Thread: Iraq/Dinar News. 09/05 to 01/14/07

Posted by: saleem on Saturday, January 06, 2007 - 04:11 PM

Kurdistan-Parliament
Kurdistan parliament winter recess delayed for 15 days
By Chiman Salh
Arbil, Jan 6, (VOI)- Iraq’s Kurdistan parliament decided a 15-day-delay to its winter recess to give legislators time to finalize debates set for draft laws on the parliament agenda, an official at Kurdistan parliament said on Saturday.
“Kurdistan parliament will convene on Sunday and continue sessions until January 16 for finalizing draft laws on the parliament’s agenda for this term,” the media spokesman for the parliament speaker, Tareq Jawhar, told the independent news agency Voices of Iraq (VOI).
The Winter recess was scheduled to start as of 1st January till early March but it is now delayed till January 16, the spokesman added.

Originally Posted by MrsCK

OH THE FINGERS OF 'BUSH'S' RUN DEEP IN MANY THINGS AND THIS MAKES ME BELIEVE MORE THAT I RESEARCH THESE OIL COMPANIES GOING INTO IRAQ THAT IS THE """"TRUE REASON"""" BUSH PASSED THE LAW THE AMERICAN PEOPLE COULD INVEST IN IRAQ TO COVER THEIR TAILS!

ALSO HERE IS ANOTHER PART OF HISTORY THAT WAS A BIT SHOCKING WHEN I FOUND IT:
Much of the Bush family wealth came from supplying needed raw materials and credit to Adolf Hitler's Third Reich. Several business operations managed by Prescott Bush - the president's grandfather - were seized by the US government during World War II under the Trading with the Enemy Act.

On October 20, 1942, the federal government seized the Union Banking Corporation in New York City as a front operation for the Nazis. Prescott Bush was a director. Bush, E. Roland Harriman, two Bush associates, and three Nazi executives owned the bank's shares. Eight days later, the Roosevelt administration seized two other corporations managed by Prescott Bush. The Holland-American Trading Corporation and the Seamless Steel Equipment Corporation, both managed by the Bush-Harriman bank, were accused by the US federal government of being front organizations for Hitler's Third Reich. Again, on November 8, 1942, the federal government seized Nazi-controlled assets of Silesian-American Corporation, another Bush-Harriman company doing business with Hitler.

better watch out unearthing bad things about dubya or you might have yourself an uprising among the dinar forums.

Sotaliraq.com

The new plan differs from its predecessors and the government stresses

(Voice of Iraq) - 06-01-2007
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Military : new plan differs from its predecessors and the government to disarm militias

Al-Hamad of Zahi
Baghdad - (Voices of Iraq)
The spokesman said the media on behalf of the Ministry of Defense today, Saturday, that the Iraqi government has placed the final touches on a military plan which will soon be implemented in source in the Iraqi government that the government is keen on disarming the militias.
He also explained the military in a telephone conversation with the News Agency (Voices of Iraq) Independent that "the government is counting on the new security plan for the security being different from previous plans in terms of mechanisms and implementation."
The military did not reveal a difference for security reasons, he said.
The military, "the plan include wider powers for commanders in the field who will oversee the implementation" and said, "and that Iraqi forces would be tasked to implement on the ground with the task of the multinational force attribution only."

On the other hand source high in the Iraqi government (of the votes of Iraq) that "the government will be keen on disarming the militias."

Mushir out that "this course is supported by the United States of America."
Asked why the Prime Minister beaten iron hand source said that "the prime minister intended to political parties that try to disrupt the ongoing political process in Iraq through its media discourse."

He explained that "the government would be keen to activate the Terrorism Act and subject statements firearms owners to legal accountability."
He emphasized that "the statements of some politicians responsible others that contributed to widening the gap between the various components of the Iraqi street."

The source explained that "the Iraqi Parliament will not hesitate to lift the immunity of anyone who tries to kindle the Iraqi street, through statements, which he described as undisciplined."

Stressing that "the Iraqi street will be felt clear changes in the level of violence in Iraq."
N p

To escalate or not to escalate? In Tehran's ruling circles, these days, that is the question. The question has come up in response to the resolution passed by the United Nations' Security Council in the dying days of last year, imposing a range of sanctions on the Islamic Republic.

Tehran's initial reaction was to dismiss the resolution as "unimportant and ineffective". President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called it "a piece of worthless paper", indicating that he might just live with it.

Read from almost any angle the resolution is, indeed, a paper tiger, if that. It looks more like a sop to an aggrieved Bush administration than a serious attempt at exerting pressure on a regime that feels it is in the ascendancy as a future regional hegemon and more. Ahmadinejad's initial reaction was right on spot. In any case, Ahmadinejad has based his strategy on avoiding a direct confrontation with the United States until President George W Bush leaves office. This is because he believes that Bush, who has imposed regime change in two of Iran's key neighbours, is an atypical American leader, and that whoever succeeds him will revert to the traditional US policy of ducking confrontation.

Nevertheless, the Islamic Republic has its own internal political dynamics- one often ignored by analysts abroad. Ahmadinejad has built his entire reputation on his promise to transform the Islamic Republic into the "core power" of a new bloc of Muslim nations capable of taking on the "infidel" West and ending its centuries' long domination of the world. Thus, he cannot allow the humiliation inflicted upon him by the UN, no matter how mild, to go unanswered. His political foes, including the business-mullahs of Tehran, are already jeering at his pusillanimity.

"We cannot be treated this way," says Hashemi Rafsanjani, leader of the business-mullahs who has vowed in private to destroy Ahmadinejad's political career.

The business-mullahs had lobbied hard to make sure that their own private assets abroad would not figure on the list of Iranian assets frozen by the UN. Thanks to efforts by Russia and China, which have substantial commercial ties with the business-mullahs, the Security Council modified the text of the resolution to that effect.

Beyond the symbolic moves already announced, it is unlikely that the Islamic Republic will take any drastic measure in response to the resolution before the issue is fully debated in the closed circles of the establishment. Even then, the final word would come from the "Supreme Guide" Ali Khamenehi whose position was reinforced in last month's election of the Assembly of Experts. (In that election Ahmadinejad failed to secure the extra seats that he needed to replace Khamenehi.)

Khamenehi has always been a cautious player by instinct. In 1989, he even had the courage to challenge, albeit briefly, the late Ayatollah Khomeini's murder fatwa against the British novelist Salman Rushdie. (He quickly changed tack when Khomeini attacked him in public by saying he should return to the seminary to learn his theological lessons better!).

More importantly, Khamenehi has no particular dog in the domestic political fight at present. He is safe for at least another eight years- that is to say until the next election for the Assembly of Experts. And, reports that he is building up his son as a possible successor can be dismissed as malicious Tehran rumour. Awakened Ahmadinejad would suit Khamenehi's interests just fine, but not if that is achieved through a major international crisis that could threaten the very existence of the regime.

By avoiding further escalation, Khamenehi could confound the advocates of regime change both inside and outside Iran. At the same time he would achieve the Islamic Republic's goal of building the "surge capacity" that it needs to build nuclear weapons if and when it so decides. The weak resolution passed by the UN provides ample scope for endless diplomatic manoeuvring for the next five to six years, the time span that the Islamic Republic supposedly needs to fully master the military aspects of the nuclear technology.

As always since the Khomeinist revolution of 1979, the interests of Iran as a nation-state are not always identical to those of Iran as the embodiment of a revolution. The interest of Iran as a nation-state at this juncture dictates a prudent and proportionate response to the UN resolution with the clear intention of avoiding further escalation.

Te interest of the revolution, however, is to show that the Islamic Republic can give as food as it gets. As Ahmadinejad said before the resolution was passed, the Islamic Republic would bestow "double punishment" on those that defied it.

Under the compromises that made the resolution possible, Iran's response will be assessed within 60 days. And that coincides with the end of the biggest annual festival of radical groups that Tehran has hosted since 1980. Leaders of virtually all revolutionary movements- from the Peruvian Shining Path to the Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah, and passing by a dozen residual Stalinist parties in Europe and Latin America, will gather in Tehran to pay tribute to Khomeini and coordinate their strategies for fighting "American Imperialism."

Known as the 10 Days of Dawn, the revolutionary jamboree this year hopes to attract a number or prominent anti-American and anti-Bush figures such as Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez, Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe, and anti-Bush activists such as Noam Chomsky and Michael Moore.

Can Ahmadinejad appear at such a feast and claim the global leadership of the anti-American movement while his administration is seen in to be in retreat against the "Great Satan"? Would Ismail Haniyah of Hamas continue to believe Ahmadinejad's promise of wiping Israel off the map when the Iranian leader is seen unable to protect his own nation's interests?

Paradoxically, the business-mullahs, often portrayed by their Western lobbyists as " moderates" or even "reformers" are the ones currently pressing for escalation. Their strategy is clear: further escalation would plunge Iran's already ailing economy into full crisis, demoralise Ahmadinejad's radical base, and open the way for the return of the business-mullahs to power within the next two to three years, if jot earlier.

Iran is already feeling the psychological effects of a still hypothetical escalation. In the past two week, Iranian Hajj pilgrims in Saudi Arabia have been shocked to find out that the Iranian currency, the rial, is no longer accepted by moneychangers there. Worse still, the Iranian rial is also disappearing from Iraqi markets where it has fallen by almost 20 per cent against the Iraqi dinar.

All that means that Tehran would now have to come up with dollars or euros to finance its clients and agents throughout the region, especially in Iraq, Lebanon and the Gulf.

The argument used by the business-mullahs is simple: avoiding escalation could mean slow economic strangulation for the Islamic Republic. Thus, it is better to raise the stakes now and force a resolution one way or another as quickly as possible. And it that means the end of Ahmadinejad's dream of creating an " Islamic Superpower", so much the better.


As in so many other junctures in the past quarter of a century , Iran is once again reaching a point at which interests as a nation clash with the interests of the revolution that has captured control of the machinery of state. For ran as a nation not to be harmed it is essential that the Khomeinist revolution die its inevitable death. Ahmadinejad is ready to sacrifice Iran as a nation at the altar of the revolution. The business-mullahs are ready to sacrifice both at the altar of their interests. Khamenehi's attitude remains a mystery. For. In his position, he is supposed to represent both the nation and the revolution.
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Sotaliraq.com

Arab League continue consultations to hold reconciliation conference

(Voice of Iraq) - 06-01-2007
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Arab League continue consultations for the convening of a conference on Iraqi National Accord

Cairo-Voice of Iraq - Ibrahim Mohammad Sharif

The Secretary General of the Arab League Amr Moussa that the main problem in Iraq lies in the accuracy of the wedge which has been among the Iraqi sects Therefore, it is vital to continue the reconciliation efforts and that the Iraqi Arab League is to hold a national reconciliation conference in Baghdad as soon as possible to prevent the deterioration of the situation any more.

This was stated by Adviser Alaa Rushdi Spokesman for the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States said that the talks with Mr. Amr Moussa gun Drnovsek President of the Republic of Slovenia, Mr. gun Jansa and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovenia on the issues relating to the situation in the Middle East before the ambassadors accredited in the world who attended the ceremony annual conference, which was held in Slovenia.

The Rushdie that the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States has stated that the Middle East faces many challenges can be summarized into three main items first peace and solidarity in the region and the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq, Sudan, Somalia and Iran's nuclear dossier and the second issue of modernization in the Arab world and the third item on relations with the Arab world the West knows conflict of civilizations.

Originally Posted by rvalreadydang

Will the Iraqi parliament seek to lay the evaluation foundations of a new monetary unit all over again? Or will the dinar remain weak against the dollar? And to what level will the Iraqi economy deteriorate if its spinal column, represented by the dinar, can not withstand to be straight up any more?(Source)AlSabah

this part here, is what caught my eye, i beleive it's an older article and maybe even mixed with the author's views on it

I was reading an article lately about the setup of the currency system. They could also had chosen to use only USD I believe, but they have chosen for also an own currency.

So the currency can be weak and ill as they describe, but we know it is made ill by a program rate and dollarization.

I think that increasing the value of the dinar dramatically will make a lot of people change their dollars for iraqi dinars.

We recently have read that GoI institutions and business are now only allowed to use the Iraqi Dinar.

One issue we never mention and that is overlooked, but in my opinion also very important,
is their National Pride.

That is why they have chosen for a own currency years ago and I believe that they want to show the world again that Iraq is a nation with a strong currency like the good old years.

I believe that is what they will do and are going to do!

This is an old article (July 4,2006) and may have been posted back then, but I thought I would re-visit it. (just the last part of it anyway). Why? Because...I LIKE IT!!

Middle East: Innocent as charged

end of article.....

Meanwhile, current investment plans in the region are impressive. The GCC, Iran and Iraq is already planning over USD 1.2 trillion in projects in the next 10 years. At a whopping 143% of 2005 GDP, with over 40% of this (around 60% of GDP) planned in the next two years, this clearly shows the intent of the countries to invest heavily in their economies, which should, over time, reduce the level of current account surpluses in the region, especially as oil prices come down to more sustainable levels.

These efforts are already reflected in strong import growth with all countries seeing growth in double-digits in 2004 and 2005 and only Kuwait expected, according to the IMF, to see growth slow below this threshold in 2006. Therefore, it is much easier to point to concerns of excessive investment spending than it is to suggest that the oil producing nations in the region should be more extravagant.

The second prong of criticism is the lack of exchange rate flexibility. While in the context of local requirements (seizing control of monetary policy and thus protecting the economies from excessive swings in the economy), we believe this criticism could be valid, in the context of global imbalances greater exchange rate flexibility would have a marginal impact.

As is well known, the huge current account surpluses are caused by the surge in international oil prices. As these are priced in USDs, a local currency appreciation would have no impact on oil revenues. There are two transmission mechanisms via which such a currency appreciation could, in theory, help address global imbalances. First, a currency appreciation would increase the international purchasing power of local currency revenues, which could boost imports. Second, the non-oil sector would suddenly become less competitive, reducing non-oil exports to the further benefit of imports.

However, for these to have a sizeable impact on global imbalances, the currency shifts would have to be dramatic and this would 1) reduce the value of the region's foreign asset holdings (which are largely denominated in USDs) and 2) undermine crucial diversification efforts. Therefore, our advice to the region, and to Saudi Arabia as its representative in the IMF's consultative process, is to follow China's lead and liberalise (dictionary.com=Generous in amount; ample) exchange rate regimes in accordance with domestic fundamentals rather than based on international pressure. While we would prefer this reform to start sooner rather than later in some countries, given the fact that real interest rates are still negative in the UAE and Qatar, the reality is that the single currency project is likely to mean that a shift in policy ahead of 2010 is unlikely.

For complete article see link below.

Middle East: Innocent as charged | SCB Economic Update

Cheers!
DayDream

Didn't know if already posted!


For the first time, a real blueprint for peace in Iraq
By Ali Allawi, former Iraqi Defence Minister
Published: 05 January 2007

The Iraqi state that was formed in the aftermath of the First World War has come to an end. Its successor state is struggling to be born in an environment of crises and chaos. The collapse of the entire order in the Middle East now threatens as the Iraq imbroglio unleashes forces in the area that have been gathering in virulence over the past decades.

It took the American-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, and the mismanagement of the country by both the Coalition Provisional Administration and subsequent Iraqi governments, to bring matters to this dire situation.

What was supposed to be a straightforward process of overthrowing a dictatorship and replacing it with a liberal-leaning and secular democracy under the benign tutelage of the United States, has instead turned into an existential battle for identity, power and legitimacy that is affecting not only Iraq, but the entire tottering state system in the Middle East.

The Iraq war is a global predicament of the first order and its resolution will influence the course of events in the Middle East and beyond for a considerable time. What we are witnessing in Iraq is the beginning of the unravelling of the unjust and unstable system that was carved out of the wreckage of the Ottoman Empire. It had held for nearly 100 years by a mixture of foreign occupation,outside meddling, brutal dictatorships and minority rule.

At the same time, it signally failed in providing a permanent sense of legitimacy to its power, engaged its citizens in their governance, or provided a modicum of well-being and a decent standard of existence for its people.

The Key Challenges

The nature and scope of the Iraq crisis can be encapsulated in the emergence of four vital issues that have challenged the entire project for remaking the Iraq state. In one form or another, these forces also affect the countries of the Arab Middle East, as well as Turkey and Iran, and the relationships between all of them.

Firstly, the invasion of Iraq tipped the scales in favour of the Shia, who are now determined to emerge as the governing majority after decades, if not centuries, of perceived disempowerment and oppression. The consequences of this historic shift inside Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East are incalculable.

Secondly, the invasion of Iraq legitimised the semi-independent region that Iraq's Kurds had forged over the past decade. The Kurds whose rights to self-determination were acknowledged in the 1920 Sevres Treaty, and then subsequently ignored by the states of the post-Ottoman Middle East, have received an enormous fillip in their march towards recognition of their unique status.

What is still left to be decided is the geographic extent of the Kurdish region in Iraq, and whether it would have proprietary access to the resources of that area. This may prove a way station to the beginnings of the formation of a Kurdish state. The challenges that will pose to the integrity and self-definition of Turkey, Iran and Syria now or in the future is another formidable side effect of the overthrow of the old Baathist state.

Thirdly, the uneven, poorly prepared and messy introduction in Iraq of democratic norms for elections, constitution-writing and governance structures is a stark break with the authoritarian and dictatorial systems that have prevailed in the Middle East. While the Iraqi experiment has so far been marred by violence, irregularities and manipulation, it is quite likely to survive as the mechanism through which governments will be chosen in the future.

Lastly, the overthrow of Saddam coincided with the attempts by Iran to assert its influence and to gain entry into regional counsels. That has exercised a number of countries in the area no end, giving rise to alarmist warnings of Iranian hegemonistic designs and "Shia crescents". The responses that are being planned for the perceived threat are terrifying in their implications, with scant attention paid to their consequences to the peace and stability of the area.

Iraq was used as a foil to revolutionary Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, with devastating consequences for both. We are witnessing a possible reprise, the consequence of which, if the new warmongers get their way, will be catastrophic for it will go to the heart of the fragile societies of the Middle East. Shia will be pitted against Sunni not only in Iraq but in Lebanon, and the Gulf countries.

Dangers of Sunni Insurgency

In the sterile world of zero-sum politics, the loss of power of the Sunni Arab community in Iraq was soon translated into a raging insurgency that challenged not only the US occupation but also the new political dispensation.

The insurgency fed on the deep resentment Sunni Arabs felt to their loss of power and prestige. It has been aggravated by the fact it was a totally unexpected force that achieved the impossible- the dethronement of the community from centuries of power in favour of, as they saw it, a rabble led by Persianate clerics. The Sunni Arabs' refusal to countenance any serious engagement with the new political order had effectively pushed them into a cul-de-sac and has played into the hands of their most determined enemies.

The state is now moving inexorably under the control of the Shia Islamists, albeit with a supporting role for the Kurds. The boundaries of Shia-controlled Baghdad are moving ever westwards so that the capital itself may fall entirely under the sway of the Shia militias.

The only thing stopping that is the deployment of American troops to block the entry of the Shia militias in force into these mixed or Sunni neighbourhoods. The geographic space outside Baghdad in which the insurgency can flourish will persist but the country will be inevitably divided. Under such circumstances, the power of the Shia's demographic advantage can only be counter-balanced by the Sunni Arabs' recourse to support from the neighbouring Arab states. It is inconceivable that such an outcome can possibly lead to a stable Iraqi state unless one side or another vanquishes its opponent or if the country is divided into separate states.

Impact of Shia Ascendancy

The response to these existential challenges emanating from the invasion of Iraq, both inside Iraq and in the Arab world has been panic-stricken or fearful, and potentially disastrous to the stability in the area and the prospects for its inhabitants.

The Arab countries of the Middle East have been unable to adjust to events in Iraq, not so much because of the contagion effect of the changes that have taken place there. This had virtually disappeared as Iraq cannot be seen as model for anything worth emulating. It has less to do with the instability that might spill over from the violence in the country. It is more to do with accommodating an unknown quantity into a system that can barely acknowledge pluralism and democracy, let alone a Shia ascendancy in Iraq.

Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, linchpins of the American security order in the Arab world, cannot accept the principle of a Shia-dominated Iraq, each for its own reasons. They will do their utmost to thwart such a possibility, and failing that, will probably try to isolate such an entity from regional counsels

Implications for Middle East

It is this with this backdrop that solutions are being proffered to resolve the Iraqi crisis. However, rather than treat the problem in a much wider context, each party is determined to stake out its narrow position irrespective of its effects on other communities, groups and countries.

The seeds of another 100 years of crisis are being sown, with the Middle East consigned to decades of turbulence and the persistence of unmitigated hatreds and grudges. The most serious issue that is emerging is the exacerbation of sectarian differences between Shia and Sunni. That is a profoundly dangerous issue for it affects not only Iraq but also Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon and the Gulf countries.

It is plausible that the cost of a Shia ascendancy in Iraq, if it is marked as such, will be further pressure on the vulnerable Shia communities in the Gulf countries. There is already the rekindling of anti-Shia rhetoric in a remarkably similar rerun to the pattern that accompanied the Saudi-led campaign to contain the Iranian revolution in the 1980s. The effect of that was the rise of the jihadi culture that was the harbinger of mass terrorism and suicide bombings.

This may drag the entire area into war or even the forced movement of people as fearful countries seek to "quarantine" or expel their Shia population.

The Solution

It requires genuine vision and statesmanship to pull the Middle East from its death spiral. The elements of a possible solution are there if the will exists to postulate an alternative to the politics of fear, bigotry and hatred.

The first step must be the recognition that the solution to the Iraq crisis must be generated first internally, and then, importantly, at the regional level. The two are linked and the successful resolution of one would lead to the other.

No foreign power, no matter how benevolent, should be allowed to dictate the terms of a possible historic and stable settlement in the Middle East. No other region of the world would tolerate such a wanton interference in its affairs.

That is not to say that due consideration should not be given to the legitimate interests of the great powers in the area, but the future of the area should not be held hostage to their designs and exclusive interests.

Secondly, the basis of a settlement must take into account the fact that the forces that have been unleashed by the invasion of Iraq must be acknowledged and accommodated. These forces, in turn, must accept limits to their demands and claims. That would apply, in particular, to the Shias and the Kurds, the two communities who have been seen to have gained from the invasion of Iraq.

Thirdly, the Sunni Arab community must become convinced that its loss of undivided power will not lead to marginalisation and discrimination. A mechanism must be found to allow the Sunni Arabs to monitor and regulate and, if need be, correct, any signs of discrimination that may emerge in the new Iraqi state.

Fourthly, the existing states surrounding Iraq feel deeply threatened by the changes there. That needs to be recognised and treated in any lasting deal for Iraq and the area.

A way has to be found for introducing Iran and Turkey into a new security structure for the Middle East that would take into account their legitimate concerns, fears and interests. It is far better that these countries are seen to be part of a stable order for the area rather than as outsiders who need to be confronted and challenged.

The Iraqi government that has arisen as a result of the admittedly flawed political process must be accepted as a sovereign and responsible government. No settlement can possibly succeed if its starting point is the illegitimacy of the Iraqi government or one that considers it expendable.

A Brighter Future

The end state of this process would be three interlinked outcomes. The first would be a decentralised Iraqi state with new regional governing authorities with wide powers and resources.

Devolution of power must be fair, well planned, and executed with equitable revenue-distribution. Federal institutions would have to act as adjudicators between regions. Security must be decentralised until such time as confidence between the communities is re-established.

The second essential outcome would be a treaty that would establish a confederation or constellation of states of the Middle East, initially including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. The main aim of the confederation would be to establish a number of conventions and supra-regional bodies that would have the effect of acting as guarantors of civil, minority and community rights.

The existence of such institutions can go a long way towards removing the anxiety disadvantaged groups feel when confronted with the radical changes sweeping the area. The gradual build up of such supra-national institutions in the proposed confederation may also expand to cover an increased degree of economic integration and harmonisation.

That may include a regional development body which would help establish and fund common energy and infrastructure policies. Lastly, an indispensable end outcome is a regional security pact that would group the countries of the Arab Middle East with Iran and Turkey, at first in some form of anti-terrorism pact, but later a broader framework for discussing and resolving major security issues that impinge on the area as a whole.

That would also provide the forum for combating the spread of virulent ideologies and sectarian hatreds and provide the basis for peacefully containing and resolving the alarm that some countries feel from the apparent expansion of Iranian influence in the area.

The Importance of the US

It was the US that launched this phase of the interminable Middle East crisis, by invading Iraq and assuming direct authority over it. Whatever project it had for Iraq has vanished, a victim of inappropriate or incoherent policies, and the violent upending of Iraq's power structures.

Nevertheless, the US is still the most powerful actor in the Iraq crisis, and its decisions can sway the direction and the manner in which events could unfold.

In other areas of the world, the US has used its immense influence and power to cement regional security and economic associations. There is no reason why the regional associations being mooted in conjunction with a decentralised Iraqi state, could not play an equally important part in resolving the Iraqi crisis and dispersing the dangerous clouds threatening the region.

The Iraqi proposals

1 Iraq government calls for regional security conference including Iraq's neighbours to produce an agreement/treaty on non-intervention and combating terrorism. Signatory states will be responsible to set of markers for commitments.

Purpose: To reduce/eliminate neighbouring countries' support for insurgents, terrorists and militias.

2 Iraq government calls for preparatory conference on a Middle-Eastern Confederation of States that will examine proposals on economic, trade and investment union. Proposals will be presented for a convention on civil, human and minority rights in the Near East, with a supreme court/tribunal with enforcement powers.

Purpose: To increase regional economic integration and provide minorities in signatory countries with supra-national protection.

3 Iraq government calls for an international conference on Iraq that would include Iraq, its regional neighbours, Egypt, the UAE, the US, UK, France, Germany, Russia and China that would aim to produce a treaty guaranteeing:

a. Iraq's frontiers.
b. The broad principles of Iraq's constitutional arrangements.
c. Establishing international force to replace the multi-national force over 12 to 18 months. Appointing international co-ordinator to oversee treaty implementation.

Purpose: To arrange for the gradual and orderly withdrawal of American troops, ensure that Iraq develops along constitutional lines, confirm Iraq and its neighbours' common frontiers.

4 Iraq government will introduce changes to government by creating two statuary bodies with autonomous financing and independent boards:

a. A reconstruction and development council run by Iraqi professionals and technocrats with World Bank/UN support.
b. A security council which will oversee professional ministries of defence, interior, intelligence and national security.

Purpose: To remove the reconstruction and development programme from incompetent hands and transfer them to an apolitical, professional and independent body. Also to remove the oversight, command and control over the security ministries from politicised party control to an independent, professional and accountable body.

5 The entire peace plan, its preamble and its details must be put before the Iraqi parliament for its approval.

For the first time, a real blueprint for peace in Iraq

Originally Posted by rvalreadydang

Will the Iraqi parliament seek to lay the evaluation foundations of a new monetary unit all over again? Or will the dinar remain weak against the dollar? And to what level will the Iraqi economy deteriorate if its spinal column, represented by the dinar, can not withstand to be straight up any more?(Source)AlSabah

this part here, is what caught my eye, i beleive it's an older article and maybe even mixed with the author's views on it

You are probably dead on about the author's views, it reeks of speculation.
I know it is from a Dealer's site, and they quoted Al Sabah (Probably loosely). I just like the fact that people like to keep emphasizing the weakness of the dinar. Only helps us out!

Thanks again!

Tazman613

I just saw on another site that cbi may not open until the 9th now?? Anyone else hear this?