Thread: Iraq/Dinar News until 5/23/07 Midnight CST

Switzerland decides against more refugees from Iraq



The Swiss government has decided against receiving further refugees from Iraq, contrary to the wishes of the Geneva-based UN refugee agency (UNHCR), Swiss Radio International (SRI) reported on Thursday.

Bern "refused to accept new Iraqi refugees," preferring to help displaced Iraqi people on the spot, SRI quoted Swiss government spokesman Oswald Sigg as saying.

According to Swiss Justice and Police Minister Christoph Blocher, other European countries had also decided that accepting contingents of refugees was no solution to the problem.

"We already have 5,000 Iraqis in Switzerland and our country is in second place in Europe in accepting them," Blocher said.

The government's new decision was slashed by some parliamentarians. "It is shocking to see the government lock the doors in the face of such a large crisis," said Carlo Sommaruga, a Geneva member of the Swiss House of Representatives.

Representing the Social Democratic Party, Sommaruga said Blocher was brandishing the threat of a massive arrival of Iraqis in Switzerland, at a time when the UNHCR was talking of responding to a call to accept "minorities" who had not been able to go into refugee camps.

Switzerland announced in April at a UNHCR conference in Geneva that it was doubling its humanitarian aid to displaced Iraqi people and refugees to 4 million Swiss francs (about 3.27 million U.S. dollars).

During the meeting, the refugee agency called on rich countries to receive 20,000 "very vulnerable" Iraqis. These included people traumatized by the violence in the country, those who had been tortured, women and abandoned children.

The non-governmental Swiss Refugee Council urged the Swiss authorities to renew a humanitarian program to help alleviate the crisis.

"We appeal to the Swiss government to accept a regular contingent of Iraqi refugees from Iraq's neighboring countries," a statement said.

Source: Xinhua

Saboteurs have upper hand in an endless war, says Iraq's Oil Minister
By Patrick Cockburn in Baghdad
Published: 18 May 2007
Iraq's Oil Minister has unequalled experience of adversity. As a leading Iraqi nuclear scientist, Dr Hussain al-Shahristani was summoned to see Saddam Hussein in 1979 and asked to assist in a project to make a nuclear weapon.

He flatly refused to help and was immediately thrown into jail and savagely tortured by being beaten for 22 days as he was hung in the air by his wrists that were tied behind his back. Adamant in his determination not to assist Saddam in developing a nuclear device Dr Shahristani spent 10 years in solitary confinement in a small windowless cell in Abu Ghraib prison.

During the chaos of the Gulf War he succeeded in escaping with the help of a "trusty" who delivered his meals. The man, a Palestinian jailed by Saddam as a favour to Yasser Arafat, agreed to help him get out of the dreaded Abu Ghraib.

Stealing a Mukhabarat (secret police) car, the scientist made his way to Kurdistan and then to Iran.

Sitting in his office in the Oil Ministry on a surprisingly rainy day in Baghdad, Dr Shahristani carries few outward signs of a life beset by danger and suffering. Following the overthrow of Saddam in 2003 he returned to Iraq and became the leader of the independent members of parliament who belonged to the Shia alliance. He became Oil Minister a year ago.

It is not an easy job. Iraq's only revenue is from the 1.6 million barrels a day of crude oil that the country exports out of the 2.2 million barrels a day it produces. Every day saboteurs blow up Iraqi oil pipelines and Oil Ministry teams try to repair them in an endless war to strangle Iraq's oil exports to the Mediterranean. Right now the saboteurs have, perhaps temporarily, the upper hand.

"It is as bad as it has ever been," says Dr Shahristani in an interview with The Independent. "If we can protect the pipeline we can add half a million barrels to our exports immediately."

The main problem is that the pipeline that takes crude oil from the oilfields in northern Iraq runs through notoriously dangerous territory between Kirkuk and Baiji to the west. "As soon as we finish a repair they plant another IED [improvised explosive device]. The pipe is hundreds of miles long and runs through a hostile area where insurgents are very active," he says. As a result all exports have to pass through Basra.

Iraq is trying to reorganise its oil industry. The US is pressing for a draft oil bill that has been in dispute for more than a year to be finally passed by parliament. It has become one of the famous "benchmarks" by which Washington says it is measuring progress in Iraq.

There is some hypocrisy here because the year in which the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority ran the Iraqi oil industry in 2003-04 was famous for managerial incompetence and corruption.

The control of oil and oil revenue is also at the centre of the fraught relationship between the central government in Baghdad and the Kurds. The need to share oil money is one of the few things holding Iraq together. The Kurds want to maximise their autonomy and, critically, to make sure that they get their present 17 per cent share of oil revenues. With some reason they are suspicious that money on which they wholly depend will be held up or sequestered by some delaying tactic in Baghdad.

Dr Shahristani says negotiations over the coming week will be crucial in deciding if agreement can be reached with the Kurds on oil and gas. He himself had just returned from Kurdistan. The Kurdish Prime Minister is expected in Baghdad this week. The Kurds are demanding that their share of Iraq's oil revenues be released to them automatically.

"We have had endless problems on getting our share," says Dilshad Miran, a Kurdish official in Baghdad. "They give us figures but we don't know if they are right."

Distrust is deep. The Kurds believe they have been deliberately short-changed by Arab-run ministries. The Baghdad government suspects what it sees as efforts by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to set up an independent oil industry. Four contracts for oil exploration signed in Kurdistan before the fall of Saddam will be honoured though they may be amended. Dr Shahristani says he told Kurdish leaders that any other contracts "are illegal and I will be writing to any company that signs a contract with the KRG... that Iraq will not deal with them in future."

Ottowa Citizen , 9 May 2007
Iraq needs Canada

John Packer, Citizen Special

Erbil, Northern Iraq - Bustling but orderly, with rosebush-lined paths from the terminal: Such is Erbil International Airport in Iraqi Kurdistan. Outside this expanding new airport is a vibrant city filled with repatriated Iraqi Kurds, increasing numbers of foreign businesspeople, humanitarian workers, diplomats and others.

I am here for a two-day conference hosted by the minister for human rights of the Kurdistan Regional Government, a position equivalent to a provincial minister serving a population the size of British Columbia. But this is not B.C. The minister has a bodyguard, as do other participants. The United Nations representative arrives with an entire personal security detail.

The conference is well-attended, becoming almost an impromptu town-hall meeting. Unrestrained criticisms are voiced, many from the women present. The minister and participating MPs listen and take notes. This continues the next day. Finally, the minister replies, acknowledging shortcomings. He notes the deteriorating situation of women, referring to an up-turn in domestic violence and the new phenomenon of honour killings and suicides. He also comments on problems of mistreatment of prisoners.

Later, I reflect that never would anyone have witnessed such a conference under Saddam Hussein. Indeed, I am not sure how many Canadian cabinet ministers would sit so patiently through such a litany of complaints and accusations. Yes, hope abounds in Kurdistan.

The place is booming.

Prospects are not lost on Norwegian, British, Canadian and other oil and natural gas firms. Underfoot lie enormous energy deposits for hungry consumers in Turkey and Europe. The green fields and hills are rich themselves, formerly producing grains and fruits enough for Iraq and export as well. And nestled in the mountains is the region's water castle, comprising sweet lakes and fast-flowing rivers capable of generating badly needed electricity to run the new economy and power development elsewhere.

Foreign investors from Turkey and the Gulf are behind the emergence of new banks and industries. The relative stability -- compared to the rest of Iraq -- is attracting not only foreign workers but even tourists. Western-educated expatriates who had fled Saddam's regime are returning. Of course, such rapid growth brings its own challenges. There are not enough schools or apartments. Freedom and rapid development bring competition, with winners and losers. The suicide rate among youth is reportedly up.

More troubling is the observation that here in Kurdistan, people have not yet acquired the instincts and habits of democratic society. Cultural pluralism and political equality are strange and difficult concepts. Minority communities feel excluded and complain of serious human-rights violations against them. Turkey to the north and Arab majorities to the south express intentions to protect their Turkish and Arab brothers.

This is ominous, yet the Kurdish leadership responds mainly with bellicose rhetoric of its own. Oil, identity and political reform can be an explosive mix.

This is where Canada can help. We have so much to share with the Kurds, and with other Iraqis. Canadians know something about federalism and the management of diversity. Iraq is newly bilingual -- on paper -- at the federal level, and it's looking to Canada for lessons on how to implement this in practice. Canadians are also expert at developing natural resources.

Most Iraqis, not least the Kurds, would welcome closer relations with Canada. Canadians don't wear the baggage of recent occupation, nor do we have a colonial past. But Iraq is a dangerous, unpredictable place. So what's in it for us?

Stability, for starters. If Iraq blows, the ramifications will be far-ranging, immediate and lasting. The price of oil will soar, and Europe's sputtering economies will collapse, furthering dependence on Russian supplies. Trade will decline and jobs will be lost.

Canada has a strong security interest in the future of Iraq. A collapsing Iraq is a boon to extremists and terrorists the world over. Give them the run of the roost in Iraq, and the whole region will suffer. If terrorists could reach the North American continent from impoverished Afghanistan, imagine what could come of ingenious and oil-rich gangs based in Iraq.

We should not be driven only by fear, however. There is an economic interest, too. Iraq needs to be rebuilt from scratch, and this rich country is not looking for aid as much as investment and trade. And of course there is always the humanitarian imperative. Involvement in Iraq will bring material, political and moral rewards.

Canada may not have the biggest military or the flashiest political style, but we can still have great significance in this ailing part of the world. A stable Kurdistan, one that respects its minorities, can become the engine for democratic transition in Iraq and beyond. They have need; Canadians have know-how. They are well-disposed; we have the means to help. Iraq, unfortunately, is a place that, at this moment, terrifies outside observers, but Canada must not write the country off. Let's get over there and help to fix it.

John Packer, a former fellow at Harvard University's Carr Center for Human Rights, was from 1991 to 1997 a staff member of the United Nations investigating human rights violations in Iraq. He lives in Ottawa.

Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker Press Roundtable
Baghdad, Iraq
May 18, 2007

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I’ve been here, I guess, about six weeks now. As all of you know who have been here a lot longer, just an awful lot goes on. We’ve had visits by the Secretary of Defense and the Vice President, the Sharm el-Sheikh meetings, the announcement that we will be talking to the Iranians later this month. A lot obviously going on on the security side and a lot going on politically which, of course, is what I’ve been primarily focused on.

As I was trying to organize my thinking about Iraq and what we’re doing here, the two broad headings -- security and national reconciliation -- obviously the two have to move together.

The reconciliation part of it, I’m finding, has a number of components. There is the truly national level, what goes on among the different components of the national unity government, but obviously also right down to the neighborhood level as the Baghdad Security Plan moves forward and our EPRTs, embedded PRTs, start to engage with their brigade combat team counterparts. And in between, if you will, the kind of governate level. I was up in Tikrit yesterday. I met with governors of the central provinces -- Ninevah, Kirkuk, Salahadin, and Diyala -- and had a chance to hear from them the multiplicity of challenges they face and how it varies from province to province and kind of trying to get at all that is part of the undertaking, too.

That’s kind of what I’ve been focused on and happy to talk about anything that is on your minds.

QUESTION: On the political -- the national reconciliation side -- how do you see, obviously there is a lot of pressure coming from Washington for movement, for progress. From your view, being here, how would you sort of characterize what’s going on?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, the image has been used before, but I think it’s a good one. This sense of different clocks -- a Washington clock and an Iraq clock. And the concept that the Washington clock seems to be running a lot faster than the Baghdad clock. And I think that’s valid. What I see is an awareness and focus on the part of the Iraqi leadership that reconciliation is key to Iraq’s success. And I see steps moving in that direction.

A couple of days ago the Presidency Council met with the Prime Minister. That’s President Talabani, the two Vice Presidents -- Adel Abd al- Mahdi the Shia, Tariq al-Hashimi, the Sunni -- then meeting with the Prime Minister. Yesterday the Political Council for National Security met under the leadership of President Talabani. That brings in, again, the Prime Minister, the Vice Presidents, the leaders of major political groupings, in this case parties such as Fadila, which has been outside the process for some time.

So I think, over this last week or so, we’ve been seeing a series of meetings that I’m not sure we’ve seen in the past. That is bringing representatives of all of Iraq’s communities together to discuss ways forward. I think that is in its own way as important as some of these individual issues we’ve been focused on, like de-Ba’athification reform, the hydrocarbon legislation and constitutional amendments. For Iraqis at senior levels, to be able to get around a table and talk about what is of concern to different communities, to be heard and then to develop concerted forms of action, is what reconciliation is ultimately all about.

So I think we are seeing some progress, as it were, at the strategic level, but there’s a tremendous amount of damage out there that’s got to be repaired. I mean, the sectarian violence over the last year has been hugely corrosive. And you just don’t wave a wand over it and make that go away in a day, a week or a month. So, I hope what we see is, again, a process of reconciliation starting to come together that will be encouraging enough outside of Iraq to sustain the support the country is going to need in order to have this really take root and fundamentally change the dynamic in the country, because that just does not happen quickly.

QUESTION: Steve Farrell, London Times. You talk about different clocks. And can you expand a little on that? And Washington seems to be talking about milestones or benchmarks or whatever. What are the Iraqis looking for -- are they looking to months, years, events? Also, benchmarks, milestones -- when you’re talking to each other, how are you judging progress and judging when things should be done by?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: It’s a great point, because I think both of us have to watch both clocks. You know, the Washington clock is a reality and I think Iraqis understand that, that they need to demonstrate in the short term that they have the will and the ability to advance certain concrete measures that further the process of reconciliation. We would expect, for example, to see hydrocarbon negotiators get together in the next couple of days. I think we expect to see, within just a few days, a team come down from Erbil to sit down with the team here in Baghdad and thrash through some of these complex issues on revenue sharing, field allocations and so forth. And the fact that they are doing that reflects a sense of urgency on the Iraqi side that they need to get this done, both because it’s important for Iraq, but also because it’s important in the U.S. and the West that we see evidence that they can come together and do these things. At the same time, and as significant as this or de-Ba’athification reform might be, they are means to an end. And the end is national reconciliation and that process, again, isn’t going to be achieved, in my view, by any specific legislative initiative. That can show a seriousness of purpose. It can lead to an atmosphere that furthers national reconciliation, but after what this country has been through it is going to take time and sustained effort to really knit people back together again. And that’s then the Baghdad clock or the Iraq clock

QUESTION: Ambassador. Just following on that. Does that then argue that the review that will go on in September with folks back in Washington, in some sense, you know, it will be difficult to form a final conclusion regardless of the legislative progress that’s made about whether to continue the current surge, whether to continue the current strategy? In some sense it’s hard to understand how you retain a kind of firm conclusion of about how things are going. Can you kind of explain what your initial thinking is about how that will be handled?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Again, it’s a great question. You know, you sit out here. I think you see this with real clarity. You see with real clarity that there is not real clarity. You simply cannot say “X” has happened, we therefore can definitively claim either success or failure. It’s going to be a complex, interwoven process. One in which, I think, we are going to be making some necessarily subjective judgments. Does this feel like it’s moving in the right direction? Clearly it is going to be good to have, again, concrete achievements to point to -- hydrocarbon legislation -- but I would not be the one to say because they got that legislative package through, that means we now have reconciliation. It means that something good has happened and shows there is seriousness of purpose and sets the stage for further progress, but it doesn’t mean that you’ve achieved something that I think is going to be quite long term. It’s going to mean taking a close look at what different actions mean.

One thing I’ve been struck by, the whole time I’ve been here, we have seen a succession of horrific suicide attacks in different parts of the country, up in Mosul, for example, aimed at the coalition, aimed at infrastructure, aimed at symbols of the government, aimed at creating mass causalities. All obviously not good news. But there is something else out there, which is that none of this has triggered a re-ignition of the kind of wide-scale sectarian violence, the loosing of the death squads and so forth, that was a feature of the landscape for much of the last year. That’s clearly an intent, but it hasn’t happened. So even looking at just security developments, I think you’ve got to kind of look beyond them and see what they might really mean.

So, I don’t know where we’ll be in September, but I’m feeling, right now, today, I’m feeling kind of encouraged, because, on the security side, we haven’t seen a reversion to wide-spread sectarian violence, in spite of the provocations; because, on the political side, we’re seeing some high-level efforts to thrash out issues around the table; and because we’re seeing a seriousness of purpose on some of the specific agenda items. Really on all of them. But, does that lead me to tell you that, come September, we’re going to be able to say that we’ve reached the sun-dappled upland and all is well and good? I don’t think so.

QUESTION: Isn’t this a change that’s going to be another one of those false dawns? Saddam fell. There was a governing council. There were elections. There was a constitution, a government. And each time people say, “Great, progress,” and each time the violence just gets stronger. Soon you’ll have a hydrocarbon law, hopefully. Soon you’ll have a review of the de-Ba’athifacation process, hopefully. What happens if it just continues?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: That’s an evaluation we’ll have to make depending on what we’ve got going on. If I had to evaluate today, though, in looking purely at the security situation, as devastating as the Al Qaeda-led chain of suicide vehicle attacks is, that has not – does not in my mind suggest the failing of the state or of society. I think it would, if this were September, I think it would be a terrible mistake to conclude because they’ve been able to mount these attacks, that therefore it isn’t working, it isn’t going to work, and we just all need to pull up stakes. That is what they would like to see, but I think that as long as you’re seeing things not happening, the sectarian or ethnic cleansing campaign not moving forward like it was prior to the plan, you need to reserve judgment.

QUESTION: Ambassador, to what are you attributing this, the fact that there has not been the – that the sectarian violence has not resumed, to what do you attribute this? Is it just because there are lots of American soldiers on the ground here? Is it because the Mahdi army is sitting out the fight? Or do you believe this is a reflection of the political parties and their engagement, the reconciliation process?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I would say probably all of the above, and a few other factors thrown in. I think what has been happening out in Anbar, for example, is significant. We didn’t create that. I don’t think the Iraqi government really created it. It was simply Iraqis out in Anbar saying, “We don’t like the way this is going. We do not share the vision that Al Qaeda has for the future of Iraq, and we’re going to stand against it.” And you’re seeing this move around a little bit. Some indications in Abu Ghraib. I gather now even in Diyala with some of the tribes. So there clearly is something going on at the popular level that says, “We do not want to move in this direction.” Sometimes it can be the case that you’ve got to look over the edge to see how deep the abyss really is before, perhaps, your attention gets focused in other directions.

We all talk to Iraqis; I don’t think any of us find very many who say, “Yes, wide-spread violence is a good thing. It’s what I want, and more importantly it’s what my family wants.” That’s not what people want, and I think what you may have working here is that people have seen enough of this to say, “I’m not going to go there. I’m not going to go there even if I’m provoked. Not only am I not going to go there, I’m going to stand up against it,” which you see out in Anbar.

I’ve been around the city enough to think that the other supposition that you mentioned is also true. I think that the security plan is starting to make a difference. Both the presence of our forces, but also the presence of Iraqi forces. I think the Iraqi army in particular has stood up to this and has been well received and I think that is showing some encouragement.

And I think it also encourages people when they see their leaders coming together, and then going out in front of the cameras and saying, “Yes, we’ve just met. We’ve talked about the issues that confront the nation. We’re determined to move ahead in resolving them.” They see the head of the Iraqi Islamic party there with the Dawa party leadership and others. I think that sends a re-enforcing signal.

I think it is all this stuff working together. But again I am not going to sit here and tell you that I think we’ve got success. There’s absolutely no way I would make that prediction right now. I think it remains a very fragile and very complex process, that what’s looking positive on one day can easily be seen as a series of setbacks the next. But the one – and again, what do I know after six weeks -- if there is a pattern that I see on the security level, it has been these car bomb attacks, again aiming at different target sets for different purposes, but the ability of Iraqis to say, “That is not going to go force me to go pick up my gun and go after my neighbor,” is encouraging.

QUESTION: Could we be one Samarra [bombing] away from that?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I think that that’s, again, a good question to ask. Is tolerance to these kinds of provocations limitless? Probably not. You have to be concerned that could be just a cumulative effect, that at a certain point people say “That’s it,” or that Al Qaeda gets the really, really big one through. They’ve tried in Karbala. They tried repeatedly in Karbala to get to the shrines. They’ve killed a lot of people, but the security measures that the Iraqis have in place have prevented that. I know from my discussions that the leadership here is keenly focused on protecting precisely those kinds of hugely symbolic types of targets. And, again, that’s what I mean about the fragility though, because if, God forbid, something happened in Karbala or Najaf or Qadhimiya or Adhamiya, I could not predict what the response would be.

QUESTION: Is Maliki the right man for the job? Do you think he has what it takes to bring all the different sides together?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, he is the man in the job and he has our support. Again what we have seen over this last week or so is, he certainly is bringing the parties together, quite literally, both in his meeting with the Presidential Council for National Security and with the Presidency Council.

And as I understand, well, I know he’s also had several separate meetings just with him and Vice President Al-Hashimi. So I think he’s definitely reaching out. Clearly you need to go beyond that and start, or carry forward with plans of action, but – again, I have only been here six weeks, and in that six weeks I’ve spent a lot of time with the Prime Minister and been present as he’s met with the Vice President, Secretary Rice, Secretary Gates, others. He is a smart individual who has paid a lot for his vision of Iraq over the years he was in exile. His party paid in blood, those that were here. I think he doesn’t need to be told by us that he is the man of the moment, who has the opportunity to try to bring this country to the position where it realizes all that he sacrificed for over the years. And he certainly knows that that requires an inclusivity. I’ve heard him describe how the Dawa party, its organization, its ideals, and the price it’s paid pretty much parallel the course of the Iraqi Islamic Party, Tariq Al-Hashimi’s party. You know, just ruthlessly pursed by the Saddam regime. Its leadership either went underground, or got out, but never compromised on basic principles.

He is, I think, clearly prepared to reach across communal boundaries. What he is much harder over on, understandably, as is Tariq Al-Hashimi, is any suggestion that the Ba’ath could do what its name literally means, which is resurrect itself. But even there, as we’ve seen with the negotiations on de-Ba’athification reform, he and Vice President Adil Abd al-Mahdi are very aware that you’ve got to reach out and include all those who can be included to reduce your enemy to the smallest core possible. There will be irreconcilables, but not to have a whole population against you, I think he understands that. So, you know, whether it is ultimately within his power, the power of this government, the power of the coalition supporting the government, to bring Iraq to a successful state, I mean, again I can’t tell you that it is. I do feel he is committed to it and I think he’s got the vision to try and bring that to fruition.

QUESTION: Do you think that there is a, if this government cannot do that, is there another, is there a viable, is there really a new formation or viable democratic national unity government that can be formed but be able to achieve it, or no, is this the last chance for the experiment to, of representative government to…?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I think that’s another great question. Iraq has had three Prime Ministers now. They’ve all encountered a lot of difficulty. Part of that, I think, is just inherent in the challenges the country faces that are pretty obvious. Part of it, I think, is inherent in the political system in which a Prime Minister has to rely on a pretty broad and diverse coalition to maintain the confidence of the Parliament, and that imposes a lot of limitations. It leads me to think that the answer is probably staying steady and just working through problems and not thinking that well, okay, let’s get another Prime Minister in here to sort all this out. My understanding of the coalition system, the nature of the Parliament that the closed list voting system has produced, is that any Prime Minister is going to have a challenge in getting backing, particularly in the Council of Representatives, for bold legislative initiatives. So it’s obviously up to Iraqis what they do. I would not think that Western interests in Iraq would be served by encouraging yet another change in government. I don’t think that’s the issue.

QUESTION: Okay, but let’s say that if that’s the case, let’s say that if this government in six/seven months, if it’s at the same place we are now, that Dave has pointed out, you’ve had legislation the CPA, (inaudible) and we’re still at the same point in six or seven months, is it possible that Iraqis would be looking at options other than a Parliamentary system for leadership and what would -- I mean, is the Embassy looking at other options, if there is a contingency - if there isn’t success and real progress in six or seven months -- beyond the democratic system?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well I would hazard to judge that if that were the case, Iraqis within the system would probably be saying, “This isn’t working.” A Prime Minister has to maintain the confidence of the Council. If the Council at some point, and its majority, loses confidence then you’ve got, you know, the fall of the government and the effort to form a new one. That’s what happens in parliamentary democracies, which this is. You know, no Prime Minister is going to be Prime Minister forever. Circumstances of those, of change, is going to have to depend on Iraq and its institutions and the members of those institutions. I mean, that’s what I would expect in the first instance. If Iraqis decide that they want an entirely new system, that would be something they would have to take on for themselves. It would require major constitutional shifts. But these would be for them to decide and for them to make. Having been here at the beginning in 2003, I can tell you now that in 2007 these will not be U.S. or coalition decisions. These will be Iraqi decisions.

QUESTION: Do you have a contingency plan for that, of some sort, of that possibility that perhaps some Iraqi leaders would want to scrap this political process.

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: No, I certainly do not. All of my thinking and efforts are going into how we can support this government, within its current system, achieve success.

QUESTION: Ambassador can you give us a little detail about the goals and, sort of, of the setup of the coming meetings with Iran?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well this flows out, of course, the Neighbors Conference process. We had a meeting here in March, at a working level, ministerial level in Sharm al-Sheikh, that brought us together with the Iranians. So we see a U.S.-Iran meeting as within that context, which means, as we have said, it is not about U.S.-Iranian relations, it’s about how direct contact between us can help the situation inside Iraq. Clearly it will be our intention in such a meeting to press the Iranians to live up to their stated policy. I was at Sharm el-Sheikh, I heard the Iranians lay out a characterization of their policy and their aims with respect to Iraq that sounds very much like our own. What we would like to see them do is act in a way that supports their stated policy, because there’s quite a variation. So this will be a discussion that is restricted to Iraq -- both the U.S. and Iran agree to that. I would not expect stunning, startling breakthroughs in an initial encounter. We’ll have a meeting, we’ll see what we think of the discussion and then decide next steps from there.

QUESTION: Is there a feeling that at least there’s an atmosphere, an ability to work together that there could be to … [inaudible]

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well again, we’re going into this focused on Iraq. What we would therefore like to see is some progress on Iraq-focused issues, leading to further progress on Iraq-focused issues. Again, bear in mind, it’s not the first time we have done this kind of thing. We had a dialogue with the Iranians under United Nations auspices on Afghanistan, sort of the 2001-2003 period, and I was involved in that as well. And that just dealt with Afghanistan and certain specific things that could be done or should not be done to create a more stable environment in Afghanistan. So we have done this kind of thing before. I think we kind of both understand what the parameters and indeed limitations are.

QUESTION: Do you plan to present them with specific evidence, for example, on the EFP problem, with contentions by the U.S. that they’re transferring those weapons, and the makings of those weapons, into Iraq—that and the holding of the Quds Force detainees will come up?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well I hope you’ll understand if I do not reveal my entire negotiating strategy to you several weeks before we even sit down at the table, but I think it would be a fair assumption that we’ll go into this with specific points, as well as general ones, on the kinds of things we see them doing here. And we certainly expect that they too will have their certain specific points. With respect to the detainee, I have no idea what they’re going to bring to the table. The issue certainly didn’t keep them from coming to the table in Sharm el-Sheikh or indeed coming forward to agree to a bilateral dialogue.

QUESTION: I guess in some ways, maybe the question is: Is the U.S. prepared to discuss turning over those detainees at some point, back to the Iranians at some level?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well that’s already out there. I mean, they’re detained under the authority of Security Council resolutions. There is a process, they have their cases reviewed periodically, I think it’s another month or two before they would be due for review, but there is already a mechanism out there to deal with this. I wouldn’t anticipate that anything we would discuss with them would at all change, kind of the framework under which they’re held or the mechanisms that deal with that, ICRC access and the rest of it.

QUESTION: Just to clarify, are all the detainees taken up north and (inaudible) still detainees—nobody has been released so far?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Not to my knowledge, no.

QUESTION: And you foresee the meeting you’re talking about happening in several weeks?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I think we’re looking at trying to -- we haven’t established a specific date, but I think we’re both interested in having a meeting before the end of the month—the end of this month.

Question: The end of –


AMBASSADOR CROCKER : The end of May -- I think it’s May [now] (laughter).

QUESTION: On those meetings, you said something about several weeks, but I am wondering, if it’s something that seen that could be useful, why the lag-time? Is that coming from their side? And secondly, is it a problem for the U.S., or the fact that really, of Iraq’s neighbors, in some ways one of the more helpful countries, in terms of Iraq, in terms of supporting the government, having representation here, economic assistance and things, really is Iran, I mean, if you look at it. And there continues, and I was at Sharm al-Sheikh also, to be that some governments, you know, say, “We don’t want to work with this [Iraqi] government,” they have their problems with the Maliki government, so I guess two things there: Why the lag time if it’s useful and then also is it, for the U.S., a problem that Iran of the neighbors is one of the more helpful countries to Iraq?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well on the first, basically we’re ready. I am ready to sit down anytime they would like. We just sort of need to hear from them when that is.

With respect to the relationship between Iran and Iraq, I guess I am not sure I would characterize it the same way you did. They have an extensive relationship with Iraq, but pretty clearly, from our perspective, not all aspects of it are helpful and some of them are positively dangerous. I mean, their support for militias, their involvement in the development and transfer of EFPs that are killing our forces, these are not good things, not from a U.S. point of view and not from an Iraqi point of view. But that’s why I made the point I did about the, kind of the difference we see between the articulation of Iran’s policy interests and goals, which again track pretty closely with ours, and then what they’re actually doing on the ground. It would be a very good thing if they brought their actions more into alignment with their words.

We have no problem with a close relationship between Iran and Iraq. What we do have a problem with is Iranian behavior in Iraq that is again counter to what we want to see, what the Iraqi government and people want to see and indeed counter to some of their own stated interests. That’s what we want to see change. But you know, Iran and Iraq —Iraq’s longest border is with Iran. They’re neighbors forever, for better or for worse; for a very long time it’s been for worse. No country has suffered more, with the exception of Iraq itself, from Saddam’s regime than the Iranians. There is an opportunity here for them, I think, to move into a whole new era in a relationship with a stable, secure, democratic Iraq that threatens none of its neighbors, including Iran. But, you know, to get there they need to start doing some more constructive things than they have.

QUESTION: Some people say, some American think-tanks, say that four years on, that when you look at America’s involvement in Iraq post-Saddam, that Iran has been the shrewder player, has ended up with more influence in the halls of power than the United States. I’m curious if you think that they actually – they bring more influence to bear inside Baghdad’s halls of power than America?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: No, I really don’t think they do. Not that that should – I mean, I don’t think it serves anyone’s interests – ours or Iraq’s – to be thinking in terms of a competition for power and influence by foreign capitals, ours or anybody else, over Iraq. It’s what can all of us do to help this Iraqi government succeed in the colossal challenges it faces. I would like to see Iran be a positive part of that process instead of a negative one. Again, you know, it’s up to them set and define their own interests, but with Saddam gone, and a democratic system in place, this would seem to be a very good opportunity for Iran to play a positive role here, to steady things down, because that would presumably be in their own interest over the long term.

QUESTION: Could you see that this ends with Iran (inaudible), with Iran being a closer ally to Iraq then America?

AMBASSDOR CROCKER: Oh well, goodness, you know that goes on into the dim middle distance of speculation, and I wouldn’t want to go there. Look, what we’re seeking is a stable, secure, democratic Iraq and, obviously, a long-term relationship with that government, that state. It will be a state that is obviously also going to have relations with all of its neighbors, and we hope that they will be good relations with all of its neighbors. That’s the whole logic of this Neighbors’ Conference – we’re strong supporters of that. Iraq has problems with not just Iran, although those are arguably the most severe, but varying degrees with many of its neighbors. We would like to see that whole galaxy of relations improve. It’s not a zero-sum game.

QUESTION: Going back to the question of two different clocks. Many Iraqis, they look at the constitution and this proposed hydrocarbon law, and they say both packages were formulated under intense U.S. pressure, with the result being that the real issues, the real substance, was delayed for future discussion. With the constitution, there’s the amendments, with the hydrocarbon law it’s the system of revenue sharing. Many Iraqis, Sunnis and Shi’as, they say, “Well, substance was kind of sacrificed for the appearance of satisfying Washington’s clock.” Do you think there is a risk, when the two clocks are out of synch, that the Americans put so much pressure on the Iraqis, that measures like this, like the constitution, like the oil law, are formulated, but the real substance is not resolved, that kind of creates animosity?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Again, it’s a great question. I think there’s always a risk, in international relations, if one power essentially compels another to do something that the second power really doesn’t want to do. I’m not sure that’s the case at all here. On the constitution, obviously an imperative to get a constitution written and adopted. Circumstances in Iraq really didn’t afford them the luxury of the whatever it was – 13 years – that we had in the U.S. to go through a constitution that still didn’t turn out perfect, obviously; we had a big, nasty old civil war. That they, for their own purposes, needed something and needed it fairly quickly. So I don’t think it was really the result of U.S. pressure, and indeed the constitution foresaw the need for amendment, had the provision in it, and that’s what they’re working off of now. Similarly, with the hydrocarbon law, you’ve got the framework agreement, which was important. It set out principles that all of the parties have committed to. It sets the stage for what I think we’re getting into now, which will be the thrashing out of the revenue-sharing, field allocation elements. So, I really don’t see a contradiction there.

Okay, somebody got a quick one?

QUESTION: (inaudible) What about de-Ba’thification, where do we stand with that now?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I understand that there have been some further intensive discussions between, in particular, the two Vice Presidents, Vice President Abd al-Mahdi and Vice President Hashimi, on the shape the text could take that would be acceptable to both of them and beyond them to their parliamentary representatives. I don’t know where that stands right now, but I do know they’re working on it, which is encouraging.

Iraqi Joint Anti-Corruption Council
May 16, 2007

The Government of Iraq is creating an Iraqi Joint Anti Corruption
Council (JACC) which will be signed at 11:00 am at the Prime Minister's
Office. This body will coordinate anticorruption agencies and formulate
nationwide strategies in combating corruption. This group shall be made
up of the Secretary of the Council of Ministers, a representative of the
Iraqi Higher Juridical Council, a senior member of the Iraqi Inspectors
General, the President of the Iraqi Supreme Board of Audit, and the
Commissioner of the Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity.

This body is the culmination of months of care drafting and negotiation
between the independent commissions, the Prime Minister's Office, and
the Court System. A departure from the political practices of the past
that relied upon a strongman approach with a single leader, this body
recognizes the independent nature of the court system and independent
agencies charged with confronting corruption in Iraq. As a means to
gather consensus to fight corruption through the bolstering on
independent nonpartisan political action the JACC signals a major
advance in democratic practice and Rule of Law.

The JACC will serve as a forum for each of the stakeholders to confront
corruption in Iraq and apply a unified front in anticorruption efforts.
This body both recognizes the equal status of these agencies and serves
to take advantage of their independence to focus a nationwide approach
for combating corruption.

This is not a U.S. Embassy event. The sponsoring agency will be the
Iraqi Council of Ministers
POC Dr Alli Alaq
0790-194-8371
Secretary General of the COM

The Central Bank starts applying the electronic payment system

18 May 2007 (Iraq Directory)

The Iraqi Central Bank began applying the electronic payment system RTGS, with the accession of a number of Iraqi banks effectively.

A source in the Bank said that: the modern payments system would facilitate payment processes among banks and between them and the Central, as all banks have accounts in the Central Bank; reconciliations are done through moving these accounts also. He added that the Bank seeks to develop such a mechanism in future in a way that exceeds the scope of the banking sector, pointing out to linking the Ministry of Finance to this system, and added that the work on linking the Iraq market for securities, as well as remittances and bonds in the Central Bank. The source indicated that the Bank is working on establishing a system for clearing checks electronically and has good and concrete preparations to develop the Iraqi banking sector to cope with the international development.

[quote=Inscrutable;202073]Iraq: Exchange Rate as of April 30, 2007

Was someone saying before that they could only adjust by a small percentage of this rate or can they do RV to a larger rate with the 30 day notice to the IMF? A little confused by this.

Thanks
JD

18 May 2007

Obstruction of Article 140 of the Constitution and a violation of Iraqi sovereignty

After the liberation of Iraq from the yoke of Saddam's dictatorship and the Baathist regime, ground favorable to build Iraq according to the Constitution protects the unity and sovereignty. Alsaiaseh has fought parties and spe******ts in the field of law several rounds of debate to get Iraqi constitution guarantees to the Iraqis their rights in their homeland, and with respect Alcord not Be Iraqi constitution, which Iraqis voted for the bell, standard ambitious and enormous sacrifices they had accepted the interest of the supreme interest of Iraq. The entire Iraqi Gedi that any change in the Constitution and it is a violation of Iraqi sovereignty Nthaka.

Among the paragraphs is necessary and urgent to change the policy of the Principles in a very large number of Alkor and other Iraqi constituencies is the right to have their owners within that according to Article 140 of the Constitution, which set the end of 2007 the date of the expiration of three stages of the normalization process, which expires conduct a plebiscite in the report the fate of the city.

A number of Iraqi parties blessing outsiders obstructing this article, through the fabrication of spurious arguments and Baselessness them.
It quoted government sources as saying that Baghdad had requested the offices of the article 140 to prepare lists of names coming from Arab countries for the purpose of allocating the necessary payments to compensate them in next year's budget 2008 measure was inconsistent with the deadlines established by the Constitution to eliminate the problem of Kirkuk.

It is known that the Iraqi government's attitude was positive article constitutional formed through the Special Committee for application and approval decisions, but they appear to be subjected to pressure by some parties to obstruct normalization procedures in the city.

The Iraqi political parties are trying to evade their constitutional obligations already approved by inviting them to postpone the application of Article 140 to a later date and that is a clear constitutional violation.
Has shown Accord Front and the Iraqi List, some of the parties in the coalition unified opposition bloc normalization procedures, and the main reason for this rejection was due to a misunderstanding in terms of constitutional rule Amadh not specialize city of Kirkuk alone but include other Iraqi cities, which witnessed the ethnically similar and attempt to change Demogeravitha population.

As these desperate attempts by some parties are hostile view to achieving self-interests at the expense of Arabs and Turkmen in Kirkuk, they merely dissenting voice does not reflect the interest of the population of Kirkuk, there are more than 12 thousand family of Arab cinema has shown willingness to return to their previous order to facilitate the process of normalization.

The organizers of the implementation of the constitutional article that there are no obstacles or impediments to the implementation of Article 140, there are four resolutions issued by the Higher Committee for normalizing that define the initial stages of the normalization process.

And from time to time and history Alterac pretext of concern for advocacy and Turkomans claim to postpone the referendum in Kirkuk and work by all means to obstruct the implementation of Article 140 and this is interference in the country's affairs Akharda rule. Including the Turkish intervention in Kirkuk cast a shadow over the deputies Iraqis and Turkoman parties oppose Article 140 through conferences and meetings , which was held in Istanbul and Ankara, and the attempt to mobilize public opinion against the constitutional article on one hand and Talibam Alcord on the other hand.

Although this issue an internal affair between the Iraqi government and the federal territory of Kurdstan and will be addressed in accordance with the Constitution, without the need for external intervention to solve them.

The Kurdistan firm position is the necessity of commitment to Article (140) of the Constitution and implemented according to the map drawn in the article mentioned in the schedule.

Journalist Kurdstan-hee Owler

KRG, Kurdistan Regional Government

Ban urges all Iraqis to rise above narrow sectarian interests, foster Politics 5/18/2007 8:17:00 PM

consensus UNITED NATIONS, May 18 (KUNA) -- As Iraq's Constitutional Review Committee prepares to submit the results of its deliberations to the full parliament, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on Friday reiterated the importance of the constitutional review process and of finalizing the outstanding issues that are vital to the process of national reconciliation.

"The Committee has undertaken its work responsibly in an atmosphere of mutual respect, and should be applauded," Ban said through his spokesperson Michele Montas.
"Striking a compromise on the core constitutional issues at the heart of Iraq's system of governance is essential for establishing stability in the country," she stressed.
She said Ban "hopes that Iraqi leaders will embrace this opportunity by rising above narrow sectarian interests, remaining open to compromise, and fostering consensus," adding that the UN remains "fully committed to a national dialogue towards a Constitution than can be supported by all Iraqis". (end) sj.tg KUNA 182017 May 07NNNN

http://www.kuna.net.kw/NewsAgenciesP...99&Language=en

Time for Iraqi leaders to move quickly on key issues -- Satterfield
Politics 5/18/2007 8:15:00 PM

WASHINGTON, May 18 (KUNA) -- It is time for the leaders of Iraq to move quickly on key issues facing the war-torn country, said David Satterfield, the U.S. State Department senior adviser on Iraq, in a National Public Radio interview on Friday.
"Every poll taken shows that the people of Iraq believe two things," Satterfield said. "First, they would like to see foreign forces leave their country. Second, they do not want to see those forces leave until the country is more stable.

The leaders of Iraq, all of them, need to understand what the consequences are if in fact they do not move forward and move forward rapidly. It is time for Iraq's leaders to move".

During a discussion marking the one-year anniversary of the Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Satterfield said the Maliki government has been "significantly challenged" by the unhelpful actions of Iran and Syria, a brutal internal Sunni insurgency and a vicious al Qaeda fundamentalist terror campaign in which many thousands of Iraqis continue to die.

"Those challenges notwithstanding, there are accomplishments," Satterfield said. "The security services of Iraq, particularly the Iraqi army, are more capable, more competent, more national. The government has moved forward on the beginnings of a political reconciliation process, but beginnings are not enough".

Satterfield predicted that the Maliki government would approve a new Iraqi oil law by this summer.
" ... On the hydrocarbons issue, we are very confident that a national hydrocarbon law, a package of measures, will indeed be agreed upon and passed shortly, by this summer," he said.

However, other major issues must also be addressed, Satterfield said. "The fundamental agreement on what the future of what Iraq should look like -- that understanding very much needs to be reached and executed as rapidly as possible for Iraq's sake," he said.

Mailiki has honored his commitment to ensure that Iraqi security forces "act on an evenhanded basis, and there would not be political interference in security decisions," Satterfield said.

Last November, Shia firebrand Muqtada al-Sadr broke with the Maliki government by withdrawing his forces from the government and the parliament, Satterfield noted. "He put them back in at the end of January, having accomplished absolutely nothing except demonstrating he had no ability to shape the behavior of the government -- a government which continues to stand up to him not just in a political sense, but also militarily," Satterfield said.

There is a significant ongoing challenge on restructuring, retraining and vetting the police forces of Iraq, Satterfield said, and Maliki "has made very clear his own unhappiness with what had happened to the management of the police forces of Iraq -- not all of them, but significant elements of the police force". (end) rm.tg KUNA 182015 May 07NNNN

http://www.kuna.net.kw/NewsAgenciesP...01&Language=en