Thread: Iraq/Dinar News. 09/05 to 01/14/07

This is an old article and probably has been posted... but it just shows you why the Dinar can't RV low and that Iraq has such a huge potential if they can get their shiite together...






Middle East Economic Survey



VOL. XLVIII

No 31

1-August-2005



Iraq: Oil Plans and Policy



By Tariq Shafiq



The following paper was presented by Tariq Shafiq at a conference organized by the Open Society Institute and London School of Economics, “Iraq Oil Wealth: Issues of Governance and Development”, from 29 June to 1 July. Mr Shafiq, a petroleum techno-economic consultant, is a director of Petrolog & Associates, Chair of Fertile Crescent Oil Company and al-Mansour Petroleum Consulting Company, and a former Executive Director and Vice Chairman of Iraq National Oil Company.



The history of Iraq’s oil and its industry is an interesting one, though sad in some respects. The oil concession agreements were the product of the First World War and the invitations for the return of the IOCs to work in partnership with a government establishment, though a healthy road to pursue, were the product of the Gulf war and the UN sanctions. In the post-Saddam era, new plans and policies for a democratic market-based society are in the making. Oil plans and policy guidelines prepared by the previous transition government of Ayad 'Alawi were not implemented and are expected to be taken up by the present government. Tentative plans and policies have been converted into non-binding memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with international oil companies (IOCs). But there is a fear that oil and gas agreements based on such MOUs could have latent prejudicial effects unless strict and transparent tendering processes, deriving their legitimacy from a petroleum law, are eventually adapted and applied. However, it is expected that an oil policy and hydrocarbon law will be subject to due democratic processes. Two years have passed in a turbulent warlike atmosphere during which senior officials in the Ministry of Oil have issued statements indicating oil plans and policy. This paper suggests oil plans and policy guidelines – intended as suggestions for deliberation and discussion.



1. Iraq Oil In A Global Context

The following table uses generally accepted reserves and cumulative production figures for January 2004; but potential reserves were estimated at 20% of proven oil reserves, while allowing Petrolog & Associates’ studied estimate of 216bn barrels for Iraq’s potential discoverable reserves. The table provides a conceptual example of Iraq’s oil reserves in a global context for the case where world proven reserves have been upgraded from the assumed 35% average recovery to 50%, which is well within the grasp of today’s oilfield management technology. However, the conceptual conclusions derived herein remain valid in other scenarios where such proven reserves are not upgraded.



Table

Proven Oil Resource Base At Recovery Assumed 50% + Potential

(Bn Barrels)



Country
Produced
Produced % Total
Proven + 15% & Potential
Total

UAE
22.1
15
132.7
149.0

Kuwait
34.2
21
133.2
159.5

Iran
55.5
32
173.6
171.3

Iraq
29.1
8
349.3
368.4

Saudi Arabia
99.8
23
358.0
432.5

ME Majors
240.7
22
1,146.8
1,087.2

World
957.0
36
1,677.0
2,634.0




The conceptual conclusions derived from the Table may be summarized as follows:

Iraq’s cumulative oil production to-date is only a small fraction, some 8%, of its oil resource base, which puts Iraq, whose oil production started seven decades ago, behind the UAE, where oil production started some three decades ago.


Iraq’s oil reserve is on a par with world leader Saudi Arabia, and its oil resource base is not far behind.


Iraq’s oil resource base may constitute 30% of the total Middle East major five producers and some 21% of world total reserves.


Iraq and the ME majors, whose production thus far is only 22% of their total reserve resource, will be able to sustain upward production rates for many years to come.


With Iraq’s total production at 8% of proven reserves it can continue its upward production rate to10mn b/d and beyond to12mn b/d, plowing in part of its potential reserves, when other ME majors will have passed their reserve midpoint and started to decline.


Iraq, however, is a founding member of OPEC and rightly adopts its policy of crude oil price stabilization and conservation through control of its production and export. Thus far and perhaps until its production reaches its post maximum of 3.5mn b/d, it may remain outside OPEC production quota. Thereafter, Iraq will have to choose between price and volume. OPEC quota could then be a limiting factor against an open production policy, especially when there are IOCs which need to produce to optimum capacity to enhance the return on their investment. Iraq’s oil reserves are of the order of 330bn barrels. It would take 300 years to exhaust its rehabilitated production of 3mn b/d, 180 years at 5mn b/d and 90 years at 10mn b/d.

2. Iraq’s Oil Policy

Iraq’s oil industry is the most efficient wealth-creating instrument. Its low discovery and development costs, in the order of $0.5/B and $0.5-1.0/B respectively, according to Petrolog & Associates studies, provide high income at all levels of oil prices and especially from those in the bracket of $22-28/B and above into $50-60/B today.



Thus, with the near total dependence of the state on oil income, simple logic dictates the requirement for a pivotal state-owned oil industry, with the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) as its commercial and technical operating arm, especially in view of its highly successful past. INOC accomplished capacity build-up from 1.5mn b/d in the early 1960s to 3.5mn b/d by 1979 and a discovery rate in excess of 6bn barrels/year (over 1972-77), matching global records.



However, in view of Iraq’s desperate need for fast-track oil development, up-to-date technology transfer, personnel training, and large capital investment, at a time when the country is in dire need of capital income, it is logical to permit a wise degree of IOC involvement, working jointly with INOC. IOCs could work independently from INOC on risky exploration if this is in the best interest of the state; but always with a ‘local content’. The latter case may well be very limited as Iraq’s need first is production capacity growth rather than oil exploration due to the availability of ample proven reserves which can support up to 10mn b/d. Capacity growth, in turn, would be limited to the country’s economic and social capital development requirement and the Ministry of Oil’s capability for regulatory and supervisory duties.



At this juncture, it would be appropriate to review the history of oil concessions in Iraq to gain insight into successes and lessons from the past. The history of the Iraq Petroleum Company’s (IPC’s) formation and the way that shares were distributed between the British, French, Dutch and American companies, are evidence of the role of politics in the Middle East in acquiring oil concession rights during and after the First World War. The major oil concessions had common ownership, which permitted effective control and common features. Examples of the latter are: extended periods of exploration and exploitation – IPC in Iraq had 75 years, KOC in Kuwait 92 years, Aramco in Saudi Arabia 66 years; frozen terms over the long life of the concession; large concessionary areas without relinquishment – most of Iran, almost all of Iraq and Saudi Arabia and all of Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar; and exclusive rights for the concessionaire to carry out operations without sufficient obligations governing the exercise of these rights, at the expense of basic government rights in vital matters such as tax and royalty, company plans and application of best oil industry practices.



Most of these features changed during the 1950s, 60s and 70s, under new circumstances and collective pressure from the host countries through OPEC. Nationalization was achieved by the late 60s and early 70s as a result of collective bargaining under OPEC’s umbrella. Iraq alone negotiated outside of OPEC, with nationalization in the early 70s resulting from an accumulation of unresolved disputes and consequences of law No 80 of 1961. Middle East concessionary agreements could not live out their term, since from the start they were not balanced, and some clauses (Iraq’s 20% participation as an example) were written so as to make their application impossible.



In most countries there was a state monopoly over the oil industry, and only a few have permitted partnerships with IOCs. The return of the IOCs in Saudi Arabia is limited to the E&D of gas, in Iran only under service contracts of buyback terms and conditions, while in Iraq invitations to IOCs since the mid-1990s have fluctuated between production-sharing agreements (PSAs) and buybacks. IOCs, including many majors, flocked to Baghdad at the invitation of the government after the Gulf War and until the end of the Saddam regime in March 2003. Only the Chinese and the Soviets signed agreements, while the remainder had draft accords; but none carried out operations on the ground due to UN-enforced sanctions. A further ‘legacy’ of Saddam’s regime is the potential of disputes over these agreements.



In the present turbulent circumstances in Iraq there is consensus amongst Iraqis, the government and most IOCs, against entering into long-term oil exploration or production agreements until there is a legally and democratically elected government, recognized by the international community, with a constitution and a petroleum law in place.



Below are suggested plans and oil policies:

The Ministry of Oil, in the absence of due democratic processes in making policy, should consult an Iraqi think-tank, made up of competent national oil technocrats, in an atmosphere of constructive debate. Rules and procedures for incorporating advice and consultation from the think-tank must be worked out and selection should be based solely on merit and without conflicts of interest.


It is important in such an exercise that constructive dialogue is encouraged, and opinions expressed without discrimination or incrimination, in order to arrive at an optimal oil policy.


Oil policy and plans must ensure optimum benefits to the nation, which is the rightful proprietor of this depleting asset. They should be prepared with the utmost care and diligence over a sufficient period of time in order to allow for constructive debate.


‘The hydrocarbon resources are inalienable and imperceptible property of the state,’ to quote from the old INOC Charter. In other words, petroleum is a non-renewable depleting asset, meriting conservation, optimum fiscal reward, as well as among other things, participation of INOC and inclusion of the ‘national content’, which should be built into every contract, with IOCs limited to the extent of the competitiveness of Iraq oil exploration and development.


Such ‘national content’ should promote and/or build: participation of national private oil companies, services and manufacturing industries; transfer of knowledge, management and technology; and local research and technical institutions. The above elements of national content have already been applied in major national oil industries such as those of Norway, Iran and Russia to the extent of 51%.


For the above reasons and in order to compensate for petroleum depletion as a source of income, investment in other economic endeavors should be made to ensure continuity of income from other resources. Once this is achieved, there is room for lesser dependence on a state upstream oil monopoly.


Ensure oil and gas conservation practices and give due regard to health, safety and environment protection throughout the exploration and exploitation and related operations.


Encourage gas development and give it a prominent role in meeting at least the domestic energy consumption needs.


Partnership of the national oil industry with IOCs is the best option to expedite building Iraq’s oil industry to dimensions commensurate with its huge resource base, catching up with the latest state-of-the-art technology and management, acquiring the necessary investment capital, and speeding up the realization of benefits through efficiency and healthy co-operation.


IOCs and foreign contractors require stability and security, law and order, assurance for the safety of their personnel and capital investment, and a fair return on investment, among other legitimate requirements.


‘Managing the hydrocarbon resource of Iraq, which belongs to all the people of all the regions and governorates of Iraq, in consultation with the governments of the regions and administrations of the governorates, and distributing the revenues resulting from their sale through the national budget in an equitable manner proportional to population throughout the country, and with due regard for areas that were unjustly deprived of these revenues by the previous regime, for dealing with their situation in a positive way, for their needs, and for the degree of development of the different areas of the country,’ in accordance with the law for administration during the transition period. While a reasonable degree of devolution of power will be necessary when issuing licenses, tendering and negotiating agreements should remain the prerogative of the central organization.


Oil and gas laws, in a hydrocarbon law, and regulations should derive their legitimacy from a constitution enacted through due international, democratic and legal processes. However, in the interim period, there is consensus of opinion that rehabilitation of the petroleum production system and its restoration to past levels, and ongoing production and development operations of short term consequence by the Ministry of Oil and its contractors, should proceed.


Contractual modes can be one of many suitable forms which include: buyback, other forms of service contracts and PSAs which preserve the ownership for the state of the petroleum resource in the ground. One may be more suitable than another for particular circumstances. Production-sharing, though, appears to have wider and more favorable acceptance by IOCs and host countries. The most important criteria, however, in all forms remains: the fiscal return to both parties, the share to each party, the extent of national content and degree of other economic and fringe benefits to the nation, the degree of control of the government to exercise and maintain administration and supervision without infringing on the company’s rights to carry out its operation effectively and efficiently.


Tendering should be the only process for selecting companies interested in working on E&D and related projects. Tenders should be comprehensive and announced to a well defined time schedule. This should involve general information and meetings with interested parties. Interested bidders should submit pre-qualifications, as only pre-qualified parties should be invited to bid. They should be given equal opportunity to access comprehensive databases. Bids should be evaluated, and shortlisted bidders be given a fair chance for discussions leading to selection of the winner. The procedure, evaluation, discussions and decision-making should be fair and transparent. Assigning a payable fee to the bids and access to database is advisable to eliminate the less serious parties and improve the quality of the bids.


Agreements between the state organization and IOCs must be written and applied in good faith, and balanced and fair in order to reduce potential disputes and endure the test of time. They may permit reviews in the light of justified changes in circumstances governing taxation, royalty, and profitability and market conditions amongst others.


No member of a consortium should have incompatible interests with the other members or with the host country’s vital oil industry’s objectives, which could curtail its investment and retard the consortium’s E&D obligations.


Iraq, with its high proven oil reserves, is capable of building up to 10mn b/d; but this may require almost two decades to achieve. Given its urgent need for production growth while the country is in dire need of capital investment, output expansion should be based on existing proven reserves, with risky exploration taking second place. While IOCs’ involvement is desirable, their insistence on high-reward and long-duration contracts may necessitate their presence being deferred, given current circumstances in Iraq.


Production capacity growth is most economically achieved in the medium term from developed oilfields which have multiple producing formations beside the main pays – the only developed formations – and through the use of enhanced oil industry management to optimize the recovery from the main pays and to correct their damage, wherever possible.


Last but not least, oil policy, plans and organizations ought to be as dynamic as the technical and marketing nature of the industry. They ought to be depoliticized and appointments should be solely on merit. Transparency and accountability must be paramount.

Privatization?

I have excluded privatization of the oil upstream as a means to raise capital or provide benefits, for the following reasons:

Privatization is equated today with denationalization, whether partially or 100%. Iraq’s economy is almost totally dependent on its oil income. With decision-making for exploration, production and exports in the hands of the multinationals, Iraq’s economy and its government’s decisions would be at their mercy – and their interests are naturally first to their shareholders. Also there are numerous disadvantages of the kind discussed earlier: possible incompatibility with the national interest under future conditions; and potential use of their power to slow activities or switch supply to other countries when it best serves their interests.


There is no advantage gained from privatization by way of investment capital, technology, or efficiency that cannot be obtained from other contractual arrangements.


Decisions made over the characteristics of the deposits and their source-base depends not only on economic or technological criteria, but also on political, historical and cultural considerations. The overwhelming majority of Iraqi oil technocrats are against privatization of the upstream.


Finally, denationalization runs against the grain of almost every Iraqi – a significant consideration in any future democratic Iraq.

The last Prime Minister, Ayad 'Alawi, tried to formulate an oil policy which appears to have been abandoned.

He intended to remove the E&D and related operations from the ministry and allocate them to a newly established INOC, whose operations, however, would be limited to existing oil producing fields, with the prospect of its partial privatization with shares.


He emphasized expediting the entry of IOCs to start developing undeveloped fields on a modified type of PSA that bars a state entity becoming a party in it, resulting in transferring decision making on oilfield development and consequently Iraq’s future income to IOCs or private companies, thus forfeiting control of price stabilization and production, at a time when Iraq would still be depending mainly on oil income.


He called for cutting the negotiating period needed to optimize contract terms and conditions, assuming that what may not be gained but given to other countries can be extracted later on the basis of the most favored nation clause. But this clause existed during the concessionary contracts era when the majors dominated the concession agreements, in an oligarchic market which had common terms and conditions, so that improvement in any one country was passed on to the others. Today’s agreements in different countries are not necessarily similar, and the players and host countries have multiplied in number. After all, the terms and conditions of each contract are unique to the country and to particular exploration and development, and rewards reflect associated costs and risks, amongst others.


To his credit, however, he appreciated and promoted the requirement for a vital policy issue: ‘Local content’ is to be encouraged in order to develop Iraqi private enterprise where he even suggested preferential treatment to Iraqi service companies.


However, his vital policy lines would have run counter to the terms of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) annex that governs the transitional governments, since it prohibits contracts that impact the long-term development of the country, with the exception of negotiating debt reduction.

3. INOC

INOC was established by law No11 of 1964 with the objective of:

‘Establishing a national oil industry that would serve as basis for future oil exploitation activities in the areas of which the rights of exploitation have been restored to the State by Law No 80 of 1961.’


‘Laying down of the ground work necessary for the growth and development of the industry so as to create an advanced oil economy not limited in scope to exploration of crude oil but extending to effective engagement in the various phases of the oil industry.’

Its Law stipulated that:

In view of the importance of the oil reserves of which the rights of exploitation are expected to be granted to INOC, the law has stipulated that the company’s capital shall be purely governmental, in keeping with the principle of sovereignty over mineral resources of the state that are natural monopolies. This, however, shall not preclude the company, acting within a statuary framework, from making use of other capital, domestic or foreign, through loans or through partnership of various forms of business cooperation with concerns or organizations concerned with oil development, should this be warranted by the magnitude of capital needed, marketing exigencies or the technological requirement of construction.


Further, since it is necessary that the company enjoys financial and administrative independence for it to be able to perform most efficiently its diverse and steadily-growing task so as to achieve the purposes for which it is established, the law has stressed the company’s independence in those spheres.

However, since the early 1970s the oil industry has been nationalized and all the country has come under the jurisdiction of INOC. These are objectives and stipulations which remain as valid today as they were then, albeit with some modification in line with the country’s market-oriented policy. Accordingly, the following principles are suggested for a future INOC charter:

INOC should be a fully state-owned independent company (administratively and financially), entrusted with the task of managing and developing Iraq’s upstream and downstream petroleum industry in all its phases inside and outside the country, but not including the manufacturing and petrochemical industry.


INOC should perform its duties and obligations in accordance with the state petroleum policy. Proper interpretation of adherence to government policy should remain the prerogative of the minister of oil. However, when in difference the matter should be resolved by the Higher Petroleum Council of Ministers.


The present operating oil and refining companies should be detached from the Ministry of Oil and attached to INOC.


INOC should have an independent board of directors made up of members from among the heads of the North and South oil companies, and the refining directorate, plus top petroleum technocrats and other qualified personnel. The chairman and managing director should have ministerial status.


The government should allocate INOC a capital budget and authorize it to borrow from domestic or foreign markets. The first budget should be commensurate with one year’s operation, plus the capital investment required for its first year of operation (as is the case normally). It may then be taxed in such a way as to leave it a return commensurate with a commonly acceptable management fee, or be allowed a fixed fee on each barrel produced during a transition period (say five years). Thereafter, it should be taxed on the same basis as IOCs operating in the country.


The company, for the purpose of achieving its objectives, should have the right to establish companies inside and outside the country, singly or jointly with other parties, or participate in existing companies.


The company should be granted exemptions from all taxes and duties in respect of the performance of its functions, which are customarily granted to IOCs in host countries.


However, petroleum resources shall continue to be the inalienable and imperceptible property of the state.

In line with the country’s market-based economy, INOC and the Ministry of Oil should examine and recommend to the Higher Petroleum Council of Ministers, after consultation with the think-tank, partial or total privatization (with safeguards to the employees) of some of the downstream and non-pivotal upstream companies, which may include the maintenance and/or services but not the main operating oil companies or strategic functions such as the pipeline transportation.

Originally Posted by AlwaysDreaming
Over at IIF, Dinartime did an interesting comparison of the IQD and the Kuwait dinar.

Kuwait

Dinartime is all about ISX, he actually wants a very low reval, and will argue for and push the ISX thing to no end.

well alsabaah should update in about an hour or a little after if they actually update.

26 November 2006 (Aljazeera)
Nuri al-Maliki, the Iraqi prime minister, has called on the rival sectarian factions in his national unity government to end the disputes that he said were behind violence last week that claimed the lives of more than 200 people.

The attacks in Sadr City last Thursday were the deadliest in Baghdad since the 2003 US invasion.

Berating all the political leadership - rather than armed groups as he has in the past - al-Maliki told a news conference: "The ones who can stop a further deterioration and the bloodshed are the politicians.

"Let's be honest - the security situation is a reflection of political disagreement."
Opposition

Dhafir al-Ani, an opposition MP for the mainly-Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front, disagreed with al-Maliki and told Aljazeera.net that the politicians were helpless and prisoners of the wills of their respective communities and militias.

Al-Ani said: "The politicians in Iraq created the militias and utilised them for their own purposes, but they became like Frankenstein’s monster. They are not listening to their creators and have their own agendas and feared warlords.

"We are not practicing proper parliamentary activities, because we are afraid from those in the street. Unfortunately, we have a violent, armed-to-the-teeth street."

The Iraqi Accordance front is the third largest bloc in the Iraqi parliament, after the Shia Unified Iraqi List, and the Kurdish bloc.

Arab summit

Foreign ministers of countries neighbouring Iraq will meet at the Arab League in Cairo on December 5 to talk about ways to stop the violence, the Egyptian foreign ministry said on Sunday.

It will be the first such meeting since nine ministers - from Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey - met in the Iranian capital of Tehran in July.
The summit plans follow a meeting between Dick Cheney, the US vice president, and King Abdullah in Saudia Arabia, which is believed to have been part of a US attempt to seek help from Iraq's neighbours and also followed proposals that the US opens a dialogue with Iran and Syria about Iraq.

An Egyptian foreign ministry statement said: "This meeting must come out with a clear Arab position on the current events in Iraq ... rejecting all forms of violence, fanaticism and sectarianism."

But analysts say that with the exception of Iran, which has close relations with Shia Muslim politicians, the neighbours have limited influence over events in Iraq, where about 100 people a day are dying in sectarian and political violence.

Iraq government 'can end crisis' | Iraq Updates

Just maybe they will get a handle on the violence

Originally Posted by Caroline

I've been traveling for the past week. Am I to understand that there is no info at this moment on a new auction? The last one was the one with only 6 banks participating, right?

Sure hoping to get some fantastic news VERY soon!

But for now.....no new auction???

Caroline

Last up date was 23nov06. Nothing new as of then.

Announcement No.(812)
D.G. of Foreign Exchange Control

The 812 daily currency auction was held in the Central Bank of Iraq day Thursday 2006 / 11/ 23 so the results were as follows :
Details Notes
Number of banks 6 -----
Auction price selling dinar / US $ 1441 -----
Auction price buying dinar / US $ ------ -----
Amount sold at auction price (US $) 5.290.000 -----
Amount purchased at Auction price (US $) ------
Total offers for buying (US $) 5.330.000 -----
Total offers for selling (US $) ------ -----

Originally Posted by Dinar Madness

Just maybe they will get a handle on the violence

With Maliki saying he wouldn't do anything about the militias until next year I wouldn't count on it. He has too go. I wouldn't doubt it if he puts it off even longer in January if he's still around.

Originally Posted by explorerhot

Maybe you know more than me. I didnt see anything about the ISX in that post,but it was a confusing post and I might have missed it. Dinar Time goes through Warka porxy program for ISX from what I remember, and I don't think they have a referal program.
Im not a big IIF fan,every other post has a face on it and a negitive slant, but i still go there every now and then as I have a warka account and ISX through warka and there are alot of ISX investors that are positive on ISX investment. Before everybody thinks me a traitor... I LOVE ROLCLUB
I feel the ISX could be big if everything happens right and I am able to sell in the future and have them actually send my $$ back to me.. A gamble,but what a payoff if all goes right. I hold Dinars in hand also, just incase.

So who's warka's proxy? How many proxies are dealing with Warka? Who owns these proxy companies? What legal recourse do you have if those proxy companies close shop and disappear without a trace? Do you have anything besides e-mails to prove ownership of stocks? Do you receive any official confirmation/statement of accounts aside from e-mails from these proxy companies? Did you figure these out? You can't hold Warka liable since they're just a conduit, you're really sending your hard earned cash to the proxy companies and using warka as a bank and transfer point. Warka is just executing your written instructions. Did you even check the fundamentals of the companies you're investing in? Did you do your research on reverse stock splits? Be careful who you're dealing with in these forums. Don't be so trusting, do your own research.

Reval the currency to stabilize the economic situation and you will see an improved security situation. JMHO. They need to reval now and high to make a difference.

Crowds Maliki throwing stones and government calls for calm

(Voice of Iraq) - 11-26-2006
This issue was sent to a friend

BAGHDAD (Reuters) - throwing Shiites ANGRY parade Shiite Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki stones in the Shiite neighborhood of Baghdad on Sunday, an expression of the anger of a car bomb explosion in Baghdad led to the destruction of their neighborhood.

Al-Maliki was visiting the poor neighborhood of Sadr City to attend the ceremony to pay tribute to the memory of fallen about 202 victims of the bombings that took place last week.

One of the men shouted, "It Jtek" while angry words fell on the al-Maliki with a crack through his convoy through the crowd.

This neighborhood is a stronghold of the Mahdi Army militia loyal to Shiite leader Moqtada Sadr.

Although the violence was limited, the demonstration was fraught with emotions, which seeks Maliki and his coalition government to contain them in the wake of the explosions that took place in the neighborhood, which was considered the most bloody since the American invasion and the subsequent retaliatory attacks.

Police said that a car bomb had exploded on Sunday, killing six people and injuring more than 20 in market south of Baghdad directly.

The mortar shells resounded again in different regions of the state capital of tension despite the curfew, which kept the seven million people inside their homes for the third day. The population of most individual incidents.

The government had said that the curfew was lifted as of Monday morning, but returned and appealed for calm after a series of high-level meetings.

In a joint statement called on the leaders of the Shiites, Kurds and years the Iraqi people not to allow those who want to deprive them of the Security Bvsm closer unity.

He accused the Maliki government factions themselves to reignite the conflict. He said three days prior to meeting with the American President George W. Bush for the discussion of how to establish stability and to start withdrawing American forces that violence highlights the "political crisis".

He said al-Maliki, frustrated because of differences within his government and the war of words between the leaders of the Sunnis and Shiites, "If we want to return things to their essence, the political crisis and stop the deterioration of security and the bloodshed in Iraq will depend on political agreement."

But he added that this will not happen "unless the parties were satisfied that there is no winner and loser in this battle."

He said in statements aired on television, "The security situation reflection of the lack of political consensus."

My Iraqis frustrated by the inability of Washington-Maliki on improving the security situation, or economic Since his appointment in April as a compromise after months of disagreement over the formation of the government between Shiite bloc Almhenmh Parliament.

Aides say to the owners, in turn, is frustrated because of the hardening of attitudes and support for armed groups from the year before leaders and allies such as the Shiite al-Sadr who rely on him to preserve the office.

It erased the American and Iraqi governments to Jordan that the summit would go ahead despite the claim by Sadr wants immediate withdrawal of the American owners to boycott the talks.

Originally Posted by DayDream

Let me be a little more specific. On the fxstreet.com site there is an article called: "Suggestions of a summit meeting in Iran this weekend with Syria and Iraq" Tue, 21 Nov 2006 09:59:44
Now at the bottom is this...

Today’s most interesting chart:
LME spot Platinum Record high as rumours that an exchange-traded fund is to be introduced.
Published on Sun, 26 Nov 2006 22:42:32 GMT

Any clue what this is? And is it related somehow to our investment?
Maybe something...Maybe nothing.

Suggestions of a summit meeting in Iran this weekend with Syria and Iraq

Cheers!
DayDream

The chart is spot Platinum - and it reached a high of 1395 the other day. This won't have anything to do with the Dinar.

However, the fact that they are talking about a summit meeting in Iran about Syria and Iraq may be something worthwhile to watch. Since that headline was dated Tue, 21 Nov 2006, has anyone seen news on a summit meeting this past weekend?

Originally Posted by goldraker

Theft and extortion of banks unchecked
1.15 million Dollars Robbed from Rafidain Bank
24/11/2006
Source: Translated by IRAQdirectory.com

The banker, Fouad Al-Hasani, President of the Iraqi Banks Association and the Executive Director of the Iraqi Credit Bank whom the Kuwaiti National Bank owns 85% of its shares, described the condition of the sector in Iraq as very difficult, and the performance of banks has become absolutely exceptional, which requires exceptional protection in light of the daily fears of workers being exposed to risks in the absence of effective precautionary measures to be provided by the authorities concerned.

Al-Hasani talked about the continuous robberies, extortion and kidnapping against Iraqi banks without any practical deterrent to stop those committing them, and most of them are members of gangs that have become a daily threat to the security of the citizen, the State and its institutions. He referred in this connection to the unknown armed robbery last Friday at a branch of the governmental Rafidain Bank in Bratha at Utteiffia north of Baghdad, killing three members of the Iraqi police and one of the members of the protection of installations; then they broke into the bank and stole 650 billion Iraqi dinars ($ 1.15 million) after they broke the safe using oxygen gas, as the investigations revealed.

Al-Hasani explained that the Iraqi Banks Association has a full visual of the necessary procedures needed to protect the sector "we look for more effective actions taken by the security institutions to protect the sector. The Association has prepared a report in this regard and its content was discuss with several bodies especially institutions relevant to the sector; on top of which: the Ministry of Finance and the Central Iraqi Bank, where duty requires assume full responsibility in the protection of government and private banks alike and to serve the goal of protecting public and private funds ". He added that several banks had "been subjected to acts of armed robbery and theft of funds and assets during the first days of the recent war on Iraq. The lawlessness increased after the recurrence of such incidents despite the imposition of strict security escorts on banks ", but Al-Hasani pointed to the need to adopt unconventional measures to protect the sector commensurate with the nature of the worsening security situation in the country.

This can't be right! Well I certainly hope not. They are stating here that they stole 650 billion dinars? Or = to 1.15 USD? Well those numbers do not match. However if they did in fact take 650 billion dinars that could be a BIG problem!

Ya, i also found this strange and posed a question regarding it a few days ago...

At the current rate (1441:1) these numbers just do not add up. 650 billion dinars is approximately 5% of printed currency!!

So, let's assume the thieves took 1.15 million because USD is the more valuable note. Also, somone could walk away with that much USD in a large duffel bag. That amount in dinars (1.15 million usd x 1441 = 1.6 billion dinars) might take a truck to carry away.

Either way, the security in banks has got to get better - remember if you have money in an Iraqi bank and it gets stolen, you might be outta luck. There is no FDIC insurance on deposits. Correct me if i'm wrong...