Thread: Iraq/Dinar News until 5/23/07 Midnight CST

Originally Posted by rev. dan frakes

this week on G M A Bush said that if congress will be patient he will have this war paid for by july , almost 400 billion. now , how do you think he will pay for it ? R.v then our tax money? hummmmmm just maybe.

revdan

RD what is GMA

Good Morning America.

Iraqi Papers Monday: 'SIIC' Annoucnes Itself
In a Press Conference, the Reformed SCIRI Calls for Federalism in Iraq
By AMER MOHSEN Posted 0 hr. 20 min. ago

Pan-Arab al-Hayat reported on a press conference that was held in Baghdad by the leadership of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC- formerly SCIRI) to announce and comment on the latest changes to the party’s platform.

A statement read by SIIC’s leader, 'Abd al-'Azeez al-Hakeem, confirmed earlier reports claiming that the powerful Shi'a party has decided to change its name and, more importantly, proclaim Ayatollah Sistani as the party’s main spiritual authority.

SIIC occupies 30 seats in the Iraqi parliament and is, along with the Sadr Current, the largest player in the ruling Shi'a coalition.

Al-Hakeem reiterated the argument claiming that the removal of the term “revolution” from the party’s name is due to the ousting of Saddam Husain “which made ‘revolution’ an outdated term,” al-Hakeem said.

Another SIIC leader, Rida Jawad Taqi, added, in the same press conference, that “the general committee has approved the renaming in accordance with the new political system in Iraq, which is based on the constitution.”

Taqi began his speech by praising the “supreme religious authority in Iraq, under the leadership of Ayatollah 'Ali al-Sistani” and vowed to “follow his guidance and path.”

Earlier leaks regarding SIIC’s reforms were based on the testimonials of unnamed leaders and lacked official confirmation. Several observers remained skeptical towards the alleged changes; today’s press conference should put such questions to rest.

In parallel, the media office of SIIC published a statement protesting the media’s use of “deformed statements attributed to the party’s leaders” and affirmed that the party’s new agenda “is not directed against anybody,” probably a reference to some analyses predicting that the party’s reforms indicate an aggressive rupture with Iran.

However, the statement did not deny any of the substantive changes discussed in earlier media reports, and was, if anything, a confirmation of these amendments.

SIIC’s move away from Khamena'i’s umbrella may have surprised observers (formerly, SCIRI’s constitution noted that the party follows the leadership of the institution of Wilayat al-Faqeeh, currently headed by Ayatollah 'Ali al-Khamena'i) especially that many of the core activists of SIIC consider themselves loyal followers to Ayatollah Khamena'i, but there are several facets to the issue.

On the one hand, only a fraction of Iraqi Shi'a follows Khamena'i and adopts his theory of Wilayat al-Faqeeh. No accurate statistics exist to confirm this opinion, but many observers consider Ayatollah Sistani to be the most widely followed religious authority in Iraq.

At the same time, SCIRI was founded in Iran, and hosted by the institution of the Iranian Revolution. SCIRI’s early membership mainly consisted of Iraqis who fled to Iran, in the hundreds of thousands; many of whom sympathized with and supported the revolution and, as a result, followed the institution of Wilayat al-Faqeeh.

After the fall of Saddam’s regime and the return of many Iraqi exiles from Iran, a clear gulf was noticeable in the party’s ranks between those who returned from Iran propagating a Khomeinist version of activism, and SCIRI’s local supporters who felt alienated by the unfamiliar loyalties of their peers.

The same applies to the larger Shi'a public, Sadrist and Fadhila supporters also tend to follow Sistani; and Sunnis often critiqued the “Iranian” iconography of SCIRI and frequently accused the party of being a tool for the Iranian clerical establishment. In that sense, SIIC’s decision to distance itself from Khamena'i may be a well-calculated stratagem to promote the party among the Shi'a populace.

The press conference revealed another aspect of SIIC’s new strategy: Al-Hayat said that SIIC’s leaders made repeated calls for the creation of new “regions” in Iraq. The new Iraqi constitution allows the formation of quasi-autonomous “regions” through the grouping of several provinces into a single unit and the creation of local representative councils and a local government for the new entity.

This arrangement was thought to be tailored to fit Kurdish needs - at the moment, Kurdistan is the only “region” in Iraq. But many voices warned that the constitutional article was, in effect, a prelude for a de facto division of Iraq between Shi'a, Kurdish and Sunni regions.

SIIC’s demands for the creation of a Shi'a “region” in the South and the Center of the country support the opinion that SIIC hopes to foment a version of “Shi'a nationalism” not unlike that of the Kurdish parties. Such a posture would distinguish the federalist SIIC from the Sadrists and Fadhila, who largely oppose federalism and the division of Iraq, and are active in pursuing an Iraqi nationalist platform.

linky...
IraqSlogger: Iraqi Papers Monday: 'SIIC' Annoucnes Itself

Originally Posted by rev. dan frakes

it was on good morning america , monday or tues, they were playing back a news tape . neno ,i just hope someone else saw it to. i hope you can confirm this.

revdan

Been to ABC News: Watch GMA All Week Long for the Latest in News, Feature Stories and Weather and looked for Archives... Not much luck yet and it is late. Will continue tomorrow. I did send this email below. Hopefully I get a response:

Subject: Monday or Tuesday.
To: [email protected]


Hello GMA,

I am in research for a segment piece that I have been told was done Monday or Tuesday. It was a Link or a Video of a few Statements from President Bush saying something with if the Congress we give him until July 07, he will have the War paid for, or the Deficit reduced.

Would appreciate any link to the search.

Thanks,
Tommy

Originally Posted by rvalreadydang

Central initiate the application of electronic payment system



بغداد ـ الصباحBaghdad morning
.The Central Bank of Iraq began applying electronic payments RTGS system, the accession of a number of Iraqi banks effectively.




.A source in the World : talk that the payments system would facilitate payments between banks and between them and also to the central fact that all banks have accounts in the Central Bank reconciliations are moving through these accounts also added that the bank seeks to develop such a mechanism in the future and beyond the scope of the banking sector, pointing to link the Ministry of Finance pointed out that the work to link the Iraq market for securities, as well as remittances and bonds in the Central Bank. The source indicated that the bank was working on the establishment of a clearing instruments electronically and has a good and concrete preparations to develop the Iraqi banking sector to cope with global development.

Translated version of http://www.alsabaah.com/

FOR all investors in the Iraqi Dinar.........I would definetly read the link below concerning the Draft Oil Law. It Spells out just how critical and debated this oil law is and what is needed IMO before the RV. Notice even though this is a report from one person............make sure you read the portion that identifies his position in all this. I tried coping and pasting but didnt work.

http://www.iraqrevenuewatch.org/docu...q_20070306.pdf

http://www.iraqrevenuewatch.org/docu...il_experts.pdf

another good read!!

Originally Posted by rvalreadydang

Central initiate the application of electronic payment system



بغداد ـ الصباحBaghdad morning
.The Central Bank of Iraq began applying electronic payments RTGS system, the accession of a number of Iraqi banks effectively.




.A source in the World : talk that the payments system would facilitate payments between banks and between them and also to the central fact that all banks have accounts in the Central Bank reconciliations are moving through these accounts also added that the bank seeks to develop such a mechanism in the future and beyond the scope of the banking sector, pointing to link the Ministry of Finance pointed out that the work to link the Iraq market for securities, as well as remittances and bonds in the Central Bank. The source indicated that the bank was working on the establishment of a clearing instruments electronically and has a good and concrete preparations to develop the Iraqi banking sector to cope with global development.

Translated version of http://www.alsabaah.com/

EXCELLENT, YES, EXCELLENT, MUHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAH.....

Now for the final pieces of the puzzle.

Originally Posted by cashNsoon

FOR all investors in the Iraqi Dinar.........I would definetly read the link below concerning the Draft Oil Law. It Spells out just how critical and debated this oil law is and what is needed IMO before the RV. Notice even though this is a report from one person............make sure you read the portion that identifies his position in all this. I tried coping and pasting but didnt work.

http://www.iraqrevenuewatch.org/docu...q_20070306.pdf

Here you go . . . What you do is copy the pdf doc to your clipboard & then paste it into a word doc / then copy it again & post it here . . . you can't copy an Adobe pdf doc. directly . . .

This does not sound like it will be a quick fix?? !!

Iraq Draft Petroleum Law: An Independent Perspective
tariq Shafiq
Director Petrolog & Associates
Chair Fertile Crescent Oil Company
[email protected]
17 February 2007
1
Iraq Draft Petroleum Law: An Independent Perspective
Content
1.0 Introduction
2.0 The Draft Petroleum Law
3.0 The Negotiations
4.0 Concluding Remarks
2
Iraq Draft Petroleum Law: An Independent Perspective

1.0 Introduction
1.1 Iraq may prove to have one of the greatest endowed petroleum resource
base in the world, with oil potential reserves in excess of 215 billion barrels
(mbpd) and proven reserves in the region of 115 billion barrels (bnb), which puts
it on par with Saudi Arabia. Moreover, its finding and development costs are low
– amongst the lowest in the Middle East. However, its historical maximum
production rate in any one year has not exceeded 3.5mn barrel per day (mbpd),
although its exploration and development history has stretched almost for eight
decades. Iraq’s oil production level historically has lagged behind its oil reserve
capability and has not reflected its low extraction costs.
Present Iraq proven reserves can support a production plateau of 10 million
barrels per day (mbpd) and maintain it for a decade. As such, priority should go
to rehabilitation and production capacity build-up and not to exploration for quite
a few years to come.
Planning oil field development for production capacity growth ought to be carried
out on a composite master plan, which examines the capacities of the discovered
and producing fields (including each producing formation within every field) from
a technical and economic feasibility point of view. In the mean time, it should take
into consideration Iraq’s economic development plans and needs. This
necessitates a centralisation of policy and planning.

1.2 Finding cost per barrel of oil is estimated at: <US Cent 0.5. Development cost
per barrel of oil is estimated at: US $0.5-1.0. This puts capital investment cost
per 1 million barrels production capacity at US $3 billion for expansion of existing
production facilities and US $6 billion, at the oil field boundary. These figures
may go to up to US $4.5 and US $9 billion to account for security requirements
and recent high oil equipment inflation cost. Operating cost per barrel is US $1-2.

1.3 Today, Iraq’s production facilities are either dilapidated, looted, sabotaged or
war-torn to the extent that in September 2003, the country’s production rate sank
to around 1mbpd, in comparison to a pre-war level of March 2003 of some
2.8mbpd. Thus far, at the beginning of 2007, Iraq is producing around 2mbpd
and exports around 1.5mbpd, a rate which is declining.
Iraq’s oil industry has been governed by the concession oil agreements until the
early seventies, and decrees and regulations since then. It is about time Iraq had
a petroleum law that sets out clear terms and conditions for good oil and gas
industry exploitation plans, policy and execution.
3

2.0 The Draft Petroleum Law
2.1 On the invitation of the Iraqi Minister of Oil, Dr Hussain Shahrestani, the Iraqi
draft petroleum law was researched and drafted by a team of three independent
Iraqi oil technocrats (including myself), who together have international, Middle
East and Iraqi oil industry experience amounting to some 120 years. Invited to
join the team was the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Minister of Oil, but
that did not materialise.

2.2 The law is based on Articles 111 and 112 of the new Iraqi Constitution, seen
in the light of Articles 2, 49, 109 and 110, which broadly define the authorities
and responsibilities of the Federal and Provincial authorities within the Petroleum
sector.
In order to clarify the imprecise nature of these Articles and to work on the basis
of a fair and sound interpretation, an objective and independent legal consultancy
was sought. Interpretation of Iraq’s Constitutional Articles Governing Oil & Gas
was made by an independent legal firm and adopted by the Ministry of Oil (MoO).
In the forthcoming review of the Constitution it is expected that a large sector of
the nation and in particular the large majority of Iraqi oil technocrats, will vote for
modification of these critical Articles 111 and 112 governing the ownership of oil
and gas and management of production, plans and strategic policy, respectively,
in light of this legal interpretation. The draft petroleum law has been written on
the basis of this legal interpretation irrespective of whether the review takes
place.

2.3 The overall objectives of the MoO draft petroleum law is to optimise Iraq’s oil
and gas exploitation, maximise return, and unite the country and nation.
The draft petroleum law seeks uniformity of plans and policy throughout the
country. It requires the MoO’s consultation and participation with the Provinces.
Supervision of oil and gas operations is shared between the Provinces and the
central Ministry. The decision making process has built-in checks and balances
to enhance transparency and anticorruption practices.

2.4 The law is investment friendly. It encourages private enterprise and
welcomes the international oil companies (IOCs) to work in partnership with the
Iraq National Oil Company (INOC).They have a recognised role to play in the
transfer of up-to-date state-of-the-art technology, technical and managerial
training of Iraqis, and in investment capital. Selection from among pre-qualified
companies will be made through tendering in a transparent and accountable
process.
Contract negotiations and decisions will be tasked to a high level Federal Oil and
Gas Commission (FOGC) assisted by a Negotiating Entity and an independent
4
advisory Think Tank. However, the function and task of the later tow entities has
been changed in the latest and 3rd petroleum draft. Authority for signature is
vested into the Council of Ministers by the Council of Representatives.
INOC will be an independent holding company, with affiliated regional operating
companies with an interrelated directorship, to ensure proper communication and
management as well as the participation of the Provinces. All discovered fields
will be ear marked to INOC.
The central Ministry of Oil (MoO) will be tasked with the supervisory and
regulatory role, in addition to the preparation of plans and policy in co-operation
and participation with the Provinces. The 3rd draft had also tasked them and the
Regional government of Kurdistan (KRG) with the role of negotiating oil and gas
contracts

3.0 The Negotiations
3.1 As highlighted above, the overall objective of the draft petroleum law is to
optimise oil and gas exploitation, maximise return, and unite the country. As
such, the draft law was written by the drafting team to serve in the interest of the
nation state as a whole, to apply equally to all parts of the country, with no
margin for negotiation between the Federal Government and any one Region or
Governorate or ethnic and sectarian groups.

3.2 The petroleum draft prepared by the drafting team was adopted by the MoO
without modification.
However, with differences between rival sectarian and ethnic parties in the
country at its peak, negotiations between the major parties have become the
rule, in advance of democratic debate among the members of the Council of
Representatives (the Parliament). The case of the draft petroleum law is no
exception.
Hard negotiations have been taking place, essentially, between KRG
representatives and the rest of the members of the Ministerial Committee, which
was set up to examine and make recommendations on the draft petroleum law to
the Council of Ministers. Once approved by the Council, the law would be passed
to the Council of Representatives for ratification.
The KRG’s position, expressed in their published Draft Petroleum Law, was
based on a radical interpretation of the pivotal Article 111, allowing for the oil and
gas in the Kurdistan as the property of the people of Kurdistan, not the whole
Iraqi nation as an undivided asset. Their petroleum law is so designed as to
contain terms and conditions vis-à-vis the Federal draft petroleum law, with a
large margin for negotiation as demonstrated in their negotiating strategy.
5
As a result, the current negotiated 3rd draft, in my view, induce material changes
that weaken the built-in checks and balances, which were carefully designed to
ensure transparency and accountability. These changes do in fact compromise
the interests of the nation as a whole, as explained below.
The Temporary Law for Administration (TAL), issued by the CPA, makes
consultation or co-operation in the management of oil and gas resources by the
Federal Government with the Regions and Governorates the only requirement,
conditional on an agreed fair distribution of revenue.
The Constitution, however, requires consultation and co-operation in the
management of resource. The draft MoO Federal petroleum law goes beyond
that in sharing with the Regions and Governorates management and decision-making.

It has been drafted for the interests of the nation state as a whole and to
apply equally to all parts of the nation, with no built in margin for negotiations
between the Federal Government and any one Region or Governorate.

3.3 The negotiations did not seem to start in earnest until the revenue sharing
issue had been settled in principle.
The negotiations were slow, proceeding in a stop and go fashion over the last
five months. An important break-through occurred around or just post the time
when a senior KRG Minister stated in an oil conference in London on 8
December, 2006, that: following a recent definitive agreement between KRG and
Federal Government negotiators over an acceptable scheme of oil revenue
sharing, the KRG position on the interpretation of Articles 111 and 112 had
changed and come into line with that of the central Government. He added that in
due course, following the building of mutual confidence, the KRG might consent
to the re-drafting of relevant constitutional articles. This was regarded by those
Iraqis present as a genuine gesture by the Iraqi Kurdish nation acting in the
common interests of the Iraqi nation.
Despite this declaration, however, the KRG official stand appears to maintain its
earlier position of authority to negotiate contracts with companies independently
of the Federal Petroleum Commission and without the requirement for its
approval.
Another sticky issue is the KRG’s half a dozen PSA contracts with small oil
companies. These provide windfall profits well above and multiples of the norm
reasonably required by the current draft petroleum law, in the order of an internal
discounted rate of return of 60-100%. The central Ministry has decreed them
unacceptable and without legal basis. Whether they are to be cancelled or, more
likely, reviewed to be brought into line with the terms of the Federal petroleum
law is another issue which is yet to be settled.
6
In my opinion, if the KRG maintains this position it would amount to a de facto
rejection of Articles 111, 112 and other relevant articles of the Constitution, which
task the Federal Government with the responsibility for the proper management
of oil and gas resources. It would leave the door open for other Regions and
Governorates to follow suit and set a damaging precedence. It could lead to
diversified contract terms and conditions within a potential lack of transparency,
accountability or the checks and balances built into the MoO draft Federal law.
However, recently a compromise solution has been reached. It would allow the
KRG to negotiate contracts with companies in the presence of a representative
from the central MoO and subject to the approval of the FOGC; and allow the
KRG itself to re-negotiate existing PSA contracts to bring them in conformity with
the Federal Petroleum Law, but their validity is subject to the approval of the
FOGC. The wording is chosen rather diplomatically. However, it should not leave
it subject to different interpretation or deny the FOGC having the final decision to
approve or reject wholly or partly the negotiated contract.
The content of the 3rd draft petroleum law of mid-January was agreed among the
Negotiating Committee, but has not been approved yet by the decision makers in
the KRG. They, also demand to defer final approval until such a time when a
complete, agreed and legalised package is finalised that includes laws for the
establishment of INOC, petroleum revenue distribution and the re-organisation of
the ministry of oil.
KRG approval has not been given despite the significant changes already made
to the MoO draft during negotiations, which have adversely affected the process
of checks and balances, and include changes to the management of INOC,
efficiency and economy of planning and execution, amongst others. Among
these are the following:

a. The original MoO draft did not restrict the appointment of the INOC
board of directors rigidly to the inclusion of members from the provinces
and federal government as the latest 3rd draft seems to suggest. The
original draft empasised however, the need for INOC’s independence
financially and commercially. Such membership restriction could adversely
affect the independence and efficiency of INOC’s operational
management.

b. Furthermore, the latest 3rd draft stipulates that oil and gas exploration
and development programmes need to follow the geographic distribution.
While social justice may require it, nature unfortunately does not as the
prospectivity for oil and gas is not equally distributed in all the provinces.
The petroleum law could include such a provision, provided it does not
affect the economics and efficiency of exploration and development
operations.
7

c. The role of the independent advisory professional think tank, named in
this 3rd draft as the Oil and Gas Independent Consultants Bureau
(OGICB), has been considerably weakened and lacks transparency. Its
former scope to examine all issues has been reduced to only those issues
selected by the FOGC. The requirement to publish its annual report has
been removed.
The appointment of its members is reduced to one year from five and the
appointment requires unanimity of all the members of the FPC; a most
strange rule, indeed. The appointments of the FOGC and OGICB
members have been made to conform to Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic
groups; an alarming indication of politicizing the most vital economic
commodity that concerns the nation when, instead, sound independent
professional management is badly needed.

d. The FOGC has been enlarged from 9 to 20 or 30 members, depending
on future development, which makes it more fit for a debating society than
trusties tasked with a vital decision-making role on optimizing the proper
resource development of the nation. Moreover, while its size has been
inflated, its role has been considerably weakened. In fact, the negotiating
role of the FOGC through the OGICB with regard to Kurdistan has been
removed and given to the KRG. This is an invitation to the others to form
Regions so as to follow suit without regard to the maturity of their
institutions, and risking disharmony of practices which would neither
encourage the major IOCs nor enhance the standards of the negotiated
contracts.

e. The grant of rights to enter into development and exploration contracts,
stated in the latest draft appears to emphasize the form rather than the
quality content of the contract. It recognises the soundness of the
contractor’s qualifications, adherence of the negotiator to a form of
negotiations process, and the use of model contracts, but does not
examine the soundness of the terms and conditions agreed on. No
contractor should be invited to bid unless it has been pre- qualified by the
MoO in accordance with pre-set conditions and procedure. However, it is
paramount that the proposed terms and conditions be examined by the
FOGC and its OGICB to ensure maximum returns to the nation, as well
as an adequate, fair and competitive rate of return for the contractor to
operate efficiently.

f. The resultant checks and balances in the third draft are now insufficient
to cope with Iraq’s internal political complications, and are more of a
façade, leaving the competence of authorities and the processes of the
grant of rights open to manipulation by the political forces that prevail in
today’s circumstances in Iraq.
8

g. Further and critically for the future of Iraq’s oil and gas industry, the
balance of power in the management of Iraq’s oil and gas resource would
have shifted alarmingly from the Centre to the Regions.
h.The critical items that have been removed in the third petroleum draft
are fundamental to professionalism, transparency and accountability. The
principles are still there but the mechanisms for enforcing them, in a
process of checks and balances within Iraq’s current turbulent situation,
have been removed or circumvented in away that could produce
damaging effects.
I would like to ascertain that this third draft law is extremely disappointing, in my
opinion and that of Farouk Al-Kasim, a member of the drafting team.

4.0 Concluding Remarks
4.1 Without a central unified policy there will be disharmony and competition
between INOC (operating on production and marketing its export oil to provide
the state’s income) and the Regions & Governorates (prioritising exploration for
additional reserves that will not be required for many years to come), and among
the various Regions and Governorates leading to disharmony and envy between
the haves and have-nots.
Such development would cause instability which is discouraging to investment,
as well as a multitude of damaging consequences contributing to fragmentation,
instead of promoting the uniformity of oil and gas practices and the unity of the
nation and country.
The Constitution has tasked the Federal Government with the job of
management of the oil and gas resource management, not any one village,
governorate or region. The initial draft law was drawn up to unify plans, policy
and decision-making through participation (beyond cooperation or consultation)
of the regions, governorates and the federal government at the centre without
ignoring participation at the operating and supervisory processes.

4.2 Instability would lead to an unhealthy oil industry and would discourage the
serious IOCs, who have the required knowledge, capital and markets. Iraq would
then find itself accepting speculators with more promises than they can deliver,
and the minor companies which do not have the capability to develop Iraq’s giant
oil fields.

4.3 IOCs, in my view, are advised to aim for urgently needed rehabilitation of the
infrastructure, expansion of production capacity of partially developed fields,
improving damaged reservoir performance, and to develop the many discovered
but not yet delineated oil fields in partnerships with INOC, rather than going for
extensive exploration for unnecessary new oil. A rush for exploration and
development contracts at this particular juncture of Iraq’s political and economic
9
development would be viewed as mortgaging the reserves of future generations.
It would provide fuel to the view that the war was for oil.

4.4 There are today a number of damaging trends of ‘Tsunami’ dimensions,
engulfing Iraq. There is a widespread lack of security and law and order,
widespread killing for reasons of identity, ethnicity, sect, or for no reason other
than criminal ends.
There is widespread lack of efficiency in government organisations and a near
absence of institutional performance or sound management at the centre and,
especially in the Provinces, in addition to a lack of investment and extremely high
unemployment.
Action to reverse these damaging trends ought to be all embracing in nature,
co-ordinated and united in approach, and having the welfare of country and
nation at heart above all considerations. A healthy and robust oil industry would
provide the revenue necessary for social and economic reform and the right
environment for easing much of the above trends.

4.5 Last but not least I salute the stand of the MoO and the negotiators of the
Federal government who were put in a position to reconcile two diametrically
opposed views, the central MoO’s view, and that of the KRG’s radical and
unacceptable interpretation of the constitutional articles governing oil and gas
ownership and management. Furthermore, they have not been given their
Federal government’s full backing against the KRG negotiators who had all the
backing and political support of their regional government.
Finally, I would appeal for a return to the spirit behind the declaration on 8th
December by the senior representative of the KRG as a genuine gesture by the
Iraqi Kurdish nation acting in the common interests of all the Iraqi nation.
10
11


Best to all . . . RR . . .

Announcement No.(923)

D.G. of Foreign Exchange Control

The 923 daily currency auction was held in the Central Bank of Iraq day Monday 2007/5/14 so the results were as follows :

Details NotesNumber of banks16-----
Auction price selling dinar / US $1261-----
Auction price buying dinar / US $1259-----
Amount sold at auction price (US $)77.380.000-----
Amount purchased at Auction price (US $) 1.000.000
Total offers for buying (US $)77.380.000-----
Total offers for selling (US $)1.000.000-----