Thread: Iraq/Dinar News until 5PM CST May 10,2007

Al-Dulaimi : may withdraw from the government, but we remain in

(صوت العراق) - 07-05-2007

(Voice of Iraq) - 07-05-2007

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Al-Dulaimi : may withdraw from the government, but we remain in the political process

He said that the security plan «sword at the necks of the year»

»

BAGHDAD : Numan Alheims London : «Middle East»
Description Adnan Al-Dulaimi, the leader of the Iraqi Accord Front (Sunni) demands made by Members of Parliament to lift his immunity as «political lie fabricated want them stranded on the scene and silencing of the guns join Sunnis».

».

Al-Dulaimi said that Sunni Front would not withdraw from the political process, but may «reconsider its participation in the Iraqi government». He also drew accusations to the security plan carried out by American and Iraqi forces in the capital, and said they wanted to «Sunnis». Al-Dulaimi also welcomed the results from both Sharm el-Sheikh.
Al-Dulaimi said in the first statement after he raised the issue of lifting of his parliamentary immunity in a press conference held yesterday in Baghdad, to demand the lifting of his immunity was merely a «political stand behind people factional». I will Echeveni any action whatsoever, nor will those voices shook me, I dedicated myself to defend the Sunnis, and face these accusations fabricated accusations of those who claim to the real and they kill and displacement». The accusations against Al-Dulaimi Hazem Al-Araji, Assistant Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and preacher Kazimiya shrine, saying that Al-Araji «calls from the podium to murder Baathists and Wahabi sect, which means that Sunnis, Vine elimination of these instigators of the murder?».

The Legal Committee in the Iraqi Parliament had announced last month that it had received a note from the Supreme Judicial Council that there are complaints filed against Iraqi MP accuses Al-Dulaimi crimes sectarian killing and displacement. The legal memorandum to lift the parliamentary immunity of Al Dulaimi to take legal action against him. Al-Dulaimi said that «a compromise will not withdraw from the political process (parliament) never ..

.

We were in the process of conviction for a unified Iraq is free from sectarian control ».

He added «our failure to withdraw from the political process does not mean that our withdrawal from the government .. List all the possibilities and all the options open to us ».

He described Al-Dulaimi participation in the political process that they had to «defend our people and our payment and Msajdena and injustice and tyranny that they are subjected to, not to obtain positions and political gains». Our goal has been and is still weak because of our marginalization and exclusion, and the Minister did not have powers that enable them to act in the service of their families and their country, which until now had been appointed from the Sunnis as general manager or an agent of a minister or ambassador ever». And on the security plan, said Al-Dulaimi «The plan sword of Damocles on the necks of the Sunnis, arrests, raids and killings, and displacement are still continuing against them by the security forces and militias and death squads».

Al-Dulaimi called on the government and not to work to turn Iraq into a «one country community», and seeks to involve everyone in government, and control officers who carry out the security plan and to punish and accounting officers who are «part of the militias and death squads, and those who kill, and attack LEFT neighborhoods and mosques name of the law».

The list of consensus had criticized in a statement last week strongly the Iraqi government, accusing it of double standards led to the arrival of the country to «national disaster by all means».

On the other hand, Al-Dulaimi said that the Accord Front welcomes the outcome of the Sharm el-Sheikh conference in Egypt.

He said that the decisions of both the Sharm el-Sheikh demanded the Iraqi government to work for «a true balance in governmental institutions». And not marginalize any party in the political process. He added : «We are delighted these decisions and support them», as quoted by Reuters.

His wondering «But it is on the government, not us .. Let's wait and see whether the government will be bound by the decisions ». Al-Dulaimi described these decisions as may help in the case of application «to contribute effectively to the restoration of security and stability in Iraq».

The decisions of both the Sharm el-Sheikh on the third and fourth of this month in Egypt had invited the Iraqi government to work to create a balance in the political process and to eliminate armed rallies and militias.

The misfortune compatibility list is the largest bloc of Arab Sunnis in the parliament, and have existing forty-four seats of the total seats in the parliament of 275 seats. For a list of six portfolios in the government chaired by Nouri Al-Maliki, who belongs to the Shiite coalition.

Translated version of http://www.sotaliraq.com/

Saad al-Ubaydi : reconciliation starts at the top hierarchy of power

(صوت العراق) - 07-05-2007

(Voice of Iraq) - 07-05-2007

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Saad Obeidi told the nation : Reconciliation begins at the top of the current hierarchy of power

A national reconciliation conference during the month of June.
Baghdad Mazen's : Informed Iraqi sources said the convening of a conference of national reconciliation will discuss the outcomes of tribal chieftains and political forces and the dissolved Iraqi army officers, to be held in June next.
For his part, Sheikh Saad Al-Obaidi, a member of the secretariat of the Supreme National Reconciliation Conference, to create conditions reconciliation between top funniest essential participation of the government of national unity, told »homeland« required first to be reconciliation between the government parliamentary parties participating in the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, which will be reflected directly on the street Iraqi.
Al l »homeland« that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki request of the Minister of State for National Dialogue Akram Al Hakim accelerate steps this conference probably in the first days of June this year, to set an agenda, simulates recommendations of the Sharm el-Sheikh and addresses three specific points : the first issue of abolishing the Baath Party, the second develop and accelerate the formation of the armed forces with the participation of all spectrums of people, and the completion of the recommendations of the National Reconciliation Conference for constitutional amendments.

Disbanding

The sources close to the Iraqi Prime Minister to the efforts by al-Maliki personally offices across advisers to find a political solution balancing security militias, Shiite and Sunni, and through mechanisms of action supervised by the Political Council for National Security, which is headed by Jalal Talabani, the president of the republic, which includes the Presidential Council and the presidency of the Iraqi parliament and heads of parliamentary blocs, and the presidency of the Ministers.
In the initial ideas for this budget, said sources told »homeland«, that Maliki is now in the timetable is not granted a lot of time unraveling the narrow partisan clashes on the possession of a weapon and refused to each party threw his only requirements harsh on the other party.
The sources said that the scenes meetings in Sharm el-Sheikh failed to pave a road to national reconciliation thorns because of the requirement Secretary General Amr Moussa of the Arab League held its administration reconciliation conference, which it described as Shiite and Kurdish parties that the return to square one lead to the rejection of all outcomes of the political process, at a time when Maliki wants the preparatory committee meetings for reconciliation conferences to find the way to set up the Iraqi new Iraqi era, where everyone relinquishes all for the new Iraq, which everyone accepted.
Commenting on Sheikh Obeidi saying »any meetings or conferences under the tent of national reconciliation initiative will be meaningful not achieve the desired success, but after resolving differences and Shenanigans between political forces in the current hierarchy of power, and working to change the basic structural joints of the state, notably agents ministries and directors-general, and dealing spirit of experience and integrity with functional positions away from the method of quotas, and the most important positions in security, such as the Iraqi army chief of staff, and directors of intelligence agencies.

Cabinet reshuffle

Obeidi believes that the Prime Minister deal positively in the days ahead with the amendment ministerial reshuffle, which it believes these sources, Maliki will work mechanisms government through a cabinet reshuffle expected first, which would be the model for any cabinet reshuffle later, the government away from the approach of sectarian and nationalist and partisan, and the second dealing with all the proposals put forward by political parties and parliamentary blocs, including the Virtue Party bloc and the Iraqi Accord, commensurate with the possibility of transferring some of these proposals to the government's agenda, specifically in the context of the initiative of national reconciliation, to create better conditions can succeed with conference preparations for a conference next June.
Al »homeland« that several joint committees, will intensify contacts with Iraqi figures were still outside the country, including groups or armed Islamic state in Syria, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan.
The most prominent of these sources suggest Andhuah under the initiative of national reconciliation during the next meeting of the Movement »Human« in Jordan, the group Younis Ahmed, the new leadership Baathist regime in Syria, and Iraqi figures of the national leadership Republic, as well as the expansion of the awakening of Iraq to include all political figures who accept armed groups represent them during this Conference.
Kuwaiti homeland

Translated version of http://www.sotaliraq.com/

Ban Ki-moon talks between Damascus and Washington are encouraging

(صوت العراق) - 07-05-2007

(Voice of Iraq) - 07-05-2007

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Talks between Damascus and Washington are encouraging ...

...

We hope that Tehran include ... Ban Ki-moon told «life» : Lebanese unanimity on the court necessary for Iran to use its influence in the region to play a role in serving stability
New York-Raghida Dergham life-07 / 05 / 07 / /

The Secretary General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon on the need to focus on the Lebanese consensus to approve the International Tribunal for the killers of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, but he said he was «deep concern» to the faltering efforts of rapprochement between Lebanese rivals. The Ki-moon said during an interview with the «life», which accompanied him aboard a Saudi Enroute from Sharm El-Sheikh to New York following his participation in the international conference on Iraq and chaired the «International Covenant» with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, that Iran should be employing its influence in Lebanon and Iraq to play a constructive role achieve peace and stability.

A corresponding aside do not know many of the personality of the Secretary-General Korean conservative, particularly with his insistence on refusing to answer many questions, or take a firm position. In the following text :

Held in Sharm el-Sheikh several meetings with the foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the Security Council and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs Prince Saud Al-Faisal and German Frank Walter Steinmeyer, Secretary General of the Arab League Amr Moussa. With those discussed in the Lebanese?

Discussed topic in Lebanon with American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her counterparts Saudi, German and others. The theme was one of the most prominent Lebanese Topics dealt with in my meetings, although the issue of Darfur was the main issue that had been discussed with everyone.

Why after informed Kailek for Legal Affairs Nicolas Michel Security Council that his efforts to help the Lebanese constitutional process to conclude a treaty establishing the court of an international nature and reached an impasse. Are spoke with the ministers issued a resolution on the establishment of the court of the Security Council under Chapter VII?

Try not specifically in Chapter VII. Discussed with the American Secretary of State and a number of other foreign ministers in it is still necessary for the Lebanese people to focus on promoting national consensus. My pledged to assist in that.

But Michel arrived at the conclusion that it made every effort and show him that there is no way that the way deadlock.

I also am deeply concerned by this. But the way we want it more than anyone else to resolve this issue is to encourage the Lebanese people to reach unanimity.

How much time will this way, Michel noted that the outcome of his visit to the Security Council in the report assumes that your report?

I did not submit my post. This report Mr. Nicolas Michel. It may be incumbent upon me to report to the Security Council.

Do you mean report says that there is need for more time before the Security Council move, or that it is up to the Council after Michel arrived at its conclusions?

Look at the matter with the leaders of the region once again, with Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, and perhaps also with Syrian President Bashar Assad on the telephone, with members of the Security Council.

What happens in the mind in terms of time frame?

I know that a number of States in the Security Council do not think (grace settlement efforts) a few months. But there is no specific time frame at this juncture. However, I also know that the level of patience fall, with many to reach the conclusion that the situation reached Wall impasse.

It seems that the patience of the United States and France run out completely, as they, as it seems, began to move towards adopting a resolution under Chapter VII recognizes the establishment of the Court. Are you against that? Is opposed?

I am not in a position to say anything about what he would do in the Security Council this issue. Of course, I will continue my consultations with members of the Council, and Sari how the situation will evolve. I know the movements of members involved in the Security Council.

Believes that this move was premature?

Will not be given prescriptions for such a situation.

When the subject of Lebanon with the American Secretary of State, on May Attafqatma something on the subsequent steps that accompany impatience?

Have explained what I am going to do in the near future to help the Lebanese people to reach national reconciliation. How I intend continuing work in this matter.

How? What will you do?

I will convene meetings and conducted phone.
Mean that you intend to return to Lebanon?

No decision was taken yet. But, if necessary, and whether the timing appropriate, I am prepared to pay another visit to Lebanon.

Met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Do you put certain ideas concerning Lebanon?

No-Look in this issue during our meeting with him, but I examined him on the phone last Saturday (April 28 last).

What is the position of Mphomk Federation?

Opinion, as I recall, OK for my opinion at this juncture.

Do I felt that the Russians will use the veto on the resolution under Chapter VII?

I told him that I will continue my efforts in diplomacy with the leaders of the region.

Will asked him to assist in the control of the Lebanese-Syrian border to prevent arms smuggling?

I explained to him what happened during my meeting with President Assad, which expressed appreciation for the roles of the diplomat.

What happened to the promises made by President Assad you? Is implemented?

I talked with Syrian Foreign Minister (Walid Mualem) in Sharm el-Sheikh, the promise of the revitalization of the border discussed with President Assad. He said they would take appropriate action. And I made the commitment to implement that promise.

Talked about Lebanon also with the Foreign Minister of Iran Manouchehr Muttaqi, as I mentioned before. Is requested assistance in the implementation of the decision to disarm the militias in Lebanon and rearm?

Asked him to play his constructive role in Lebanon, Iran has influence in Iraq and in Lebanon. We are eager to play a constructive role in the Iranian government to assist in ensuring peace and security in the region.

What did he say to you? Has he made a commitment to stop D «Hezbollah» weapons?

Not talking about «Hezbollah» specifically, but said that Iran will try to play a constructive role.

What about Kauk with the Saudi Foreign Minister, how Ttarkatma to the subject of Lebanon?

Talked about topic go the same Haddock him.

I said that the Arab peace initiative which was renewed by the Arab summit Riyadh are «good starting point for negotiations» Arab-Israeli. What will you do, in your capacity as Secretary General of the United Nations, to push Israel to agree to the Arab initiative, the starting point for negotiations?

When I visited Israel, told Israeli leaders that they must examine the Arab initiative seriously. I know that there are certain points that contradicts Israel, but there are other points Israel can live with it and build on it. And I hope that we will not be open Arab initiative formula : Grasp it or not taken. I hope that it is not.

Is it useful to put the Arab initiative in the Security Council for adopting a resolution in the matter?

I think that it would be best, at this juncture, to leave matters to Arabs and Israelis. As you know, he met Arab foreign ministers in Cairo a few weeks ago and assigned to Jordan and Egypt resume the role of the contact point to discuss these matters. Therefore, it is better to leave things to the Arabs and Israelis to enter into a dialogue, if there is a need for the role of facilitator, the other countries such as the United States, and perhaps also of the United Nations, play that role.

Is the United Nations able to play this role, or they can only play a role complementary to the American role?

There is no formal request to play the role of facilitator sense of the word. But I will be similar to this role.

I believe that each State is capable of playing a similar role. The minister since the American engaged in an active dialogue with the parties concerned.

When it meets the international Quartet, which includes the United Nations and the United States, the European Union and Russia in mid-May (May) this, what will be on the table to take advantage of the current momentum? Patience is running out and the people suffer and the Palestinian territories Tqatim There are fears losing hope entirely, leading to open conflict.

Disturbing and sad that many people suffer because of the lack of progress in the peace process in the Middle East. There is a growing realization among Arab leaders and Western countries and the United Nations, to the fact that the time has come for all parties concerned to engage in serious dialogue and progress, and this is what we are doing. We will discuss in the next meeting of the quartet and will be engaging in another round of exchanging views with our Arab partners in an informal setting.

Arabs presented a peace plan is the Arab initiative, a plan on the table.

إلى طاولة المفاوضات؟

And reports indicate that Israel continues to build settlements and the construction of the wall and the closure policy, Are you willing to put pressure on Israel to come to the negotiating table?

I will do everything in my power to facilitate the peace process. When I was in Israel told Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Foreign Minister invited to anybody that it must consider seriously the issue of Palestinian refugees and restricting the level of freedom of movement.The United States also has no plans to ease these restrictions. There are developments in this area.

What is your stance on Israel's continued construction of settlements and construction of the wall, leading to the confiscation of illegal Palestinian lands?

Israeli leaders talked about seen and Harth, and I said that the security concerns that must be balanced with a compromise deal with the humanitarian suffering of the Palestinian people.

These actions are illegal. Talking about international legitimacy, and you are not ready even to the criticism, why?

The subject is not that I do not criticized. Diplomatic means to resolve these issues require always alert to the sensitivities and act far from escalation. I understand that you have to deal with when adopts conflicting parties.

But we are talking about international legitimacy?

Of course, The United Nations and the Security Council to take the necessary measures, and everyone knew that.During the meetings «Quartet Committee» reaffirming resolutions 242 and 338 and other relevant resolutions.

You do not seem ready to take a position to continue building settlements and the construction of the wall being devoured Palestinian land in contravention of international legitimacy.

I have already told them what stands.I am not in a position to disclose publicly about everything I said to the Israelis and Palestinians. Is able to understand this?

I understand, of course, but ask you about your position and not what happened in Pink, including closed-circuit ...

.

(Intervene spokeswoman for the Secretary-General says that there is room for the last question only). Let me ask you about if Iran and the lack of an expected meeting between American Secretary of State, and her Iranian counterpart despite attempts Do not hold a meeting index bad in your opinion?

Maybe it would be better to meet for talks, but this does not necessarily reflect the official positions of each. I hope that emerge in the near future an opportunity for leaders on the course encouraging the talks that took place between the United States and Syria.

The European foreign policy coordinator Javier Solana was not optimistic about the outcome of his talks with Iran regarding the suspension of uranium enrichment, which Iran insists that the suspension of uranium enrichment. Is there any other way to break the deadlock and the status quo otherwise?

To let the European Union and Iran in continuing dialogue and negotiations on this issue.

Do you believe in immediate withdrawal of American troops from Iraq is calling for concern, or that the continued American military presence has become part of the problem?

The security situation in Iraq explosive. Consequently, the stability requires, according to the Coalition forces and the United States in particular, the survival of these forces as an effective means of ensuring the stability of the situation there, while the international family, regionally and internationally, to work together. This is what we have done in Sharm El-Sheikh conference.

These efforts must be matched by efforts to push the Iraqi political dialogue between Iraqis.

Translated version of http://www.sotaliraq.com/

Originally Posted by Hkp

Saad al-Ubaydi : reconciliation starts at the top hierarchy of power

(صوت العراق) - 07-05-2007

(Voice of Iraq) - 07-05-2007

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Saad Obeidi told the nation : Reconciliation begins at the top of the current hierarchy of power

A national reconciliation conference during the month of June.
Baghdad Mazen's : Informed Iraqi sources said the convening of a conference of national reconciliation will discuss the outcomes of tribal chieftains and political forces and the dissolved Iraqi army officers, to be held in June next.
For his part, Sheikh Saad Al-Obaidi, a member of the secretariat of the Supreme National Reconciliation Conference, to create conditions reconciliation between top funniest essential participation of the government of national unity, told »homeland« required first to be reconciliation between the government parliamentary parties participating in the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, which will be reflected directly on the street Iraqi.
Al l »homeland« that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki request of the Minister of State for National Dialogue Akram Al Hakim accelerate steps this conference probably in the first days of June this year, to set an agenda, simulates recommendations of the Sharm el-Sheikh and addresses three specific points : the first issue of abolishing the Baath Party, the second develop and accelerate the formation of the armed forces with the participation of all spectrums of people, and the completion of the recommendations of the National Reconciliation Conference for constitutional amendments.

Disbanding

The sources close to the Iraqi Prime Minister to the efforts by al-Maliki personally offices across advisers to find a political solution balancing security militias, Shiite and Sunni, and through mechanisms of action supervised by the Political Council for National Security, which is headed by Jalal Talabani, the president of the republic, which includes the Presidential Council and the presidency of the Iraqi parliament and heads of parliamentary blocs, and the presidency of the Ministers.
In the initial ideas for this budget, said sources told »homeland«, that Maliki is now in the timetable is not granted a lot of time unraveling the narrow partisan clashes on the possession of a weapon and refused to each party threw his only requirements harsh on the other party.
The sources said that the scenes meetings in Sharm el-Sheikh failed to pave a road to national reconciliation thorns because of the requirement Secretary General Amr Moussa of the Arab League held its administration reconciliation conference, which it described as Shiite and Kurdish parties that the return to square one lead to the rejection of all outcomes of the political process, at a time when Maliki wants the preparatory committee meetings for reconciliation conferences to find the way to set up the Iraqi new Iraqi era, where everyone relinquishes all for the new Iraq, which everyone accepted.
Commenting on Sheikh Obeidi saying »any meetings or conferences under the tent of national reconciliation initiative will be meaningful not achieve the desired success, but after resolving differences and Shenanigans between political forces in the current hierarchy of power, and working to change the basic structural joints of the state, notably agents ministries and directors-general, and dealing spirit of experience and integrity with functional positions away from the method of quotas, and the most important positions in security, such as the Iraqi army chief of staff, and directors of intelligence agencies.

Cabinet reshuffle

Obeidi believes that the Prime Minister deal positively in the days ahead with the amendment ministerial reshuffle, which it believes these sources, Maliki will work mechanisms government through a cabinet reshuffle expected first, which would be the model for any cabinet reshuffle later, the government away from the approach of sectarian and nationalist and partisan, and the second dealing with all the proposals put forward by political parties and parliamentary blocs, including the Virtue Party bloc and the Iraqi Accord, commensurate with the possibility of transferring some of these proposals to the government's agenda, specifically in the context of the initiative of national reconciliation, to create better conditions can succeed with conference preparations for a conference next June.

Al »homeland« that several joint committees, will intensify contacts with Iraqi figures were still outside the country, including groups or armed Islamic state in Syria, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan.
The most prominent of these sources suggest Andhuah under the initiative of national reconciliation during the next meeting of the Movement »Human« in Jordan, the group Younis Ahmed, the new leadership Baathist regime in Syria, and Iraqi figures of the national leadership Republic, as well as the expansion of the awakening of Iraq to include all political figures who accept armed groups represent them during this Conference.
Kuwaiti homeland

Translated version of http://www.sotaliraq.com/

In a joint press statement ..

رئيس حكومة أقليم كوردستان

Head of government territory Kurdstan

(صوت العراق) - 07-05-2007

(Voice of Iraq) - 07-05-2007

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In a joint press statement ..

:

Head of government territory Kurdstan :

The Islamic Republic of Iran us in good stead in good times and bad
Iranian Foreign Minister : you have achieved any progress in preparing Kurdstan brace and force us

Tehran-fraternization

In a joint statement, Mr. Najirfan Barzani, head of government Kurdstan region, which is currently visiting Tehran at the official invitation of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Sawa month Mottaki, Iranian Foreign Minister, who was the first official Najirfan Mr. Barzani met in Tehran, who spoke about the inter common issues of interest to both sides, history abounds cooperation between the two sides ..

..

The objectives of the visit said Mr. Najirfan Barzani : We have discussed the overall situation and the current Iraqi development of economic relations existing between us and the position of leadership Alcordstanih about the Iraqi situation and the prevailing violence and the prospects for the future .. With Mr. Iranian Foreign Minister :

As Mr. Barzani Najirfan We have had good talks about the Iraqi situation and our party's views are identical Bada connection on the way to building a free Iraq unified security as well as we follow with interest the efforts made in the territory of Kurdstan led by Masoud Barzani and Mr. Barzani and the rest Najirfan Messrs. officials there and call your Iraq and Iraq Kurdstan dear good, progress and prosperity and that any development there be a promise and a brace and force us.

.

He then reviewed Mr. Barzani Najirfan history of relations and friendship between the government of the Kurdstan and between the Islamic Republic of Iran.

He said : The Islamic Republic of the best help and support us in various stages particularly difficult days experienced by the people of Kurdstan He added : We have today, the first of our meetings with the Foreign Minister and it is hoped to have further meetings with the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and a number of other ministers and officials Messrs. ..
This, Mr. President of the government of the territory Kurdstan had arrived on Friday to Tehran at the head of an official party delegation to hold talks with Iranian officials on various issues of common concern both sides and the whole region and ways to strengthen the existing relations between them.

Translated version of http://www.sotaliraq.com/

Announcement No.(918)

D.G. of Foreign Exchange Control

The 918 daily currency auction was held in the Central Bank of Iraq
day Monday 2007/5/7 so the results were as follows :

Details Notes
Number of banks 18 -----
Auction price selling dinar / US $ 1265 -----
Auction price buying dinar / US $ ------ -----
Amount sold at auction price (US $) 89.140.000 -----
Amount purchased at Auction price (US $) ------
Total offers for buying (US $) 89.140.000 -----
Total offers for selling (US $) ------ -----


1. علما ان :Note that :

The sale price for remittances dinars (1264) / $.

سThe sale price cash dinars (1276) / $.

2.2. The quantity sold, the amount of cash (18.550.000) and $ remittances amount (70.590.000) dollars


D.G. of Investments

Daily price Bulletin buying and selling Sunday 2007/5/6

Currency
Currency Code
Selling Price In IQD
Buying Price In IQD

US Dollar
USD
1267.000
1265.000

European Euro
EUR
1721.473
1720.612

British Pound
GBP
2525.258
2523.995

Canadian Dollar
CAD
1144.638
1144.066

Swiss Franc
CHF
1045.811
1045.288

Swedish Krona
SEK
187.715
187.621

Norwegian Kroner
NOK
212.246
212.139

Danish Krone
DKK
231.086
230.971

Japanese Yen
JPY
10.544
10.539


The above price represent reference rate and does not from any commitment on the Central Bank of Iraq.

Note: The prices of the bulletin issued on Sunday will adopted for Monday also due to the weekend in New York .

.

This article is long but interesting and well worth reading...

Preserving Iraq's 'Patrimony'
07.05.07

by Michael Schwartz and Tom Engelhardt
TomDispatch

In the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2002-2003, oil was seldom mentioned. Yes, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz did describe the country as afloat "on a sea of oil" (which might fund any American war and reconstruction program there); and, yes, on rare occasions, the president did speak reverentially of preserving "the patrimony of the people of Iraq" – by which he meant not cuneiform tablets or ancient statues in the National Museum in Baghdad, but the country's vast oil reserves, known and suspected. And yes, oil did make it prominently onto the signs of war protesters at home and abroad.

Everybody who was anybody in Washington and the media, not to speak of the punditocracy and think-tank-ocracy of our nation knew, however, that those bobbing signs among the millions of antiwar demonstrators that said "No Blood for Oil" were just so simplistic, if not utterly simpleminded. Oil news, as was only proper, was generally relegated to the business pages of our papers, or even more properly – since it was at best but one modest factor among so very many in Bush administration calculations – roundly ignored.

Admittedly, the first "reconstruction" contract the administration issued was to Halliburton to rescue that country's "patrimony," its oil fields, from potential self-destruction during the invasion, and the key instructions – possibly just about the only instructions – issued to U.S. troops after taking Baghdad were to guard the Oil Ministry. Then again, everyone knew this crew had their idiosyncrasies.

Ever since, oil has played a remarkably small part in the consideration of, coverage of, or retrospective assessments of the invasion, occupation, and war in Iraq (unless you lived on the Internet). To give but a single example, the index to Thomas E. Ricks' almost 500-page bestseller, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, has but a single relevant entry: "oil exports and postwar reconstruction, Wolfowitz on, 98."

Yet today, every leading politician of either party is strangely convinced that the key "benchmark" the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki must pass to prove its mettle is the onerous oil law, now stalled in parliament, that has been forced upon it by the Bush administration. In the piece below, TomDispatch regular Michael Schwartz follows the oil slicks deep into the Gulf of Catastrophe in Iraq. He offers a sweeping view of the role oil, the prize of prizes in Iraq, has played in Bush administration considerations and what role the new oil law is likely to play in that country's future. Tom

The Struggle Over Iraqi Oil

Eyes eternally on the prize
by Michael Schwartz

The struggle over Iraqi oil has been going on for a long, long time. One could date it back to 1980 when President Jimmy Carter – before his Habitat for Humanity days – declared that Persian Gulf oil was "vital" to American national interests. So vital was it, he announced, that the U.S. would use "any means necessary, including military force" to sustain access to it. Soon afterwards, he announced the creation of a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, a new military command structure that would eventually develop into United States Central Command (Centcom) and give future presidents the ability to intervene relatively quickly and massively in the region.

Or we could date it all the way back to World War II, when British officials declared Middle Eastern oil "a vital prize for any power interested in world influence or domination," and U.S. officials seconded the thought, calling it "a stupendous source of strategic power and one of the greatest material prizes in world history."

The date when the struggle for Iraqi oil began is less critical than our ability to trace the ever growing willingness to use "any means necessary" to control such a "vital prize" into the present. We know, for example, that, before and after he ascended to the vice presidency, Dick Cheney has had his eye squarely on the prize. In 1999, for example, he told the Institute of Petroleum Engineers that, when it came to satisfying the exploding demand for oil, "the Middle East, with two thirds of the world's oil and the lowest cost, is still where the prize ultimately lies."

The mysterious Energy Task Force he headed on taking office in 2001 eschewed conservation or developing alternative sources as the main response to any impending energy crisis, preferring instead to make the Middle East "a primary focus of U.S. international energy policy." As part of this focus, the Task Force recommended that the administration put its energy, so to speak, into convincing Middle Eastern countries "to open up areas of their energy sectors to foreign investment" – in other words, into a policy of reversing 25 years of state control over the petroleum industry in the region.

The Energy Task Force set about planning how to accomplish this historic reversal. We know, for instance, that it scrutinized a detailed map of Iraq's oil fields, together with the (non-American) oil companies scheduled to develop them (once the UN sanctions still in place on Saddam Hussein's regime were lifted). It then worked jointly with the administration's national security team to find a compatible combination of military and economic policies that might inject American power into this equation.

According to Jane Mayer of The New Yorker, the National Security Council directed its staff "to cooperate fully with the Energy Task Force as it considered the 'melding' of two seemingly unrelated areas of policy: 'the review of operational policies towards rogue states,' such as Iraq, and 'actions regarding the capture of new and existing oil and gas fields.'"

While we cannot be sure that this planning itself was instrumental in setting the U.S. on a course toward invading Iraq, we can be sure that plenty of energy was being expended in Washington, planning for the disposition of Iraq's massive oil reserves once that invasion was successfully executed.

In 2002, just a year after Cheney's Task Force completed its work, and before the U.S. had officially decided to invade Iraq, the State Department "established a working group on oil and energy," as part of its "Future of Iraq" project. It brought together influential Iraqi exiles, U.S. government officials, and international consultants. Later, several Iraqi members of the group became part of the Iraqi government. The result of the project's work was a "draft framework for Iraq's oil policy" that would form the foundation for the energy policy now being considered by the Iraqi parliament.

The Prize

The specific prize in Iraq is certainly worthy of almost any kind of preoccupation. Indeed, Iraq could someday become the most important source of petrochemical energy on the planet.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Iraq possesses 115 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, third largest in the world (after Saudi Arabia and Iran). About two-thirds of its known oil reserves are located in Shia southern Iraq, and the final third in Kurdish northern Iraq. However, in energy terms, only about 10 percent of the country has actually been explored and there is good reason to believe that modern methods – which have not been applied since the beginning of the Iraq-Iran War in 1980 – might well uncover magnitudes more oil.

Estimates of the possible new finds offered by officials of various interested governments range from 45 billion to 214 billion additional barrels, depending on the source; but some non-governmental experts see the final treasure exceeding 400 billion barrels. If the latter figure is correct, then Iraq would likely become the world's largest source of oil.

For the most part, Iraq's petroleum has "attractive chemical properties;" that is, its oil is considered to be of very high quality. Moreover, both its current fields and many of the potential new discoveries would be extremely cheap to access, if security weren't such a problem today in Iraq. James Paul of the international policy monitoring group, the Global Policy Forum, offers this positive view:

"According to Oil and Gas Journal, Western oil companies estimate that they can produce a barrel of Iraqi oil for less than $1.50 and possibly as little as $1…. This is similar to production costs in Saudi Arabia and lower than virtually any other country."

With the price of a barrel of crude oil today above $64 a barrel, the potential for profits is stupendous, and the only question is: Who will pocket them – the oil companies or the Iraqi government – and, if the former, which oil companies will those be? It is not inconceivable that any major oil companies able to claim a large portion of the Iraqi oil spoils could double, triple, or even quintuple their already gigantic global profits.

Under Saddam Hussein, Iraqi oil never fulfilled the potential of even its proven oil fields. A modest goal for the country's oil industry would have been producing 3.5 million barrels per day, but the temporary disruptions caused by the Iraq-Iran War and the more permanent ones caused by UN sanctions imposed after the Gulf War in 1991 severely limited production. From the late 1990s until the American invasion in 2003, Iraq averaged around 2.5 million barrels per day.

Knowledge of this level of underproduction was certainly one factor in Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz's prewar prediction that the administration's invasion and occupation of Iraq would pay for itself; he hoped for a quick postwar increase in production to 3.5 million barrels per day or, at the $30 per barrel price of oil at that time, close to $40 billion per year in revenues.

An expected expansion in production levels (once the oil giants were brought into the mix) to perhaps 6.5 million barrels, through the development of new oil fields or more efficient exploitation of existing fields, had the potential to more than cover the expected American short-term military costs and leave the new Iraqi government flush as well.

This, then, was the allure of melding energy policy and military policy, as Cheney's energy group and allied administration officials envisioned it.

The Initial Campaign to Capture Iraqi Oil


With all this history, the particular way the U.S. sprang into action as soon as its forces arrived in Baghdad was hardly surprising. While American troops simply stood by as unrestrained looting severely damaged the dawn-of-civilization treasures in the National Museum, compromised the ability of hospitals to deliver health care, and destroyed many government offices, large numbers of American soldiers were deployed to protect the Oil Ministry and its associated holdings. This effort was certainly emblematic of the newly established occupation's priorities.

Not long after President Bush declared "major combat operations in Iraq have ended" under a "Mission Accomplished" banner on the deck of the aircraft carrier the USS Abraham Lincoln, Paul Bremer, the new head of the American occupation, promulgated a series of laws designed, among other things, to kick-start the development of Iraqi oil. In addition to attempting to transfer management of existing oil facilities (well heads, refineries, pipelines, and shipping) to multinational corporations, he also set about creating an oil-policy framework, unique in the region, that would allow the major companies to develop the country's proven reserves and even to begin drilling new wells.

All these plans were, however, quickly frustrated, both by the growing Sunni insurgency and by civil resistance. Iraq's oil workers quickly unionized – even though Bremer extended Saddam's prohibition on unions in state-owned companies – and effectively resisted the transfer of management duties to foreign companies. In one noteworthy moment, the oil workers actually refused to take orders from Bechtel officials in the oil hub of Basra, thus preserving their own jobs as well as the right of the Iraqi state-owned Southern Oil Company to continue to control the operation in that region. Bechtel's management contract was subsequently voided.

At the same time, the growing insurgency, acting on a general Iraqi understanding that a major goal of the occupation was to "steal" Iraqi oil, systematically began to attack the oil pipelines that traveled through the Sunni areas of the country. Within a few months, all oil exports in the northern part of Iraq were interrupted – and the northern export pipelines have remained generally unusable ever since.

To resistance of various sorts must be added the "contribution" of the major American corporations involved in "reconstructing" Iraq, notably Halliburton and Bechtel. These crony corporations, with close ties to the Bush administration, accepted huge fees to rehabilitate dilapidated or damaged oil facilities. Almost without fail, they chose not to repair existing plants locally or to employ the raft of skilled Iraqi technicians who had used remarkable ingenuity in maintaining these facilities during a dozen years of UN sanctions.

Working under cost-plus agreements that guaranteed a fixed profit rate no matter how much an operation ultimately cost, they preferred instead to install expensive new proprietary equipment. Then, in the absence of any outside oversight, they ran up huge expenses and frequently failed to complete their contracts, leaving the oil facilities they were servicing in states of disrepair or partial repair – and equipped with technology that local technicians could not service.

Meanwhile, the major oil companies refused Bremer's invitation to invest their own money in Iraqi projects, pointing out the obvious – that the insurgency and the spreading chaos made such investments unwise. In addition, they were well aware that Bremer's regime in Baghdad lacked clear authority to sign contracts with them. This, in turn, meant that their investments might be in jeopardy once a legitimate government took power.

When technical sovereignty was finally handed over to an appointed Iraqi government headed by the CIA's favorite Iraqi exile, Iyad Allawi, in June 2004, the new premier embraced Bremer's policy, but to no avail. The international oil companies were no more impressed with his future than they had been with Bremer's. Like Wolfowitz, they knew that Iraq "floats on a sea of oil"; unlike him, they were no dreamers. They weren't willing to risk their capital in the dangerous and legally ambiguous circumstances then prevailing.

As a result, the first two years of Bush administration efforts to "access" Iraqi oil failed – and dismally so at that. Average production never exceeded the bottom-of-the-barrel 2.5 million barrels Saddam's regime managed to extract on its worst days. By 2006, production had slipped below 2 million barrels per day.

Dealing With the Iraqi Government

It is difficult to judge how much Bremer's inability to implement the pre-planned oil policy contributed to the Bush administration decision to reverse its plans for Iraqi "democracy" – which, as Juan Cole has pointed out, involved council-based elections, an electorate restricted to a small elite, and Bremer as "a MacArthur in Baghdad for years" – and push for an elected Iraqi government. It certainly is true, however, that this change triggered a campaign aimed at the "capture of new and existing oil and gas fields."

As soon as the first elections for a temporary Iraqi government were completed in January 2005 American officials in Iraq began lobbying forcefully for adoption of the very policy that the State Department's pre-invasion Future of Iraq project had drafted. The State Department planners had concluded that production-sharing agreements – a method that granted multinational oil companies effective control of oil fields without transferring permanent ownership to them – would be the basic instrument through which a future "independent" Iraq would develop new oil fields.

Wary by now of being seen as the chief advocate of this policy, which it so desperately wanted in place, the Bush administration concocted a strategy that would enlist the international community in pressuring Iraq to adopt its program.

This was done by making the International Monetary Fund (IMF) a key player in Iraqi oil policy. Through loans in the 1980s and reparations imposed for his invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saddam had accumulated $120 billion in external debt, the largest per-capita debt in the world and a potentially insurmountable obstacle to economic recovery, even in oil-rich Iraq. One option available to the new government was to declare this debt "odious," a technical term in international law referring to debt accumulated by authoritarian rulers for their own personal or political aggrandizement.

Saddam's expansionist war against Iran, his use of public funds to build ostentatious monuments and palaces, his transfer of billions to his personal accounts, and his failure to maintain the infrastructure of the country all were excellent evidence that the debt was indeed odious; and the U.S. claimed as much for almost $40 billion of it, held by 19 industrialized countries known as the Paris Club.

Instead of seeking to cancel this debt (and the remaining $80 billion) entirely, however, the Bush administration sent James Baker, secretary of state under George H. W. Bush, to the Paris Club to negotiate conditional forgiveness. The resulting agreement immediately forgave $12 billion, but left $28 billion on the books.

A second $12 billion would be abrogated when the Iraqi government signed onto "a standard International Monetary Fund program," and a further $8 billion three years later, after the IMF confirmed Iraqi compliance. Even if "successful," almost $8 billion would still be outstanding to the Paris Club – together with $80 billion not covered by the agreement.

The "standard International Monetary Fund program," not surprisingly, included the now familiar American policies regarding Iraqi oil, as well as the use of profit-sharing agreements and a host of other provisions that would open the Iraqi economy as a whole, and the oil sector in particular, to investment by multinational corporations.

Among the most punitive of the provisions was a demand for an end to the economic breadbasket that guaranteed all Iraqi families low prices for fuel and food staples. In a country with, by 2005, somewhere between 30 percent and 70 percent unemployment, average wage levels under $100 per month, and escalating inflation, these Saddam-era subsidies meant the difference between basic subsistence and disaster for a large proportion of Iraqis.

Independent journalists Basav Sen and Hope Chu summarized the new agreement thusly:

"A move that appears on the surface to be beneficial for Iraq – debt cancellation – is being used as a tool of control by the World Bank, the IMF and the wealthy creditor countries. What is more, it is a tool of control that will last long after the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces."

Zaid al-Ali, an international lawyer working on development issues in Iraq, described the agreement as a "perfect illustration of how the industrialized world has used debt as a tool to force developing nations to surrender sovereignty over their economies."

The newly elected Iraqi National Assembly promptly denounced this agreement as "a new crime committed by the creditors who financed Saddam's oppression." This forceful expression reflected the opinions of the Assembly's constituents. After all, 76 percent of Iraqis believed that the main reason for the Bush administration's invasion was "to control Iraqi oil."

As it happened, the protest did not prevent that government from endorsing the deal. Otherwise, it faced the prospect of the U.S. – which still had operational control over Iraqi finances – simply appropriating most of its revenues for debt service. When the agreement was announced, interim Oil Minister Thamir Ghadbhan, a British-trained technocrat, publicly protested the provisions eliminating fuel and food subsidies. He was subsequently pushed out.

The U.S. then began pressuring the Iraqi government to draft a definitive petrochemical law that would conform to the IMF guidelines. Given the levels of resistance to the very idea, this work was conducted in secret and took until the end of 2006 to complete. As independent journalist Joshua Holland described the process:

"Just months after the Iraqis elected their first constitutional government, USAID sent a BearingPoint adviser to provide the Iraqi Oil Ministry 'legal and regulatory advice in drafting the framework of petroleum and other energy-related legislation, including foreign investment'….

The Iraqi parliament had not yet seen a draft of the oil law as of July [2006], but by that time … it had already been reviewed and commented on by U.S. Energy Secretary Sam Bodman, who also 'arranged for Dr. al-Shahristani to meet with nine major oil companies – including Shell, BP, ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco, and ConocoPhillips – for them to comment on the draft.'"

Even the Iraqi Study Group, James Baker's Commission, got into the act at the end of 2006, devoting three pages of its proposal for a partial redeployment of American forces from Iraq to exhorting the Iraqis to enact a petrochemical bill that would place its oil reserves in the hands of the major oil companies.

The Proposed Petrochemical Bill

When the "Draft Hydrocarbon Law" was finally delivered to the Iraqi Parliament on Feb. 18, 2007, key provisions had already been leaked and immediately denounced by the full spectrum of the Iraqi opposition. Taking turns registering dismay were the majority of the parliament, a wide range of government officials, the leadership of major Sunni political parties, the union of oil workers, the Sadrists – the most powerful Shia grouping – and the visible leadership of the insurgency.

All this led to many changes in the law, including the removal of all mention of either privatization or production-sharing contracts, which would have given multinational oil companies 15-25 years of basically unregulated operational control over Iraqi oil facilities. The amended version in no way excluded the use of PSAs, but it removed the explosive designation from the actual wording of the law.

It is worth reviewing the logic of PSAs to understand why the U.S. was so determined to make them a part of the law, and why many Iraqis were so ferociously opposed.

Production-sharing agreements are generally applied in circumstances where there is a strong possibility that oil exploration will be extremely costly or even fail, and/or where extraction is likely to prove prohibitively expensive. To offset huge and risky investments, the contracting company is guaranteed a proportion of the profits, if and when oil is extracted and sold.

In the most common of these agreements, the proportion remains very high until all development costs are amortized, allowing the investing company to recoup its investment expenditures (if oil is found), and then to be rewarded with a larger-than-normal profit margin for the remainder of the contract which, in the Iraqi case, could extend for up to 25 years.

This is perhaps a reasonably fair, or at least necessary, bargain for a country that cannot generate sufficient investment capital on its own, where exploration is difficult (perhaps underwater or deep underground), where the actual reserves may prove small, and/or where ongoing costs of extraction are very high.

None of these conditions apply in Iraq: huge reservoirs of easily accessible oil are already proven to exist, with more equally accessible fields likely to be discovered with little expense. This is why none of Iraq's neighbors utilize PSAs. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates all pay the multinationals a fixed rate to explore and develop their fields; and all of the profits become state revenues.

The advocates of PSAs in Iraq justify their use by arguing that $20 billion would be needed to develop the Iraqi fields fully and that favorable PSAs are the only way to attract such heavy doses of finance capital under the current highly dangerous circumstances. This assertion seems, however, to be little more than a smokescreen.

No major oil companies are willing to invest in Iraq now, no matter how sweet the deal. If order is restored, on the other hand, Iraq would have no trouble attracting vast amounts of finance capital to develop reserves that could well be worth in excess of $10 trillion and hence would have no need whatsoever for PSAs.

Based on leaked information, journalists reported that the PSAs envisioned by the Iraqi petrochemical law contained extremely favorable provisions for the oil companies, in which they would be entitled to 70 percent of profits until development expenses were amortized and 20 percent afterwards. This would have guaranteed them at least twice the typical profit margin over the long run and many times that figure during the initial years.

There are other elements in the law (and the possible PSA contracts) that have also roused resistance inside Iraq. Among the most controversial:

Insofar as PSAs or their legal equivalent were enacted, Iraq would lose control over what levels of oil the country produced with the potential to substantially weaken the grip of OPEC on the oil market.
The law would allow the oil companies to fully repatriate all profits from oil sales, almost ensuring that the proceeds would not be reinvested in the Iraqi economy.

The Iraqi government would not have control over oil company operations inside Iraq. Any disputes would be referred instead to pro-industry international arbitration panels.

No contracts would be public documents.

Contacting companies would not be obliged to hire Iraqi workers, and could pursue the current policy of employing American technicians and South Asian manual laborers.

Several African countries with vast mineral riches have been subjected to these sorts of conditions, with large multinational companies extracting both minerals and profits while returning only a tiny fraction of the proceeds to the local population. As the resources are taken out of the ground and the country, the local population actually becomes poorer, while the potential for future prosperity is drained.

The draft petrochemical law, if enacted and implemented, could ensure that Iraq would remain in a state of neoliberal poverty in perpetuity, even if order did return to the country.

The Resistance

The petrochemical law is hardly assured of successful passage, and – even if passed – is in no way assured of successful implementation. Resistance to it, spread as it is throughout Iraqi society, has already shown itself to be a formidable opponent to the dwindling power of the American occupation.

The parliament itself may be the first line of defense. It challenged the original IMF agreement and has refused to consider the bill for two months, already missing a March deadline for passage that American politicians of both parties had pronounced an important "benchmark" by which to judge the viability of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government.

In addition, the government officials responsible for administering the oil industry could prove formidable opponents. Rafiq Latta, a London-based oil analyst, told Nation reporter Christian Parenti, "The whole culture of the ministry opposes [the law]…. Those guys ran the industry very well all through the years of sanctions. It was an impressive job, and they take pride in 'their' oil."

Perhaps most formidable of all is the Federation of Oil Unions, with 26,000 members and allies throughout organized labor. The oil workers overturned contracts in 2003 and 2004 that would have placed substantial oil facilities under multinational corporate control; and they initiated a vigorous campaign against the U.S. sponsored oil program as early as June 2005 – calling a conference to oppose privatization attended by "workers, academics, and international civil-society groups."

In January 2006, they convened a convention composed of all major Iraqi union groups in Amman, Jordan, which issued a manifesto opposing the entire neo-liberal U.S. program for Iraq, including any compromise on national control of oil production.

At a second Amman labor meeting in December of 2006, the Federation of Oil Unions announced its opposition to the pending law even before it was released. Iraq's trade unions, speaking in a single voice, declared that:

"Iraqi public opinion strongly opposes the handing of authority and control over the oil to foreign companies, that aim to make big profits at the expense of the people. They aim to rob Iraq's national wealth by virtue of unfair, long term oil contracts that undermine the sovereignty of the State and the dignity of the Iraqi people."

When the bill was made public, oil union president Hassan Jumaa denounced it before yet another protest meeting, stating:

"History will not forgive those who play recklessly with our wealth. … We consider the new law unbalanced and incoherent with the hopes of those who work in the oil industry. It has been drafted in a great rush in harsh circumstances."

He then called on the government to consult Iraqi oil experts (who had not participated in drafting the law) and "ask their opinion before sinking Iraq into an ocean of dark injustice."

If the oil workers and their union allies decide to organize protests or strikes, they are likely to have the Iraqi public on their side. Fully three-quarters of Iraqis believe that the United States invaded in order to gain control of Iraqi oil, and most observers believe they will surely agree with the oil workers that this law is a vehicle for that control. Even Iyad Allawi has now publicly taken a stand opposing it, perhaps the best indication that opposition will be virtually unanimous.

Finally – and no small matter – the armed resistance is also against the oil law. The Sunni insurgency underscored its opposition by assassinating Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi, a major advocate of the pending law, on the day the bill was made public.

The significance of the opposition of the Sunni insurgency is amplified by the stance of the Sadrists, the most rebellious segment of the Shia majority. Sadr spokesman Sheik Gahaith Al Temimi warned journalist Michael Parenti that while the Sadrists would "welcome" foreign investment in oil, they would do so only "under certain conditions. We want our oil to be developed, not stolen. If a bad law were to be passed, all people of Iraq would resist it."

It seems clear that what the oil law has the power to do is substantially escalate the already unmanageable conflict in Iraq. Active opposition by the parliament alone, or by the unions alone, or by the Sunni insurgency alone, or by the Sadrists alone might be sufficient to defeat or disable the law.

The possibility that such disparate groups might find unity around this issue, mobilizing both the government bureaucracy and overwhelming public opinion to their cause, holds a much greater threat: the possibility of creating a unified force that might push beyond the oil law to a more general opposition to the American occupation.

Like so many American initiatives in Iraq, the oil law, even if passed, might never be worth more than the paper it will be printed on. The likelihood that any future Iraqi government which takes on a nationalist mantel will consider such an agreement in any way binding is nil.

One day in perhaps the not so distant future, that "law," even if briefly the law of the land, is likely to find itself in the dustbin of history, along with Saddam's various oil deals. As a result, the Bush administration's "capture of new and existing oil and gas fields" is likely to end as a predictable fiasco.

Michael Schwartz, professor of sociology and faculty director of the Undergraduate College of Global Studies at Stony Brook University, has written extensively on popular protest and insurgency, and on American business and government dynamics.

His books include Radical Protest and Social Structure and Social Policy and the Conservative Agenda (edited, with Clarence Lo). His work on Iraq has appeared on numerous Internet sites, including TomDispatch, Asia Times, Mother Jones, and ZNet, and in print in Contexts, Against the Current, and Z Magazine.

Copyright 2007 Michael Schwartz

Preserving Iraq's 'Patrimony' - by Michael Schwartz and Tom Engelhardt

Economic : the role of banks Altejariahvi revitalize Iraq market for securities

D. Khalaf Falah Al-Rubaie

The investment banking and particularly the long-term financing projects oriented agricultural and industrial activities directly related to the process of economic development

Most types of investments that do the role of the banking sector in the development process, this type of investment to achieve financial returns are high and continuing to banks, and also contributes to the development of the securities market and increase the number of productive companies listed in that market.
And follower of the banking sector activity in Iraq, noted that most investments are concentrated in the commercial banks to provide credit facilities and short-term advances, with the weakness of the relative importance of financial resources directed towards productive activities, indicates a weak role in the development process. Since most of these banks prefer to retain a surplus large reserve of cash to make long-term loans. It is natural that this trend leads investment portfolios to a steady decline in profitability ratios and the rate of return on invested capital. This trend has been associated with several factors, notably the high rate of bad debts repayment witnessed by the banking sector during the economic blockade and the period following the fall of the regime, and the other due to the weakness of investment opportunities already available to those banks in the productive areas.
It can be argued that both workers refer to a situation of structural weaknesses in the role of commercial banks as institutions for financial intermediation in Iraq, as a result of weakness in its operations in the securities market, and this situation is not the only government banks, but the situation is generally experienced the banking system in Iraq, which leaves the this organ great responsibility in the revitalization of the stock market.
To accomplish this task should follow the following steps :
1.1. Banks need to pay government and private collaboration with the National Authority for Investment important marketing and promotion of the new stock and bond issues, especially those relating to equity issuances public sector enterprises put up for privatization.
2.2. The need to adopt a policy for recycling portfolios through putting a portion of possession for sale of securities and use of proceeds or part thereof to purchase new securities 0
3.3. Banks could revitalize the stock market through the provision of funding which takes several forms, including :
أ- .- A form of loans to clients to buy shares of the private sector. B-loan guarantee a certain percentage of securities not exceeding 40% of the value of the shares.
T. form-the form of loans to finance the purchase of shares.

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Draft of Iraqi Oil Bill Criticized By Kurds, Sunnis
Posted GMT 5-6-2007 17:48:40

IRBIL, Iraq -- Kurdish and Sunni officials expressed deep reservations Wednesday about the draft version of a national oil law and related legislation, misgivings that could derail one of the benchmarks of progress in Iraq laid down by President Bush.

The draft law, which establishes a framework for the fair distribution of oil revenue, was approved by the Iraqi Cabinet in late February after months of protracted negotiations.

The White House was hoping for quick passage to lay the groundwork for a political settlement among Iraq's ethnic and sectarian factions. But the Kurdish concerns have created doubts about the bill even before parliament takes it up for debate.

The Kurds have taken issue with a provision that was quietly packaged with the draft oil law by the Shiite-led Oil Ministry late last month.

The measure would essentially cede management of nearly all known oil fields and related contracts to a state-run oil company to be set up after the law is enacted, said Khalid Salih, a spokesman for the Kurdish regional government.

Salih said the provision violated a clause in Iraq's constitution that says the central government must work with regional governments to determine management of known fields that haven't been developed.

The Kurds, who have held effective autonomy in northern Iraq since 1991, want maximum regional control over oil contracts.

The provision is part of four "annexes" that will be debated with the draft oil law in parliament. Objections to any of the annexes would stall passage of the law.

"We are worried about these ideas put into the annexes," Salih said. "It worries us a lot."

Parliament members say it is almost certain that no law regarding oil would be passed without Kurdish approval.

Adding a further complication, Sunni lawmaker Saleem Abdullah said Wednesday that the main Sunni bloc objected to any discussion of the law in parliament at this time.

"It is inappropriate since the security condition is not encouraging," Abdullah said. He said Sunnis worried that the law would give foreign companies too large a role in Iraq's oil industry.

By Edward Wong, Sheryl Gay Stolberg
New York Times

Draft of Iraqi Oil Bill Criticized By Kurds, Sunnis

Economic : annexation riparian parties
Minister of Water Resources : common understandings and comprehensive outcome of the meeting of Antalya

Baghdad-Sabah.

The Minister of Water Resources Latif Rashid Jamal, the meeting included with the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Hilmi GÜLER Mohamed Turkish and Syrian Minister of Irrigation Nader rot in the Turkish city of Antalya

Might open the door to a comprehensive and common understandings on issues of water disputed.
He added that the meeting is of great importance from the fact that the end of the rupture at the ministerial level in the water resources sector between Iraq, Turkey and Syria continued for about twenty years, pointing out that the meeting saw an exchange of views on the subject of the development of water sources and use in a just and reasonable as well as to emphasize that the subject water is a common element of cooperation between the three countries.
The participation of the Minister for Water Resources, in Antalya ministerial meeting during his working visit to Turkey to participate in the Istanbul conference of donors to Iraq and the Water Forum and the Department of river basins.
The minister pointed out that the Turkish side presented with information about existing projects on water sources, especially bridging "Ilisu" where Turkey emphasized on the tongue and its minister of energy, said that the projects would have a prominent role in the welfare and development of the region. He explained that the technical issues relating to the controversial dam will be discussed during the technical committee meeting to be held later in Damascus, pointing out that the conferees also agreed to move forward in cooperation and solidarity in the field of water, and decided to start the periodic trilateral talks at the ministerial level in order to activate and technical cooperation agreements.
The Abdul Latif during the meeting that the water issues a priority in Iraq, stressing that the trilateral cooperation in the water resources sector supports the interests of the people. He pointed out that Iraq encourages "development projects in Turkey and Syria, if they do not harm the Iraqi Interests).
In a remarkable step held the joint technical committee to study issues relating to water matters between Iraq and Turkey, which formed in 1980 its first meeting late last month, the first since 1989, to discuss various issues of water strategy between the parties. Sources confirmed that the Iraqi delegation which participated in the meeting requested by the Turkish side to inform States co operation plan in the event of the Ilisu dam on the Tigris River created, in addition to access to the operational plan of water resources projected for the remainder of this year.

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