Thread: Archive Latest News - Think Tank - 16/08/07 - 03/11/07

Planning minister’s decision to return to government regrettable – IAF

Baghdad - Voices of Iraq
Friday , 14 /09 /2007

Baghdad, Sept 14, (VOI)- The Iraqi Accordance Front (IAF) described on Friday the decision taken by Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation Ali Baban to return to the government as “regrettable”.

“Member of the Islamic party and the IAF Ali Baban stressed during his meeting with Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi his "commitment to IAF's decision to quit the cabinet and that he neither intends to return to the government nor violates his obligation towards IAF of which he is a member, however the minister changed his position next day and announced his returning to the government,” the IAF said in a statement received by the independent news agency Voices of Iraq (VOI).

“The Sunni bloc considers the minister’s position as personal and regrettable,” the statement added, noting that his position will not affect or change its decision.
The IAF thanked its ministers who are committed to its decision to abandon the government.

The minister said at a press conference on Thursday that he decided to return to the government because he wanted to assert that the country is more important than the government.

He told the (VOI) over the phone that he decided to come back “to highlight the dangerous of adopting laws of oil and gas, financial resources and provincial council through attending the cabinet’s meetings.”

Ali Baban is a leading figure in Hashemi's Iraqi Islamic Party, a main component of the Sunni IAF.

On Wednesday, a source from Prime Minister's office said "Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation decided to return to the government and to end his boycott to the cabinet sessions."

The IAF, the third largest bloc in Iraqi parliament with 44 out of a total 275 seats, had announced last month that its five ministers and deputy premier, Sallam al-Zawbaie, have quit the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki because "the government slammed the door shut to any reforms that would help rescue Iraq."

The IAF is composed of three main Sunni political organizations: the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Congress of the People of Iraq and the National Dialogue Council.

Baban himself had threatened to withdraw from the government before his bloc's decision last month if the oil and gas law approved without making "fundamental amendments".

He asserted that the law has "negative effects" on Iraqi oil wealth, calling for holding a referendum on that law.

Aswat Aliraq

Iraq still facing legal challenges: White House report

Friday, September 14, 2007

[JURIST] The White House submitted a new Benchmark Assessment Report [PDF text] on Iraq to Congress Friday, noting that little progress had been made by the Iraqi government toward accomplishing 18 "benchmarks" thought to be essential to Iraq's stability. The Initial Benchmark Assessment Report [PDF text; JURIST report], submitted to Congress in July, had reported that the Iraqi government was making satisfactory progress toward meeting eight of 18 goals and unsatisfactory progress on eight others; two of the goals could not be rated for performance. The assessment issued Friday found that the Iraqi government had only met one new benchmark - allowing former members of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party [party website] to hold government positions:
The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward enacting and implementing legislation on de-Baathification reform. The fact that legislation has not yet passed the COR should not diminish the significance of the agreement reached by the leaders or the re-integration of former Baathists taking place on the ground. The overarching goal of de-Baathification reform is political accommodation between the Shi’a and Sunni communities. The leaders’ agreement combined with the return of former Baathists to civic life is a significant step in that regard. Debate on this draft law in the COR is an integral part of developing the broad political acceptance needed to promote real reconciliation.

President Bush, in a televised address [transcript] on Thursday, said this about the Iraq government's progess:

The government has not met its own legislative benchmarks - and in my meetings with Iraqi leaders, I have made it clear that they must. Yet Iraq's national leaders are getting some things done. For example, they have passed a budget. They're sharing oil revenues with the provinces. They're allowing former Baathists to rejoin Iraq's military or receive government pensions. Local reconciliation is taking place. The key now is to link this progress in the provinces to progress in Baghdad. As local politics change, so will national politics.
Friday's report claims that meeting the 18 benchmarks required of the Iraqi government will advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, improve the security of the Iraqi population, provide essential services to the population, and promote the country's economic well-being.

Some of the benchmarks already met by the Iraqi government include the formation of a Constitutional Review Committee [JURIST report] and completion of a constitutional review, enacting and implementing legislation on de-Baathification reform [JURIST news archive] and enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions [JURIST news archive]. The Iraqi government has far failed at the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources [JURIST report], increasing the number of Iraqi security forces able to operate independently and ensuring that Iraqi political officials are not undermining or making false accusations against foreign forces. Two benchmarks, amnesty legislation and militia disarmament, were not ready to be assessed. AP has more. BBC News has additional coverage.

JURIST - Paper Chase: Iraq still facing legal challenges: White House report

The Hunt Oil Dispute and the Future of Iraqi Federalism

September 13, 2007

JURIST Guest Columnist Haider Ala Hamoudi of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law says that a dispute over the legality of an oil exploration contract recently made between Hunt Oil Co. and the Kurdistan Regional Government calls into question the growing push for a form of loose federalism for Iraq...


On September 8, it was reported by the Associated Press that Hunt Oil Co. signed an oil exploration deal with the Kurdistan Regional Government ("KRG"), the government of the semi-autonomous region of Iraq controlled by the Kurdish ethnic minority. In the conflict that has since ensued between the Iraqi oil minister and the KRG regarding the legality of the contract is a lesson in the limits of law in nearly stateless societies and the consequent difficulties that would attend any legally sanctioned partition of Iraq. The dispute calls into question the growing call for a form of loose federalism for Iraq, often on the basis of the success of the Kurdish region. It turns out, from the Hunt Oil example, that the matter of separation is not so easy, in the absence of strong, central, national institutions of law that almost presuppose communities working together rather than apart. Let's begin with the constitution, which will frame the legal debate in the Hunt Oil case, which will in turn demonstrate the entire fallacy of the loose federalism position.

The advocates and detractors of loose Iraqi federalism sometimes fail to mention that the current Constitution of Iraq already provides for the possibility of the state envisioned by the loose federalists. Article 110 of the Constitution restricts the exclusive power of the national government to a very limited set of issues dealing with foreign exchange, coinage, national defense, a mail system, citizenship and related matters. Article 114 then mentions broader shared powers between the national government and substate entities known as regions ('aqaleem), and Article 115 makes clear that regional laws have priority over national laws, ultimately meaning that the national government only has effective control over the very narrow list of matters contained in Article 110. The real issue, then, is whether the Shi'i and Sunni populations outside of Baghdad (which is the one province that cannot form an autonomous region under Article 124), currently divided into "provinces" (muhafadhat), will seek to have their own regions as per the Kurdish example, as is contemplated by Article 119. If the provinces were to elect to do this, then a model of loose federalism would be achieved. It would be a rather destructive form of loose federalism, however, one that would extend well beyond what proponents in the United States desire and an almost sure catalyst for future conflict.

The reason for this is, unsurprisingly, oil. Even the loose federalists realize the necessity of sharing natural resources on a national basis, or the resource poor Sunni regions would almost be sure to object to the federal divisions. The latest convert to the loose federalism cause, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, therefore refers to Baghdad as the "cash register" that would dispense money to the regions.

Unfortunately for Friedman and his loose federalism allies, however, the constitution, by Kurdish demand, calls for something considerably less than this. Articles 111 and 112 are the compromise drawn between the Kurds and the Shi'a, the primary drafters of Iraq's constitution, on the issue of natural resources. First of all, not all natural resources are covered by Articles 111 and 112, but only oil and gas. Phosphates, which have been described as a potentially profitable by some, lie beyond the purview of these Articles and therefore are under regional control. More importantly, while Article 111 indicates that oil and gas are the property of the entire Iraqi people, Article 112 indicates that management of "existing fields" (al-huqul al-haliya) of oil and gas is under the control of the national government (along with the governments of the regions in question) and that the oil from these fields be shared on a per capita basis, with certain limited exceptions in favor of areas particularly devastated by the actions of the Saddam regime. This presumably leaves new oil fields to be managed as the regions would like. How distribution of revenues might work for new oil fields seems more difficult to determine, given that Article 111 declares oil and gas to be the property of all of the Iraqi people and Article 112 only mentions equitable distribution of oil and gas from existing fields. In any event, some form of consultation with the national government seems necessary, because, among other things, Article 112 also provides that the national government together with the regions and provinces that have national resources are supposed to set oil and gas policy.

Thus, under the Constitution, the KRG seems to have the better legal argument respecting its deal with Hunt Oil, which was signed, it should be noted, after the KRG passed its own oil and gas law. Baghdad appears to have no exclusive sovereignty over the exploration of new fields. Moreover, the question of appropriate revenue distribution under the Constitution is not at issue because the KRG's oil and gas law requires national distribution of any revenues received, and the KRG has pledged to adhere to this in connection with the Hunt Oil deal.

Yet while the oil minister hardly seems to be in a very strong legal position to block the deal, surely the KRG's response to his claims, which are that the minister should tend to his own affairs and deal with the substantial problems inherent in the oil industry outside of Kurdistan, is hardly legally defensible as well. If these resources are truly the property of the Iraqi people, and oil policy is decided in connection with the national government, then surely some form of oversight, monitoring or at least extensive detailed consultation with the national government is necessary. How else is the national government to know what oil is part of the "existing fields", whether the figures respecting barrels sold are accurate, along which pipelines the oil is sent, and so forth. Even the terms of the deal have not been disclosed publicly, information that would be vital to setting oil policy.

To date, the parties have not engaged in meaningful dialogue of any kind on these matters, at least in public. This writing so far as I know is the only one that even begins to touch on the legal issues in any depth. The oil minister and the KRG have made clear their differing views on the legality of the deal, without providing the basis for their positions. And the dispute has not yet involved the Sunni Arabs who are neither in government nor in the Kurdish region in large numbers and who are therefore likely to be even more opposed to the oil deal, let alone any future oil deal signed by a potential Shi'i region. This is hardly an encouraging start to the development of the industry.

One can imagine myriad ways in which disputes of this sort could be resolved. The parties could meet and seek to reach some sort of agreement respecting the level of control Baghdad should have over new oil fields. They could define by legislation what is and is not an existing field. They could organize a program of oil exploration and industry development with input from both national and regional sources to the satisfaction of all parties. Alternatively, they could rely on national courts, or create alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, to address their differences.

The paradox, being, of course, that this requires the very spirit of trust and mutual cooperation whose absence in Iraq is the very appeal of the loose federalist vision. If the trust were to somehow emerge, loose federalism would be irrelevant. In the absence of trust, as the Hunt Oil dispute shows, loose federalism is impossible. In considering the legal difficulties that lie ahead for revenue sharing, as represented in microcosm by the Hunt Oil case, and the odd expectation of loose federalists that these matters can be overcome while Iraq's communities will continue to be at odds with one another, I am reminded of the economist who found himself on a desert island with only a single, unopened can of food. His solution, much like that of the loose federalists, was seductively appealing in its simplicity, elegance and logic. "I'll just assume a can opener," he said.

Haider Ala Hamoudi is a professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. The American-born son of Iraqi parents, he has lived and worked in Iraq and has been a legal advisor to the Iraqi government.

JURIST - Forum: The Hunt Oil Dispute and the Future of Iraqi Federalism

Iraq: al-Qaeda group threatens Sunnis

An al-Qaeda front group warns it will hunt down and kill Sunni Arab tribal leaders who cooperate with the U.S. and its Iraqi partners in the wake of the assassination of the leader of the revolt against the terror movement.

In a separate statement, the Islamic State of Iraq announced a new offensive during Ramadan, the Muslim holy month of fasting that began this week. The statement said the offensive was in honor of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of al-Qaeda in Iraq who was killed by a U.S. airstrike in June 2006.

The statements were posted Friday and Saturday on Islamist websites, and among other things claimed responsibility for the assassination of Abdul-Sattar Abu Risha, who spearheaded the uprising against al-Qaeda in Anbar province west of the capital.

In claiming responsibility for Abu Risha's death Thursday, the Islamic State said it had formed "special security committees" to track down and "assassinate the tribal figures, the traitors, who stained the reputations of the real tribes by submitting to the soldiers of the Crusade" and the Shiite-led government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

"We will publish lists of names of the tribal figures to scandalize them in front of our blessed tribes," the statement added.

In a second statement posted Saturday, the purported head of the Islamic State, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, said he was "honored to announce" the new offensive in memory of the "martyr Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the beginning of Ramadan," which started for Iraqi Sunnis on Thursday and for Shiites the following day.

"Today we are on the door steps of a new era ... Today we witness the fallacy of the Western civilization and the renaissance of the Islamic giant," al-Baghdadi said in a half hour audio file.

U.S. officials hope Abu Risha's death will not reverse the tide against al-Qaeda, which began last year when he organized Sunni clans to fight the terror movement, producing a dramatic turnaround in Ramadi and other parts of Anbar province.

The revolt has spread to Sunni insurgent groups in Baghdad, Diyala province and elsewhere. Some insurgents who were ambushing U.S. troops a few months ago are now working alongside the Americans to rid their communities of al-Qaeda.

Iraq: al-Qaeda group threatens Sunnis - USATODAY.com

First The Surge And Then The Stab

To understand what's really happening in Iraq, follow the oil money, which already knows that the surge has failed.

Back in January, announcing his plan to send more troops to Iraq, President Bush declared that “America will hold the Iraqi government to the benchmarks it has announced.”

Near the top of his list was the promise that “to give every Iraqi citizen a stake in the country's economy, Iraq will pass legislation to share oil revenues among all Iraqis.”

There was a reason he placed such importance on oil: Oil is pretty much the only thing Iraq has going for it. Two-thirds of Iraq's GDP and almost all its government revenue come from the oil sector. Without an agreed system for sharing oil revenues, there is no Iraq, just a collection of armed gangs fighting for control of resources.

Well, the legislation Bush promised never materialized, and on Wednesday attempts to arrive at a compromise oil law collapsed.

What's particularly revealing is the cause of the breakdown. Last month the provincial government in Kurdistan, defying the central government, passed its own oil law; last week a Kurdish Web site announced that the provincial government had signed a production-sharing deal with the Hunt Oil Co. of Dallas, and that seems to have been the last straw.

Now here's the thing: Ray L. Hunt, the chief executive and president of Hunt Oil, is a close political ally of Bush. More than that, Hunt is a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a key oversight body.

Some commentators have expressed surprise at the fact that a businessman with very close ties to the White House is undermining U.S. policy. But that isn't all that surprising, given this administration's history. Remember, Halliburton was still signing business deals with Iran years after Bush declared Iran a member of the “axis of evil.”

No, what's interesting about this deal is the fact that Hunt, thanks to his policy position, is presumably as well-informed about the actual state of affairs in Iraq as anyone in the business world can be. By putting his money into a deal with the Kurds, de****e Baghdad's disapproval, he's essentially betting that the Iraqi government — which hasn't met a single one of the major benchmarks Bush laid out in January — won't get its act together. Indeed, he's effectively betting against the survival of Iraq as a nation in any meaningful sense of the term.

The smart money, then, knows that the surge has failed, that the war is lost, and that Iraq is going the way of Yugoslavia. And I suspect that most people in the Bush administration — maybe even Bush himself — know this, too.

Light a fire under al-Maliki

After all, if the administration had any real hope of retrieving the situation in Iraq, officials would be making an all-out effort to get the government of Prime Minister Nouri Kamal al-Maliki to start delivering on some of those benchmarks, perhaps using the threat that Congress would cut off funds otherwise. Instead, the Bushies are making excuses, minimizing Iraqi failures, moving goal posts, and, in general, giving the Maliki government no incentive to do anything differently.

And for that matter, if the administration had any real intention of turning public opinion around, as opposed to merely shoring up the base enough to keep Republican members of Congress on board, it would have sent Gen. David Petraeus, the top military commander in Iraq, to as many news media outlets as possible —not granted an exclusive appearance to Fox News on Monday night.

Bush not trying very hard

All in all, Bush's actions have not been those of a leader seriously trying to win a war. They have, however, been what you'd expect from a man whose plan is to keep up appearances for the next 16 months, never mind the cost in lives and money, then shift the blame for failure onto his successor.

In fact, that's my interpretation of something that startled many people: Bush's decision last month, after spending years denying that the Iraq war had anything in common with Vietnam, to suddenly embrace the parallel.

Here's how I see it: At this point, Bush is looking forward to replaying the political aftermath of Vietnam, in which the right wing eventually achieved a rewriting of history that would have made George Orwell proud, convincing millions of Americans that our soldiers had victory in their grasp but were stabbed in the back by the peaceniks back home.

What all this means is that the next president, even as he or she tries to extricate us from Iraq — and prevent the country's breakup from turning into a regional war — will have to deal with constant sniping from the people who lied us into an unnecessary war, then lost the war they started, but will never, ever, take responsibility for their failures.
Paul Krugman is a columnist for The New York Times.

TheDay.com - First The Surge And Then The Stab

Sadr group to pull out of Iraq's ruling Shiite bloc

The movement of radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr said on Saturday it has decided to withdraw from the Shiite bloc that leads the Iraqi government.

"The Sadr bloc will hold a press conference in Najaf this evening where it will anounce its decision to withdraw from the Shiite alliance," Sadr spokesman Saleh al-Obeidi told AFP.

The United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) initially comprised four key Shiite factions -- the Sadr group, the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council of Iraq, the Dawa party and the Fadhila party -- and held 130 seats in the 275-member parliament.

However, the number dropped to 115 when the Fadhila party pulled out in March.

The Sadr bloc has 32 seats in parliament.

Sadr group to pull out of Iraq's ruling Shiite bloc - Yahoo! News

Iraq Sunni party expels MP who rejoined cabinet
Iraqi Islamic Party takes action against Ali Baban for returning to Maliki's cabinet.

BAGHDAD - The leading Sunni Arab faction in the Iraqi parliament said on Saturday it had expelled an MP after he rejoined the Shiite-led government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.

The Iraqi Islamic Party, headed by Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi, took the action against Planning Minister Ali Baban after he announced on Thursday that he was returning to Maliki's cabinet.

Baban was among five Sunni Arab ministers and a deputy prime minister who began a boycott of the cabinet on August 1.

"The Iraqi Islamic Party urged Ali Baban to change his decision, but it was useless," the party said in a statement.

"So the party decided unanimously to discharge him and to end relations with him. We now bear no responsibility for any of his actions."

It added that it did not accept people who "are not committed to our decisions totally."

The Iraqi Islamic Party is the largest faction in the National Concord Front, the main Sunni Arab bloc in the 275-member parliament.

The bloc pulled out its ministers after accusing the government of failing to rein in Shiite militias and of the arbitrary arrest and detention of Sunnis.

Baban in announcing his decision to return to the government said the boycott was sending "a wrong message" and was effectively serving as a "punishment" for Iraqis.

Middle East Online

I was looking at the title of this thread. Think tank and discussion.
Seems like most of what we are seeing is copy and paste from internet news.
I suppose this is a good thing.

What do you guys think?

You need internet to read this.

Discussion is a good idea but you need members to contribute to discuss.

Al-Qaeda Announces Responsibility for the Assassination of Sheikh Abu Reesha

The so called Islamic State of Iraq which is related to al-Qaeda terrorist organization announced its responsibility on the assassination of al-Anbar Awakening Conference Head Sheikh Sattar Abu Reesha on Thursday by a bomb explosion near his house in al-Ramadi city.

The security authorities imposed a state of emergency in al-Anbar Province after the assassination process where 2 of the sheikh’s escorts were killed too.

PUKmedia :: English - Al-Qaeda Announces Responsibility for the Assassination of Sheikh Abu Reesha