoints and lack the training to respond to persistent attacks. They rarely patrol on foot, are mistrusted with good reason by the Sunnis and viewed skeptically by many of the Shiites.
It is not clear if the Iraqi security forces will be substantially improved in quality within the next year. Time, though, does alter conditions. A habit takes about twelve weeks to develop. Better military habits can be transferred over time from the American to the Iraqi units, and the Ministry of Defense is the least sectarian agency and preaches that its soldiers are Iraqis, not Sunni or Shiite.
The police cannot be entirely discounted, but the army is the more credible defense against a resurgent JAM offensive. The local effectiveness of the army is critically dependent upon the battalion commander and one or two aggressive company commanders.
The Americans on-scene will be able to judge that. They know who the bad apples are that must be replaced. At least one three-star Iraqi general, two division commanders and several battalion commanders have been relieved due to pressure, including giving the details to the press.
2008: How can success be reinforced while numbers decrease? By enhancing the role of the adviser. In Baghdad, The Surge has generated momentum and optimism. Excepting monstrous car bombings, it is likely violence will decrease. What carries beyond The Surge into 2008 is less clear.
In Baghdad, the police, primarily manning checkpoints, will remain distinctly secondary to the Iraqi Army as a stabilizing force. Among Iraqi and US army units, there is wide variation in the number and jointness of the patrols that are the basic tool for securing the population. One advisory team daily leaves the wire, motivating its Iraqi battalion to conduct ten patrols a day. Another team focuses upon staff improvements, and its battalion conducts four patrols a day. One US unit patrols on foot with the Iraqis; another rides in humvees without Iraqis, etc.
The Iraqi army at the battalion level - and many police units - is advancing at an acceptable pace; it is the performance at the national level that is unacceptable. The Shiites govern defensively and reactively, as if they expected to be stripped of their huge majority. Yes, the ministries lack competence due to the dismissal of the Baathists and the flight of the educated class from Iraq.
Lack of capacity, however, can be compensated by the activism of advisers and American logistic skills. Currently, for instance, many advisers pick up and supervise the payrolls of Iraqi battalions and police, fuel is routinely provided when it technically shouldn't be, etc.
As distinct from a lack of capacity, however, there is no means of compensating for determined sectarianism or corrosive obduracy. Iraqi Army officers who do not hesitate to arrest Shiite militia are too frequently relieved of command and shifted to other duties.
It is no secret which ministries and personalities have failed and obstructed too often to be tolerated. Some senior people have to be removed from power. This is the key challenge facing the State Department, requiring remarkable skill, cunning and, above all, a sense of urgency.
Countering an insurgency without the ability to promote the competent and fire the disloyal and the disastrous is an uphill battle.
Based on the talent, candor and experience of our military leaders and strategic staff now assembled, flaws in that strategy should not be a major concern.
And while national-level legislation such as the hydrocarbon law is necessary to provide assurances of national unity and acceptable proportionality of resources, it is not clear legislation will motivate many insurgents and militia to desist.
Imprison the irreconcilables. At the same time, the irreconcilable Sunni insurgents and Shiite militia must be killed or captured. There's a big problem here. The number of insurgents killed is quite low. Iraq, especially Baghdad, is not a shooting war; it's a police war, and police keep order by arrests, not by shootings. But since the scandal of Abu Ghraib, the American military has sought to get out of the arrest business and turn all prisoners over to an Iraqi judicial system that does not exist.
8. Concrete barriers are imperative. The suicide bomber is a long-term terror. Americans tolerate millions of hours of inconvenience daily at airport security checkpoints. Barriers to reduce the bloodshed from murderous bombers should have been erected years ago in Baghdad. That such protection has been limned as an offense to civil rights reflects poorly on the instincts of too many in the press.
Anbar has improved due to years of persistent effort in fighting, an increase in forces and the swing of the tribes. A year ago, the Sunnis in Anbar were in denial, fearing al Qaeda in Iraq, yet hoping to regain the power they had enjoyed under Saddam. For years, I watched American regimental commanders warn the sheiks and local councils that one day the Americans would be gone and al Qaeda would rule, unless they stood up. Now some of the tribes are doing so, and Sunni recruits for the police are standing in line.
Neuter the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry of Interior, with adequate money, will not release the funds to hire more police in Anbar and to reinforce success on the ground. Senior Iraqi leaders are aware of the situation, yet tolerate the inaction. The MoIs prejudice against Sunni Anbar hurts the war effort.
MoI is so dysfunctional that many officers told me it should be neutered as an organization, becoming the paymaster for the provincial governors who would raise and direct the police outside Baghdad, while inside the capital the police would gradually be placed under military supervision.
Greatly increase the Iraqi forces in Anbar. Terror coexists with progress in Anbar. For instance, in Habbineah, I watched a father refused treatment for his son, saying he would be killed if he accepted medical help from the Americans or the Iraqi soldiers. In Haditha, residents who are now secure insisted to me that the irahibin (al Qaeda in Iraq) would return to rout the police, if the Marines left. In Fallujah, city leaders are routinely assassinated and Iraqi forces have stopped patrolling the Pizza Slice/Blackwater Bridge in the trouble-plagued Jolan western end of the city. What is called the Murder and Intimidation (M&I) strategy of AQI is flourishing.
One reason is that Iraqi forces are instinctive raiders who prefer defensive strong points from which they sally forth in large numbers, especially when they have a fixed target. Patrolling in small numbers to hold those neighborhoods where they have no relatives - in other words, securing the population - does not come naturally.
They cannot fight the war the way we do. Yet the more we patrol together, the more they become accustomed to our style, our constraints and our supporting logistics. The solution is not to believe that the ISF will, on their own, patrol like Americans if given another year. Instead, add recruits to the ISF and associates like the tribal forces and let them do what comes naturally: prevail by hugely greater numbers at the point of attack.
In Anbar, for instance, today there are about 18,000 Iraqi and 33,000 Coalition forces. Given the vast distances and an insurgency that numbers over 10,000, several officers suggested a goal of 40,000 Iraqi soldiers and police by the end of 2008. The Marines have so developed their linkages with the tribes that such numbers are credible. Lacking such numbers, these officers implied a need for some highly mobile US battalions launching company-sized operations for years to come.
Iran's influence is malign. Probably in reaction to accepting in 2002 intelligence assessments about Iraq that proved false, the press has bent over backward not to link the central government of Iran with explosive devices, money transfers and Iranian agents active inside Iraq. I was surprised how frequently both Iraqi officials and American officers told me that Iran was in essence waging a proxy war against the US. Whatever the extent of its actual influence over and through the Shiite militias, Iran is widely perceived as a malign influence and the US has found no strategy to compel Iran to desist.
Beware the Thieu syndrome. Congressional expressions that the war is lost are unhelpful, and not just because they encourage the enemy. From 1973 on, the Thieu government lost faith in American support and clammed up. Without American knowledge, Thieu ordered a pullback from the central highlands. This precipitated panic and disaster.
It seems obvious that Mr. Maliki's confidants are bruiting scenarios that consolidate Shiite power and territory, unchallenged by an American rebuttal that explicates the folly of foolish thinking. (Indeed, an explicit narrative in Arabic detailing how and why blood would continue to be shed ought to be circulated widely throughout the Assembly.) By the end of 2007, the United Nations must pass another Security Council resolution approving the Coalition's actions in Iraq. This requires prior negotiations that could be touchy if, like Thieu, Mr. Maliki privately believes he must gain the authority to rearrange sectors to hedge against American withdrawal.
There may, for instance, be a temptation to retrench in Anbar. The danger lies in unintended consequences that ignite a cascade of emotions such as occurred in the first week of April, 2004, when catastrophe was narrowly avoided. The Americans didn't see it coming with Thieu. It would be prudent to examine now Thieu-type precipitate actions by the GoI.
Dedication. I've read about our army being "broken", and certainly much more time at home for the units is deserved. I'm not Pollyannaish; I heard the complaints about the extension, etc. But I was out with enough different units to attest to the energy and mission focus of our soldiers and marines. These are good guys and they understand the strategy Petraeus has laid out. The core of our strength lies in our battalions and at that level it has positively infected the performance of the Iraqi battalions and the local police.
AQI are mean bastards, but they can be broken. That means they have to be put away permanently when caught, or put in the earth.
Standing back. From this trip, five variables struck me.1. The sense of momentum that the surge strategy and leadership have infused into the effort.2. The biggest challenge is at the top level of the Iraqi government, to include the National Assembly. It is very uncertain whether the higher ranks of the Iraqis can rise above the concept that seniority means privilege and can compromise with the Sunnis, when past oppression has been so real and pervasive. If the top persists in passive or active anti-Sunni manifestations, the effort is doomed.3. The persistence of the murder and intimidation campaign. An increase in the number and the certainty of imprisonments is needed. More broadly, given that in Fallujah and elsewhere the numbers of Iraqi forces have not been enough in themselves, a police-based strategy is needed for rooting out the assassins. The root of the dilemma is the American insistence upon strict rules of law that are foreign to the Iraqi culture and have not been supplemented by American detective methods as a substitute for the old Iraqi way of doing business.4. The vast distances versus the modest mobility and sustainability of Iraqi forces favor the mobile insurgent. An identification system - not episodic gestures - is imperative. That way, the mobility and anonymity of the insurgents are limited. Identification, though, also means trust in the ministries of government - a problematic assumption.5. AQI must be beaten psychologically. Both JAM and AQI prey on the weak. They don't fight each other or the Iraqi army. The Iraqis in Special Forces units scorn the AQI and literally chase them down during night raids. The jundi don't express any particular fear of them. Yet AQI has a mystique of ferocity among the people, too many of whom believe AQI zealotry will overwhelm the Iraqi security forces.The Iraqi Army must break that mystique by picking fights, by venturing into areas like the Zidon, by publicly mocking and humiliating the AQI and by smashing it.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...2-29-april-20/
-
Sponsored Links
Thread Information
Users Browsing this Thread
There are currently 8 users browsing this thread. (0 members and 8 guests)
24 Hour Gold
Advertising
- Over 20.000 UNIQUE Daily!
- Get Maximum Exposure For Your Site!
- Get QUALITY Converting Traffic!
- Advertise Here Today!
Out Of Billions Of Website's Online.
Members Are Online From.
- Get Maximum Exposure For Your Site!
- Get QUALITY Converting Traffic!
- Advertise Here Today!
Out Of Billions Of Website's Online.
Members Are Online From.